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ABSTRACT
ETHICAL MACHINE LEARNING:
FAIRNESS, PRIVACY, AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi
Michael Kearns
Aaron Roth
Large-scale algorithmic decision making has increasingly run afoul of various social norms,
laws, and regulations. A prominent concern is when a learned model exhibits discrimination against some demographic group, perhaps based on race or gender. Concerns over
such algorithmic discrimination have led to a recent flurry of research on fairness in machine learning, which includes new tools for designing fair models, and studies the tradeoffs
between predictive accuracy and fairness. We address algorithmic challenges in this domain.
Preserving privacy of data when performing analysis on it is not only a basic right for users,
but it is also required by laws and regulations. How should one preserve privacy? After about
two decades of fruitful research in this domain, differential privacy (DP) is considered by
many the gold standard notion of data privacy. We focus on how differential privacy can
be useful beyond preserving data privacy. In particular, we study the connection between
differential privacy and adaptive data analysis.
Users voluntarily provide huge amounts of personal data to businesses such as Facebook,
Google, and Amazon, in exchange for useful services. But a basic principle of data autonomy
asserts that users should be able to revoke access to their data if they no longer find the
exchange of data for services worthwhile. The right for users to request the erasure of
personal data appears in regulations such as the Right to be Forgotten of General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). We
provide algorithmic solutions to the the problem of removing the influence of data points
from machine learning models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Are algorithms ethical? Algorithms are replacing humans in a wide variety of tasks such
as recidivism prediction, hiring, and granting loans, to name a few. These algorithms1 are
trained on people’s data and are used to make decisions about them—decisions that can
have material impact on their well-being. Without any constraints, algorithms are developed to achieve a desired objective such as maximizing accuracy for a certain prediction
task. However, algorithms do not enjoy a sense of morality like people to know whether
certain decision about an individual is ethical. In fact, researchers have observed that algorithms can be unethical in several aspects. They can leak information about an individual’s
data in their output and hence invade their privacy [130]. It also has been observed that
some predictive algorithms that are used by big corporations such as Facebook exhibit discriminatory behavior against certain populations [5, 86]. These phenomena call for enforcing
algorithms to act according to some standard moral and ethical principles: in today’s world,
with the increasing impact of artificial intelligence on our lives, algorithms must be trained
to achieve their desired objective subject to the constraint that they are ethical.
Given the existing evidences that algorithms can act unethically, the past few years have
seen an increasing interest from government agencies to officially require organizations and
businesses who have access to people’s data follow certain rules and principles regarding data
usage and processing. For example, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is
a regulation in the European Union since 2016, provides certain principles that companies
with access to customers’ data must comply with. These principles include Lawfulness,
Fairness, and Transparency, as well as Integrity and Confidentiality, and the Right to be
Forgotten.
1

More precisely, the predictive models output by the algorithms.

1

This thesis is focused on developing algorithms that are ethical, and thereby complying with
the existing regulations. More precisely, it addresses theoretical and practical challenges in
enforcing ethical and societal constraints such as fairness when designing machine learning
algorithms. The thesis is divided into three parts which are discussed below.
Part I: Fairness in Machine Learning . The first part of the thesis will focus on
developing machine learning algorithms that do not discriminate across individuals, or based
on sensitive attributes such as race or gender. The challenges that will be solved in this
domain include proposing strong yet actionable notions of fairness, as well as the technical
challenge of designing algorithms that are fair with respect to, say, race, when access to
race data is prohibited by laws or policies.
The first question that we will focus on is the following: what does it mean to be fair? The
community studying fairness in machine learning has yet to settle on definitions. Statistical
notions of fairness are the most popular class of definitions in the literature, in large part
because they can be easily checked and enforced on arbitrary data distributions. These definitions partition individuals into “protected groups” (often based on race, gender, or some
other protected attribute) and ask that some statistic of the learned classifier (error rate,
false positive rate, positive classification rate, etc.) be approximately equalized across those
groups. These definitions of fairness, despite their popularity, are subject to the following
criticisms: 1) They only guarantee that the average person from each protected group is
treated similarly, and so provide very weak promises to individuals. 2) They often impose
constraints of equalizing group error (false positive, false negative, etc.) rates which may
require artificially increasing the error on at least one group, without any corresponding
benefit to any other group—this is a cost that we are willing to pay in the name of equity. Part of this thesis is focused on addressing these issues regarding statistical notions of
fairness, which are discussed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
The majority of works in fairness assume that access to sensitive attributes such as race
or gender is given to us. But what if access to sensitive attributes is limited? There are
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various settings in which there is a desire to train a model that is fair with respect to some
sensitive feature, but in which the values for these features are unavailable in the training
data. This might be for legal reasons (e.g. in the United States it is against the law to
use race as an input to consumer lending models), or for policy reasons (e.g. many large
consumer-facing organizations choose not to ask their customers for such information). This
leads to an apparent technical conundrum: How can we be fair by race if we don’t have data
about race? We give answers to this question in Chapters 4 and 5.
Part II: Data Privacy and Beyond . This part of the thesis addresses challenges in
designing practical algorithms for data analysis tasks that must also satisfy differential
privacy, which is by many the gold standard notion of data privacy. We will also focus
on how differential privacy can be useful beyond preserving data privacy. For instance, it
has been shown that differentially private data analysis can help avoid overfitting, which
is an important concern in statistics and data science that can invalidate many statistical
discoveries.
Many data analysis pipelines are adaptive: the choice of which analysis to run next depends on the outcome of previous analyses. Common examples include variable selection
for regression problems and hyper-parameter optimization in large-scale machine learning
problems: in both cases, common practice involves repeatedly evaluating a series of models
on the same dataset. Unfortunately, this kind of adaptive re-use of data invalidates many
traditional methods of avoiding over-fitting and false discovery, and has been blamed in
part for the recent flood of non-reproducible findings in the empirical sciences [58]. There
is a simple way around this problem: don’t re-use data. This idea suggests a baseline called
data splitting: to perform k analyses on a dataset, randomly partition the dataset into k
disjoint parts, and perform each analysis on a fresh part. Unfortunately, this natural baseline makes poor use of data. A recent literature [12, 44] shows how to give a significant
asymptotic improvement over this baseline via a connection to differential privacy: rather
than computing and reporting exact sample quantities, perturb these quantities with noise.

3

This line of work established a powerful transfer theorem, that informally says that any
analysis that is simultaneously differentially private and accurate in-sample will also be
accurate out-of-sample, i.e., with respect to the distribution. Unfortunately, thus far this
literature has had little impact on practice. One major reason for this is that although the
more sophisticated techniques from this literature give asymptotic improvements over the
data splitting baseline, the concrete bounds do not actually improve on the baseline until
the dataset is enormous. In Chapter 6, we give a novel proof of the transfer theorem connecting differential privacy and in-sample accuracy to out-of-sample accuracy. Our proof is
simpler than the proofs proposed by prior work, gives key structural insights that can be
used elsewhere, and in particular yields an improved concrete bound that beats the data
splitting baseline at dramatically smaller data set sizes compared to prior work.
Part III: The Right to Be Forgotten

. After a machine learning model is trained on

a data set, there might be requests for deleting certain individual data points. This part of
the thesis will focus on developing algorithms that can efficiently make a machine learning
model “forget” the influence of an individual’s data, upon their deletion request.
What does it mean to delete data? It is straightforward to delete a customer’s data from a
database and stop using it to train future machine learning models. But what about models
that have already been trained using an individual’s data? These are not necessarily safe; it
is known that individual training data can be exfiltrated from models trained in standard
ways via model inversion attacks [55, 130, 139]. Regulators are still grappling with when a
trained model should be considered to contain personal data of individuals in the training
set and the potential legal implications. In 2020 draft guidance, the U.K.’s Information
Commissioner’s Office addressed how to comply with data deletion requests as they pertain
to machine learning models: If the request is for rectification or erasure of the data, this
may not be possible without re-training the model...or deleting the model altogether [74].
Retraining the model every time a deletion request is received can be prohibitive in terms
of both time and money—especially for large models and frequent deletion requests. The
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problem of data deletion (also known as machine unlearning) is to find an algorithmic middle
ground between the compliant but impractical baseline of retraining, and the potentially
illegal standard of doing nothing. An unlearning algorithm iteratively updates models as
deletion requests come in, with the twin goals of 1) having computational cost that is
substantially less than the cost of full retraining, and more importantly 2) the “unlearning
guarantee” that the output models are (almost) indistinguishable from the models that would
have resulted from retraining. The notion of indistinguishability that we and prior work
adopt is a differential privacy like notion of statistical indistinguishability that asks that the
distribution of the models output by the unlearning algorithm be close to the distribution of
the models that would have resulted from fully retraining. We will show how we can provide
efficient algorithmic solutions for the machine unlearning problem in Chapters 7 and 8.

5

I

Fairness in Machine Learning

Chapter 2
Average Individual Fairness
This chapter proposes a new family of fairness definitions for classification problems that
combine some of the best properties of both statistical and individual notions of fairness. We
posit not only a distribution over individuals, but also a distribution over (or collection of)
classification tasks. We then ask that standard statistics (such as error or false positive/negative rates) be (approximately) equalized across individuals, where the rate is defined as
an expectation over the classification tasks. Because we are no longer averaging over coarse
groups (such as race or gender), this is a semantically meaningful individual-level constraint.
Given a sample of individuals and classification problems, we design an oracle-efficient algorithm (i.e. one that is given access to any standard, fairness-free learning heuristic) for
the fair empirical risk minimization task. We also show that given sufficiently many samples, the ERM solution generalizes in two directions: both to new individuals, and to new
classification tasks, drawn from their corresponding distributions. Finally we implement our
algorithm and empirically verify its effectiveness.

2.1. Introduction
The community studying fairness in machine learning has yet to settle on definitions. At a
high level, existing definitional proposals can be divided into two groups: statistical fairness
definitions and individual fairness definitions. Statistical fairness definitions partition individuals into “protected groups” (often based on race, gender, or some other binary protected
attribute) and ask that some statistic of a classifier (error rate, false positive rate, positive
classification rate, etc.) be approximately equalized across those groups. In contrast, individual definitions of fairness have no notion of “protected groups”, and instead ask for
constraints that bind on pairs of individuals. These constraints can have the semantics that
“similar individuals should be treated similarly” ([39]), or that “less qualified individuals
should not be preferentially favored over more qualified individuals” ([77]). Both families of
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definitions have serious problems, which we will elaborate on. But in summary, statistical
definitions of fairness provide only very weak promises to individuals, and so do not have
very strong semantics. Existing proposals for individual fairness guarantees, on the other
hand, have very strong semantics, but have major obstacles to deployment, requiring strong
assumptions on either the data generating process or on society’s ability to instantiate an
agreed-upon fairness metric.
Statistical definitions of fairness are the most popular in the literature, in large part because
they can be easily checked and enforced on arbitrary data distributions. For example, a
popular definition ([22, 68, 99]) asks that a classifier’s false positive rate should be equalized
across the protected groups. This can sound attractive: in settings in which a positive
classification leads to a bad outcome (e.g. incarceration), it is the false positives that are
harmed by the errors of the classifier, and asking that the false positive rate be equalized
across groups is asking that the harm caused by the algorithm should be proportionately
spread across protected populations. But the meaning of this guarantee to an individual
is limited, because the word rate refers to an average over the population. To see why
this limits the meaning of the guarantee, consider the example given in [87]: imagine a
society that is equally split between gender (Male, Female) and race (Blue, Green). Under
the constraint that false positive rates be equalized across both race and gender, a classifier
may incarcerate 100% of blue men and green women, and 0% of green men and blue women.
This equalizes the false positive rate across all protected groups, but is cold comfort to any
individual blue man and green woman. This effect isn’t merely hypothetical — [87, 91]
showed similar effects when using off-the-shelf fairness constrained learning techniques on
real datasets.
Individual definitions of fairness, on the other hand, can have strong individual level semantics. For example, the constraint imposed by [77, 78] in online classification problems
implies that the false positive rate must be equalized across all pairs of individuals who
(truly) have negative labels. Here the word rate has been redefined to refer to an expecta-
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tion over the randomness of the classifier, and there is no notion of protected groups. This
kind of constraint provides a strong individual level promise that one’s risk of being harmed
by the errors of the classifier are no higher than they are for anyone else. Unfortunately, in
order to non-trivially satisfy a constraint like this, it is necessary to make strong realizability
assumptions.
2.1.1. Our Results
We propose an alternative definition of individual fairness that avoids the need to make
assumptions on the data generating process, while giving the learning algorithm more flexibility to satisfy it in non-trivial ways. We consider that in many applications each individual
will be subject to decisions made by many classification tasks over a given period of time,
not just one. For example, internet users are shown a large number of targeted ads over the
course of their usage of a platform, not just one: the properties of the advertisers operating
in the platform over a period of time are not known up front, but have some statistical
regularities. Public school admissions in cities like New York are handled by a centralized
match: students apply not just to one school, but to many, who can each make their own
admissions decisions ([1]). We model this by imagining that not only is there an unknown
distribution P over individuals, but there is an unknown distribution Q over classification
problems (each of which is represented by an unknown mapping from individual features
to target labels). With this model in hand, we can now ask that the error rates (or false
positive or negative rates) be equalized across all individuals — where now rate is defined
as the average over classification tasks drawn from Q of the probability of a particular
individual being incorrectly classified.
We then derive a new oracle-efficient algorithm for satisfying this guarantee in-sample, and
prove novel generalization guarantees showing that the guarantees of our algorithm hold
also out of sample. Oracle efficiency is an attractive framework in which to circumvent
the worst-case hardness of even unconstrained learning problems, and focus on the additional computational difficulty imposed by fairness constraints. It assumes the existence of
“oracles” (in practice, implemented with a heuristic) that can solve weighted classification
9

problems absent fairness constraints, and asks for efficient reductions from the fairness constrained learning problems to unconstrained problems. This has become a popular technique
in the fair machine learning literature (see e.g. [3, 87]) — and one that often leads to practical algorithms. The generalization guarantees we prove require the development of new
techniques because they refer to generalization in two orthogonal directions — over both
individuals and classification problems. Our algorithm is run on a sample of n individuals
sampled from P and m problems sampled from Q. It is given access to an oracle (in practice, implemented with a heuristic) for solving ordinary cost sensitive classification problems
over some hypothesis space H. The algorithm runs in polynomial time (it performs only
elementary calculations except for calls to the learning oracle, and makes only a polynomial
number of calls to the oracle) and returns a mapping from problems to hypotheses that
have the following properties, so long as n and m are sufficiently large (polynomial in the
VC-dimension of H and the desired error parameters): For any α, with high probability
over the draw of the n individuals from P and the m problems from Q
1. Accuracy: the error rate (computed in expectation over new individuals x „ P and new
problems f „ Q) is within Opαq of the optimal mapping from problems to classifiers
in H, subject to the constraint that for every pair of individuals x, x1 in the support of
P, the error rates (or false positive or negative rates) (computed in expectation over
problems f „ Q) on x and x1 differ by at most α.
2. Fairness: with probability 1 ´ β over the draw of new individuals x, x1 „ P, the
error rate (or false positive or negatives rates) of the output mapping (computed in
expectation over problems f „ Q) on x will be within Opαq of that of x1 .
The mapping from new classification problems to hypotheses that we find is derived from
the dual variables of the linear program representing our empirical risk minimization task,
and we crucially rely on the structure of this mapping to prove our generalization guarantees
for new problems f „ Q.
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2.1.2. Additional Related Work
The literature on fairness in machine learning has become much too large to comprehensively summarize, but see [110] for a recent survey. Here we focus on the most conceptually
related work, which has aimed to bridge the gap between the immediate applicability of
statistical definitions of fairness with the strong individual level semantics of individual
notions of fairness. One strand of this literature focuses on the “metric fairness” definition
first proposed by [39], and aims to ease the assumption that the learning algorithm has
access to a task specific fairness metric. [95] imagine access to an oracle which can provide
unbiased estimates to the metric distance between any pair of individuals, and show how to
use this to satisfy a statistical notion of fairness representing “average metric fairness” over
pre-defined groups. [59] study a contextual bandit learning setting in which a human judge
points out metric fairness violations whenever they occur, and show that with this kind of
feedback (under assumptions about consistency with a family of metrics), it is possible to
quickly converge to the optimal fair policy. [145] consider a PAC-based relaxation of metric
fair learning, and show that empirical metric-fairness generalizes to out-of-sample metric
fairness. Another strand of this literature has focused on mitigating the problems that arise
when statistical notions of fairness are imposed over coarsely defined groups, by instead
asking for statistical notions of fairness over exponentially many or infinitely many groups
with a well defined structure. This line includes [73] (focusing on calibration), [87] (focusing
on false positive and negative rates), and [96] (focusing on error rates).

2.2. Model and Preliminaries
We model each individual in our framework by a vector of features x P X , and we let
each learning problem2 be represented by a binary function f P F mapping X to t0, 1u.
We assume probability measures P and Q over the space of individuals X and the space
of problems F, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume throughout that the
support of the distributions P and Q are X and F, respectively. In the training phase there
is a fixed (across problems) set X “ txi uni“1 of n individuals sampled independently from
2

we will use the terms: problem, task, and labeling interchangeably.
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Table 1: Summary of notations for individuals vs. problems.

space

element

distribution

data set

individual

X

xPX

P

X

problem

F

f PF

Q

F

sample size

“ txi uni“1
“ tfj um
j“1

n

empirical dist.
p “ U pXq
P

m

p “ U pF q
Q

P for which we have available labels of m learning tasks represented by F “ tfj um
j“1 drawn
independently from Q3 . Therefore, a training data set of n individuals X for m learning
␣
(n
tasks F takes the form: S “ xi , pfj pxi qqm
j“1 i“1 . We summarize the notations we use for
individuals and problems in Table 1.
In general the function class F will be unknown. We will aim to solve the (agnostic) learning
problem over a hypothesis class H, which need bear no relationship to F. We assume
throughout that H contains the constant classifiers h0 and h1 where h0 pxq “ 0 and h1 pxq “
1 for all x. This assumption will allow us to argue about feasibility of the constrained
optimization problems that we will solve. We allow for randomized classifiers, which we
model as learning over ∆pHq, the probability simplex over H.
Unlike usual learning settings where the primary goal is to learn a single hypothesis p P
∆pHq, our objective is to learn a mapping ψ P ∆pHqF that maps learning tasks f P F
represented as labelings of the training data to hypotheses p P ∆pHq. We will therefore
have to formally define the error rates incurred by a mapping ψ and use them to formalize
a learning task subject to our proposed fairness notion. For a mapping ψ, we write ψf to
denote the classifier corresponding to f P F under the mapping, i.e., ψf “ ψ pf q P ∆pHq.
Notice in the training phase, there are only m learning problems F “ tfj um
j“1 to be solved,
and therefore, the corresponding empirical fair learning problem reduces to learning m
randomized classifiers p “ pp1 , p2 , . . . , pm q P ∆pHqm , where pj is the learned classifier for
the jth problem fj P F . In general, learning m specific classifiers for the training problems
might not give any generalizable rule mapping new problems to hypotheses — but the
3

Throughout we will use subscript i to denote individuals and j to denote learning problems.
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specific algorithm we propose will, in the form of a set of weights (derived from the dual
variables of the ERM problem) over the training individuals.
2.2.1. AIF: Average Individual Fairness
Definition 2.2.1 (Individual and Overall Error Rates of a Mapping ψ). For a given individual x P X , a mapping ψ P ∆pHqF , and distributions P and Q over X and F, the
individual error rate of x incurred by ψ is defined as follows:
ȷ
P rhpxq ‰ f pxqs

„
E px, ψ; Qq “ E

f „Q h„ψf

The overall error rate of ψ is:

err pψ; P, Qq “ E rE px, ψ; Qqs
x„P

While we will focus on a fairness constraint that asks that the individual error rate should be
approximately equalized across all individuals, our techniques can be extended to equalizing
false positive and negative rates across individuals as well.
Definition 2.2.2 (Average Individual Fairness (AIF)). In our framework, we say a mapping
ψ P ∆pHqF satisfies “pα, βq-AIF” (reads pα, βq-approximate Average Individual Fairness)
with respect to the distributions pP, Qq if there exists γ ě 0 such that:

P p|E px, ψ; Qq ´ γ| ą αq ď β

x„P

2.2.2. Notations
We briefly fix some notations:
• For an event A, 1 rAs represents the indicator function of A. 1 rAs “ 1 if A occurs.
• For a natural number n P N, rns “ t1, 2, . . . , nu.
• U pSq represents the uniform distribution over the set S.
13

• For a mapping ψ : A Ñ B and A1 Ď A, ψ|A1 represents ψ restricted to the domain A1 .
• For a hypothesis class H, ∆pHq represents the probability simplex over H.
• dH denotes the VC dimension of the hypothesis class H.
• CSCpHq denotes a cost sensitive classification oracle for H which is defined below.
Definition 2.2.3 (Cost Sensitive Classification (CSC) in H). Let D “ txi , c1i , c0i uni“1 denote
a data set of n individuals xi where c1i and c0i are the costs of classifying xi as positive (1)
and negative (0) respectively. Given D, the cost sensitive classification problem defined over
H is the optimization problem:

argmin
hPH

n
ÿ
␣

c1i hpxi q ` c0i p1 ´ hpxi qq

(

i“1

An oracle CSCpHq takes the data set D “ txi , c1i , c0i uni“1 as input and outputs the solution to
the optimization problem. We use CSCpH; Dq to denote the classifier returned by CSCpHq
on an input data set D. We say that an algorithm is oracle efficient if it runs in polynomial
time given the ability to make unit-time calls to CSCpHq.

2.3. Learning subject to AIF
In this section we first cast the learning problem subject to the AIF fairness constraints as
the constrained optimization problem (2.1) and then develop an oracle efficient algorithm
for solving its corresponding empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem (in the spirit of
[3]). In the coming sections we give a full analysis of the developed algorithm including its insample accuracy/fairness guarantees, and define the mapping it induces from new problems
to hypotheses, and finally establish out-of-sample bounds for this trained mapping.
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Fair Learning Problem subject to (α, 0)-AIF
min

ψP∆pHqF ,γPr0,1s

s.t. @x P X :

err pψ; P, Qq
(2.1)
|E px, ψ; Qq ´ γ| ď α

Definition 2.3.1 (OPT). Consider the optimization problem (2.1). Given distributions P
and Q, and fairness approximation parameter α, we denote the optimal solutions of (2.1)
by ψ ‹ pα; P, Qq and γ ‹ pα; P, Qq, and the value of the objective function at these optimal
points by OPT pα; P, Qq. In other words

OPT pα; P, Qq “ err pψ ‹ ; P, Qq

We will use OPT as the benchmark with respect to which we evaluate the accuracy of our
trained mapping. It is worth noticing that the optimization problem (2.1) has a nonempty
set of feasible points for any α and any distributions P and Q because the following point
is always feasible: γ “ 0.5 and ψf “ 0.5h0 ` 0.5h1 (i.e. random classification) for all f P F
where h0 and h1 are all-zero and all-one constant classifiers.
2.3.1. The Empirical Fair Learning Problem
We start to develop our algorithm by defining the empirical version of (2.1) for a given
training data set of n individuals X “ txi uni“1 and m learning problems F “ tfj um
j“1 . We
will formulate the empirical problem as finding a restricted mapping ψ|F by which we mean
the domain of the mapping is restricted to the training set F Ď F. We will later see how
the dynamics of our proposed algorithm allows us to extend the restricted mapping to a
mapping from the entire space F. We slightly change notation and represent a restricted
mapping ψ|F P ∆pHqF explicitly by a vector p “ pp1 , . . . , pm q P ∆pHqm of randomized
classifiers where pj P ∆pHq corresponds to fj P F . Notice the empirical versions of the
overall error rate and the individual error rates incurred by the mapping p (see Definition
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2.2.1) can be expressed as:
n
m
n
´
¯
´
¯
ÿ
ÿ
1ÿ
p “ 1
p Q
p “ 1
E xi , p; Q
P rhj pxi q ‰ fj pxi qs
err p; P,
n i“1
m j“1 n i“1 hj „pj

(2.2)

m
´
¯
ÿ
p “ 1
E x, p; Q
P rhj pxq ‰ fj pxqs
m j“1 hj „pj

(2.3)

Using these empirical quantities, we cast the empirical version of the fair learning problem
(2.1) as the constrained optimization problem (2.4) where there is one constraint for each
individual in the training data set. Note that the optimization problem (2.4) forms a linear
program and that we considered a slightly relaxed version of (2.1) where instead of pα, 0qAIF, we require p2α, 0q-AIF (of course now with respect to the empirical distributions) only
to make sure the optimal solution pψ ‹ , γ ‹ q of (2.1) (in fact ψ ‹ restricted to F ) is feasible in
(2.4) as long as enough samples are acquired. This will appear later in the generalization
analysis of our proposed algorithm.
Empirical Fair Learning Problem
min

pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s

s.t. @i P t1, . . . , nu:

´
¯
p Q
p
err p; P,
(2.4)
ˇ ´
ˇ
¯
ˇ
ˇ
p
E
x
,
p;
Q
´
γ
ˇ
ˇ ď 2α
i

2.3.2. A Reductions Approach: Formulation as a Two-player Game
We use the dual perspective of constrained optimization problems to reduce the fair ERM
(2.4) to a two-player game between a “Learner” (primal player) and an “Auditor” (dual
p ď
player). Towards deriving the Lagrangian of (2.4), we first rewrite its constraints in rpp, γ; Qq
0 form where

» ´
fin
¯
p
¯
E xi , p; Q ´ γ ´ 2αffi
p “—
r p, γ; Q
´
¯
–
fl
p ´ 2α
γ ´ E xi , p; Q
´

P R2n

(2.5)

i“1

represents the “fairness violations” of the pair pp, γq in one single vector. Let the correspond“
‰
´ n
2n
ing dual variables be represented by λ “ λ`
i , λi i“1 P Λ, where Λ “ tλ P R` |||λ||1 ď Bu.
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Note we place an upper bound B on the ℓ1 -norm of λ in order to reason about the convergence of our proposed algorithm. B will eventually factor into both the run-time and the
approximation guarantees of our solution. Using Equation (2.5) and the introduced dual
variables, we have that the Lagrangian of (2.4) is
´
¯
´
¯
p Q
p ` λT r p, γ; Q
p
L pp, γ, λq “ err p; P,

(2.6)

We therefore consider solving the following minmax problem:

min

max L pp, γ, λq “ max

pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s λPΛ

min

λPΛ pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s

L pp, γ, λq

(2.7)

where strong duality holds because L is linear in its arguments and the domains of pp, γq
and λ are convex and compact ([131]). From a game theoretic perspective, the solution
to this minmax problem can be seen as an equilibrium of a zero-sum game between two
players. The primal player (Learner) has strategy space ∆pHqm ˆ r0, 1s while the dual
player (Auditor) has strategy space Λ, and given a pair of chosen strategies pp, γ, λq, the
Lagrangian L pp, γ, λq represents how much the Learner has to pay to the Auditor — i.e.
it defines the payoff function of a zero-sum game in which the Learner is the minimization
player, and the Auditor is the maximization player.
Using no regret dynamics, an approximate equilibrium of this zero-sum game can be found
in an iterative framework. In each iteration, we let the dual player run the exponentiated
gradient descent algorithm and the primal player best respond. The best response problem
of the Learner can be decoupled into pm ` 1q separate minimization problems and that in
particular, the optimal classifiers p can be viewed as the solutions to m weighted classifi´
n
cation problems in H where all m problems share the same weights w “ rλ`
i ´ λi si P R

over the training individuals. In the following subsection, we derive and implement the best
response of the Learner where we use the learning oracle CSCpHq (see Definition 2.2.3) to
solve the weighted classification problems.
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2.3.3. BEST: The Learner’s Best Response
We formally describe and analyze the best response problem of the Learner in this subsection
and summarize the results in a subroutine called BEST. In each iteration of the described
iterative framework, the Learner is given some λ P Λ picked by the Auditor and she wants
to solve the following minimization problem.

L pp, γ, λq

argmin
pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s

We will use Equations (2.2) and (2.3) to expand the Lagrangian (2.6) and decouple the
above minimization problem into pm ` 1q minimization problems, each depends only on one
variable the Learner has to pick.

argmin

L pp, γ, λq

pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s

”

argmin
pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s

n !
´
¯ ÿ
´ ´
¯
¯
´
´
¯¯)
p
p
p ´ γ ` λ´ γ ´ E xi , p; Q
p
err p; P, Q `
λ`
E xi , p; Q
i
i
i“1

n
n !
¯ ÿ
´ ´
¯
¯
´
´
¯¯)
1ÿ ´
´
p `
p
p
E xi , p; Q
λ`
E
x
,
p;
Q
´
γ
`
λ
γ
´
E
x
;
p;
Q
”
argmin
i
i
i
i
pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s n i“1
i“1
˙ ´
n ˆ
n
¯
ÿ
ÿ
␣ ´
(
1
`
`
´
p
λi ´ λi γ `
”
argmin
` λi ´ λi E xi , p; Q
n
pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s i“1
i“1
+
# ˆ
˙
n
m
n
ÿ
␣ ´
(
1 ÿ ÿ 1
`
`
´
”
argmin
λi ´ λi γ `
` λi ´ λi
P rhj pxi q ‰ fj pxi qs
hj „pj
m j“1 i“1 n
pP∆pHqm ,γPr0,1s i“1

Therefore, the minimization problem of the Learner gets nicely decoupled into pm ` 1q
J
´
minimization problems. Let wi “ λ`
i ´λi for all i, and acccordingly, let w “ rw1 , . . . , wn s P

Rn . First, the optimal value for γ is chosen according to
«
γ“1

n
ÿ

i“1
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ff
wi ą 0

(2.8)

And for learning problem j, the following minimization problem must be solved.

argmin

n
ÿ

pj P∆pHq i“1

p1{n ` wi q P rhj pxi q ‰ fj pxi qs ” argmin
hj „pj

hj PH

n
ÿ

p1{n ` wi q 1 rhj pxi q ‰ fj pxi qs

i“1

where the equivalence holds since the Learner can choose to put all the probability mass on
a single classifier. This minimization problem represents exactly a weighted classification
problem. Since we work with cost sensitive classification oracles in this paper, we further
reduce the weighted classification problem to a CSC problem that can be solved by a call
to the CSC oracle for H (CSCpHq). For problem j P rms, let
c1i,j “ pwi ` 1{nqp1 ´ fj pxi qq ,

c0i,j “ pwi ` 1{nqfj pxi q

represent the costs associated with individual i P rns. Observe that the above weighted
classification problem can be now casted as the following CSC problem.

hj “ argmin
hPH

n
ÿ

c1i,j hpxi q ` c0i,j p1 ´ hpxi qq

(2.9)

i“1

To sum up, in each iteration of the algorithm the Auditor first uses the exponentiated
gradient descent algorithm to update the dual variable λ (or correspondingly, the vector of
ř
weights w over the training individuals) and then the Learner picks γ “ 1 r ni“1 wi ą 0s and
solves m cost sensitive classification problems casted in (2.9) by calling the oracle CSCpHq
for all 1 ď j ď m. We have the best response of the Learner written in Subroutine 1. This
subroutine will be called in each iteration of the final AIF learning algorithm.
2.3.4. AIF-Learn: Implementation and In-sample Guarantees
In Algorithm 2 (AIF-Learn), with a slight deviation from what we described in the previous
subsections, we implement the proposed algorithm. The deviation arises when the Auditor
updates the dual variables λ in each round, and is introduced in the service of arguing for
generalization. To counteract the inherent adaptivity of the algorithm (which makes the
quantities estimated at each round data dependent), at each round t of the algorithm, we
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Algorithm 1 BEST– best response of the Learner in the AIF setting
!
)n
Input: dual weights w P Rn , training examples S “ xi , pfj pxi qqm
j“1 i“1
řn
γ Ð 1 r i“1 wi ą 0s
for j “ 1, . . . , m do
c1i Ð pwi ` 1{nqp1 ´ fj pxi qq for i P rns.
c0i Ð pwi ` 1{nqfj pxi q for i P rns.
D Ð txi , c1i , c0i uni“1
hj Ð CSC pH; Dq
end
h Ð ph1 , h2 , . . . , hm q
Output: ph, γq
draw a fresh batch of m0 problems to estimate the fairness violation vector r (2.5). From
another viewpoint – which is the way the algorithm is actually implemented – similar to
usual batch learning models we assume we have a training set F of m learning problems
upfront. However, in our proposed algorithm that runs for T iterations, we partition F
into T equally-sized (m0 ) subsets tFt uTt“1 uniformly at random and use only the batch of
problems Ft at round t to update the dual variables λ. Without loss of generality and to
avoid technical complications, we assume |Ft | “ m0 “ m{T is a natural number. This is
pt “ U pFt q for the uniform distribution over the
represented in Algorithm 2 by writing Q
batch of problems Ft , and ht |Ft for the associated learned classifiers for Ft . We will see this
a
r 1{m0 q term to the regret of the Auditor and
modification will only introduce an extra Op
thus we have to assume m0 is sufficiently large (Assumption 2.3.1) so that the Auditor has
in fact low regret.
Notice AIF-Learn takes as input an approximation parameter ν P r0, 1s which will quantify
how close the output of the algorithm is to an equilibrium of the introduced game, and it will
accordingly propagate to the accuracy bounds. One important aspect of AIF-Learn is that
the algorithm maintains a vector of weights wt P Rn over the training individuals X and
that each ppj learned by our algorithm is in fact an average over T classifiers where classifier
t is the solution to a CSC problem on X weighted by wt . As a consequence, we propose to
p
x q P ∆pHqF
extend the learned restricted mapping pp P ∆pHqm to a mapping ψp “ ψpX,
W
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that takes any problem f P F as input (represented to ψp by the labels it induces on the
x “ twt uT to solve T CSC
training individuals), uses X along with the set of weights W
t“1
problems in a similar fashion, and outputs the average of the learned classifiers denoted by
ψpf P ∆pHq. This extension is consistent with pp in the sense that ψp restricted to F will be
exactly the pp output by our algorithm. We have the pseudocode for ψp written in detail in
p
Mapping 3 and we let AIF-Learn output ψ.
Algorithm 2 AIF-Learn – learning subject to AIF
Input: fairness parameter α, approximation parameter ν,
training data set X “ txi uni“1 and F “ tfj um
j“1
1`2ν
α ,

BÐ

T Ð

16B 2 p1`2αq2 logp2n`1q
,
ν2

Partition F uniformly at random: F “
θ1 Ð 0 P R2n
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
λ‚i,t Ð B
wt Ð

‚ q
exppθi,t
1

ř

ηÐ

ν
,
4p1`2αq2 B

tFt uTt“1

m0 Ð

m
T,

!
)n
S Ð xi , pfj pxi qqm
j“1

i“1

where |Ft | “ m0 .

for i P rns and ‚ P t`, ´u

1` i1 ,‚1 exppθi‚1 ,t q
´ n
n
rλ`
i,t ´ λi,t si“1 P R

pht , γt q Ð BESTpw
´ t ; Sq
¯
pt
θt`1 Ð θt ` η ¨ r ht |Ft , γt ; Q
end
pp Ð

1
T

řT

1
T

řT

1
T

řT

x Ð twt uT
W
t“1
¯
´
¯
´
p , mapping ψp “ ψp X, W
x (see Mapping 3)
pγ
p, λ
Output: average plays p,
t“1 ht

,

γ
pÐ

t“1 γt

,

pÐ
λ

t“1 λt

,

p
x q – pseudocode for the mapping ψp output by Algorithm 2
Algorithm 3 ψpX,
W
Input: f P F (represented to ψp as tf pxi qun )
i“1

for t “ 1, . . . , T do
c1i Ð pwi,t ` 1{nqp1 ´ f pxi qq for i P rns
c0i Ð pwi,t ` 1{nqf pxi q for i P rns
D Ð txi , c1i , c0i uni“1
hf,wt Ð CSC pH; Dq
end
ψpf Ð

1
T

řT

t“1 hf,wt

Output: ψpf P ∆pHq
We start the analysis of Algorithm 2 by establishing the regret bound of the Auditor over T
rounds of the algorithm. The regret bound will help us pick the number of iterations T and
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the learning rate η so that the Auditor has sufficiently small regret (bounded by ν). Notice
the Learner uses her best response in each round of the algorithm which implies that she
has zero regret. Since in this subsection we eventually want to state in-sample guarantees
p and Q),
p we work with the restricted
(i.e., guarantees with respect to the distributions P
p F “ p.
p In the next subsection we will focus on generalizations in our framework
mapping ψ|
p We defer all the proofs
and there we will have to state the guarantees for the mapping ψ.
to the Appendix
Lemma 2.3.1 (Regret of the Auditor). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let tλt uTt“1 be the sequence of exponentiated gradient descent plays (with learning rate η) by the Auditor to the given tht , γt uTt“1
of the Learner over T rounds of Algorithm 2. We have that for any set of individuals X,
with probability at least 1 ´ δ over the problems F , the (average) regret of the Auditor is
bounded as follows.
T
T
´
¯ 1 ÿ
´
¯
ÿ
1
max
L ht , γt , λ ´
L ht , γt , λt
T λPΛ t“1
T t“1
d
log p2nT {δq B log p2n ` 1q
ďB
`
` ηB p1 ` 2αq2
2m0
ηT

The last two terms appearing in the above regret bound come from the usual regret analysis
of the exponentiated gradient descent algorithm. However, the first term originates from
a high probability Chernoff-Hoeffding bound because as explained before, the Auditor is
using — instead of the whole set of problems F — only m0 randomly selected problem Ft to
estimate the vector of fairness violations r at round t. Hence at each round t, the difference
of fairness violation estimates — one with respect to Ft and another with respect to F —
will appear in the regret of the Auditor which can be bounded by the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s
inequality. We will therefore have to assume that m0 is sufficiently large to make the above
regret bound small enough.
Assumption 2.3.1. For a given confidence parameter δ, inputs α and ν of Algorithm 2,
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we suppose throughout this section that the number of fresh problems m0 used in each round
¯
´
¯
´
T logpnT {δq
{δq
,
or
equivalently
m
“
m
¨
T
ě
O
.
of Algorithm 2 satisfies m0 ě O logpnT
0
2
2
2
2
α ν
α ν
p
pγ
Following Lemma 2.3.1 and Assumption 2.3.1, we characterize the average plays pp,
p, λq
output by Algorithm 2 in the following lemma. Informally speaking, this lemma guarantees
that neither player would gain more than ν if they deviated from these proposed strategies
output by the algorithm. This is what we call a ν-approximate equilibrium of the game. The
proof of the lemma follows from the regret analysis of the Auditor and is fully presented in
the Appendix.
Lemma 2.3.2 (Average Play Characterization). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. We have that under Assumption 2.3.1, for any set of individuals X, with probability at least 1 ´ δ over the labelings
p output by Algorithm 2 forms a ν-approximate equilibrium of
pγ
p, λq
F , the average plays pp,
the game, i.e.,
¯
´
¯
´
p ď L p, γ, λ
p ` ν for all p P ∆pHqm , γ P r0, 1s
pγ
p, λ
L p,
´
¯
p
p
pγ
p, λ ě L pp,
p, λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
L p, γ

We are now ready to present the main theorem of this subsection which takes the guarantees
provided in Lemma 2.3.2 and turns them into accuracy and fairness guarantees of the pair
pγ
pp,
pq using the specific form of the Lagrangian (2.6). The theorem will in fact show that
the set of randomized classifiers pp achieves optimal accuracy up to O pνq and that it also
p
satisfies pO pαq , 0q-AIF notion of fairness, all with respect to the empirical distributions P
p
and Q.
Theorem 2.3.3 (In-sample Accuracy and Fairness). Let 0 ă δ ă 1 and suppose Assumppγ
tion 2.3.1 holds. Let pp,
pq be the output of Algorithm 2 and let pp, γq be any feasible pair
of variables for the empirical fair learning problem (2.4). We have that for any set of indi-
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Figure 1: Illustration of generalization directions.

viduals X, with probability at least 1 ´ δ over the labelings F ,
¯
´
¯
´
p Q
p ď err p; P,
p Q
p ` 2ν
p P,
err p;

p Qq.
p In other
and that pp satisfies p3α, 0q-AIF with respect to the empirical distributions pP,
words, for all i P rns,
ˇ ´
ˇ
¯
ˇ
ˇ
p ´γ
pQ
pˇ ď 3α
ˇE xi , p;

2.3.5. Generalization Theorems
When it comes to out-of-sample performance in our framework, unlike in usual learning
settings, there are two distributions we need to reason about: the individual distribution
P and the problem distribution Q (see Figure 1 for a visual illustration of generalization
directions in our framework). We need to argue that ψp induces a mapping that is accurate
with respect to P and Q, and is fair for almost every individual x „ P, where fairness
is defined with respect to the true problem distribution Q. Given these two directions for
generalization, we state our generalization guarantees in three steps visualized by arrows in
p and
Figure 1. First, in Theorem 2.3.4, we fix the empirical distribution of the problems Q
show that the output ψp of Algorithm 2 is accurate and fair with respect to the underlying
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individual distribution P as long as n is sufficiently large. Second, in Theorem 2.3.5, we fix
p and consider generalization along the underlying
the empirical distribution of individuals P
problem generating distribution Q. It will follow from the dynamics of the algorithm, as
p that the learned mapping ψp will remain accurate and fair with
well as the structure of ψ,
respect to Q. We will eventually put these pieces together in Theorem 2.3.6 and argue that
ψp is accurate and fair with respect to the underlying distributions pP, Qq simultaniously,
given that both n and m are large enough. We will use OPT (see Definition 2.3.1) as a
p
benchmark to evaluate the accuracy of the mapping ψ.
Theorem 2.3.4 (Generalization over P). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let

´
¯
pγ
p be the outputs of
ψ,

Algorithm 2, and suppose
˜
r
něO

`
˘¸
mdH ` log 1{ν 2 δ
α2 β 2

where dH is the VC dimension of H. We have that with probability at least 1´5δ over the observed data set pX, F q, the mapping ψp satisfies p5α, βq-AIF with respect to the distributions
´
¯
p , i.e.,
P, Q
ˇ
´ˇ ´
¯
¯
ˇ
ˇ
pQ
p ´γ
P ˇE x, ψ;
pˇ ą 5α ď β
x„P

and that,
´
¯
´
¯
p P, Q
p ď OPT α; P, Q
p ` O pνq ` O pαβq
err ψ;

The proof of this theorem will use standard VC-type generalization techniques where a
Chernoff-Hoeffding bound is followed by a union bound (accompanied with the two-sample
trick and Sauer’s Lemma) to guarantee a uniform convergence of the empirical estimates
to their true expectation. However, compared to the standard VC-based sample complexity
bounds in learning theory, there is an extra factor of m because there are m hypotheses to
be learned and that the α2 factor appears in the denominator since in our setting a uniform
convergence for all – pure – classifiers will not simply lead to a uniform convergence for
all – randomized – classifiers without blowing up the sample complexity (specifically when
proving generalization for fairness). We will therefore directly prove uniform convergence for
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randomized classifiers and that our argument will go through by sparsifying the distributions
`
˘
p F (taking samples of size O
r 1{α2 from p)
p coupled with a uniform convergence for
pp “ ψ|
˘
`
˘
`
r 1{α2 -sparse classifiers (randomized classifiers with support size ď O
r 1{α2 ) and this is
O
how α2 shows up in the sample complexity bound.
´
Theorem 2.3.5 (Generalization over Q). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let

¯
pγ
ψ,
p

be the outputs of

Algorithm 2 and suppose
ˆ
r
měO

log pnq log pn{δq
ν 4 α4

˙

We have that for any set of observed individuals X, with probability at least 1 ´ 6δ over
the observed problems F , the learned mapping ψp satisfies p4α, 0q-AIF with respect to the
´
¯
p Q , i.e.,
distributions P,

P

p
x„P

ˇ
´ˇ ´
¯
¯
ˇ
ˇ
p Q ´γ
pˇ ą 4α “ 0
ˇE x, ψ;

and that,
´
¯
´
¯
p P,
p Q ď OPT α; P,
p Q ` O pνq
err ψ;

This theorem will follow directly from Chernoff-type concentration inequalities where the
fact that in each round the Auditor in our algorithm is using only a fresh batch of randomly
selected m0 problems to estimate the fairness violations will help us to prove concentration
without appealing to a uniform convergence. The sample complexity for m stated in this
theorem is equivalent to that of Assumption 2.3.1 because we needed almost the same type
of concentration for controlling the regret of the Auditor in the previous subsection. Having
proved generalization separately for P and Q, we are now ready to state the final theorem of
this section which provides generalization guarantees simultaneously over both distributions
P and Q.
´
¯
pγ
p
Theorem 2.3.6 (Simultaneous Generalization over P and Q). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let ψ,
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be the outputs of Algorithm 2 and suppose
˜
r
něO

`
˘¸
mdH ` log 1{ν 2 δ
α2 β 2

ˆ
,

r
měO

log pnq log pn{δq
ν 4 α4

˙

where dH is the VC dimension of H. We have that with probability at least 1 ´ 12δ over the
observed data set pX, F q, the learned mapping ψp satisfies p6α, 2βq-AIF with respect to the
distributions pP, Qq, i.e.,

P

x„P

ˇ
´ˇ ´
¯
¯
ˇ
ˇ
p Q ´γ
pˇ ą 6α ď 2β
ˇE x, ψ;

and that,
´
¯
p P, Q ď OPT pα; P, Qq ` O pνq ` O pαβq
err ψ;

To prove this theorem we basically start with the guarantees we have for the empirical
p Qq
p and lift them into their corresponding guarantees for pP, Qq
p by Theorem
distributions pP,
p to pP, Qq which is not
2.3.4. We will then have to take another “lifting” step from pP, Qq
quite similar to what we have shown in Theorem 2.3.5 and will be proved as a separate
lemma in the Appendix. Note that the bounds on n and m in Theorem 2.3.6 are mutually
dependent: n must be linear in m, but m need only be logarithmic in n, and so both
bounds can be simultaneously satisfied with sample complexity that is only polynomial in
the parameters of the problem.

2.4. Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented the AIF-Learn algorithm and conclude with a brief experimental
demonstration of its practical efficacy using the Communities and Crime dataset4 , which
contains U.S. census records with demographic information at the neighborhood level. To
obtain a challenging instance of our multi-problem framework, we treated each of the first
n “ 200 neighborhoods as the “individuals” in our sample, and binarized versions of the
first m “ 50 variables as distinct prediction problems. Another d “ 20 of the variables were
4

Described in detail and available for download at http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/commun
ities`and`crime
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(a) convergence plot: communities data set

(b) error spread plot: communities data set

Figure 2: (a) Error-unfairness trajectory plots illustrating the convergence of algorithm AIF-Learn. (b)
Error-unfairness tradeoffs and individual errors for AIF-Learn vs. simple mixtures of the error-optimal
model and random classification. Gray dots are shifted upwards slightly to avoid occlusions.

used as features for learning. For the base learning oracle assumed by AIF-Learn, we used
a linear threshold learning heuristic that has worked well in other oracle-efficient reductions
([87]).
Despite the absence of worst-case guarantees for the linear threshold heuristic, AIF-Learn
seems to empirically enjoy the strong convergence properties suggested by the theory. In
Figure 2(a) we show trajectory plots of the learned model’s error (x axis) versus its fairness
violation (variation in cross-problem individual error rates, y axis) over 1000 iterations
of the algorithm for varying values of the allowed fairness violation 2α (dashed lines). In
each case we see the trajectory eventually converges to a point which saturates the fairness
constraint with the optimal error.
In Figure 2(b) we provide a more detailed view of the behavior and performance of AIFLearn. The x axis measures error rates, while the y axis measures the allowed fairness
violation. For each value of the allowed fairness violation 2α (which is the allowed gap
between the smallest and largest individual errors on input α), there is a horizontal row of
200 blue dots showing the error rates for each individual, and a single red dot representing
the overall average of those individual error rates. As expected, for large α (weak or no
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Figure 3: Pareto frontier of error and fairness violation rates on training and test data sets.

fairness constraint), the overall error rate is lowest, but the spread of individual error rates
(unfairness) is greatest. As α is decreased, the spread of individual error rates is greatly
narrowed, at a cost of greater overall error.
A trivial way of achieving zero variability in individual error rates is to make all predictions
randomly. So as a baseline comparison for AIF-Learn, the gray dots in Figure 2(b) show
the individual error rates achieved by different mixtures of the unconstrained error-optimal
model with random classifications, with a black dot representing the overall average of
these rates. When the weight on random classification is low (weak or no fairness, top row
of gray dots), the overall error is lowest and the individual variation (unfairness) is highest.
As we increase the weight on random classification, variation or unfairness decreases and
the overall error gets worse. It is clear from the figure that AIF-Learn is considerably
outperforming this baseline, both in terms of the average errors (red vs. black lines) and
the individual errors (blue vs. gray dots).
Finally, we present out-of-sample performance of AIF-Learn, for which we provided theoretical guarantees in Section 2.3.5, in Figure 3. To be consistent with in-sample results
reported in Figure 2(b), for each value of α, we trained a mapping on exactly the same sub-
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set of the Communities and Crime data set (n “ 200 individuals, m “ 50 problems) that we
used before. Thus the red curve labelled “training” in Figure 3 is the same as the red curve
appearing in Figure 2(b). We used a completely fresh holdout consisting of n “ 200 individuals and m “ 25 problems (binarized features from the dataset that weren’t previously used)
to evaluate our generalization performance over both individuals and problems, in terms of
both accuracy and fairness violation. Similar to the presentation of generalization theorems
in Section 2.3.5, we demonstrate experimental evaluation of generalization in three steps.
The blue and green curves in Figure 3 represent generalization results over individuals (test
data: test individuals and training problems) and problems (test data: training individuals
and test problems) respectively. The black curve represent generalization across both individuals and problems where test individuals and test problems were used to evaluate the
performance of the trained models.
Two things stand out from Figure 3:
1. As predicted by the theory, our test curves track our training curves, but with higher
error and unfairness. In particular, the ordering of the models (each corresponds to
one α) on the Pareto frontier is the same in testing as in training, meaning that the
training curve can indeed be used to manage the trade-off out-of-sample as well.
2. The gap in error is substantially smaller than would be predicted by our theory: since
our training data set is so small, our theoretical guarantees are vacuous, but all points
plotted in our test Pareto curves are non-trivial in terms of both accuracy and fairness.
Presumably the gap in error would narrow on larger training data sets.
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Chapter 3
Lexicographic Fairness
This chapter extends the notion of minimax fairness in supervised learning problems to its
natural conclusion: lexicographic minimax fairness (or lexifairness for short). Informally,
given a collection of demographic groups of interest, minimax fairness asks that the error
of the group with the highest error be minimized. Lexifairness goes further and asks that
amongst all minimax fair solutions, the error of the group with the second highest error
should be minimized, and amongst all of those solutions, the error of the group with the third
highest error should be minimized, and so on. Despite its naturalness, correctly defining lexifairness is considerably more subtle than minimax fairness, because of inherent sensitivity
to approximation error. We give a notion of approximate lexifairness that avoids this issue,
and then derive oracle-efficient algorithms for finding approximately lexifair solutions in
a very general setting. When the underlying empirical risk minimization problem absent
fairness constraints is convex (as it is, for example, with linear and logistic regression), our
algorithms are provably efficient even in the worst case. Finally, we show generalization
bounds—approximate lexifairness on the training sample implies approximate lexifairness
on the true distribution with high probability. Our ability to prove generalization bounds
depends on our choosing definitions that avoid the instability of naive definitions.

3.1. Introduction
Most notions of statistical group fairness ask that a model approximately equalize some
error statistic across demographic groups. Often this is motivated as a tradeoff: the goal is
to lower the error of the most disadvantaged group, and if doing so requires increasing the
error on some more advantaged group, so be it—this is a cost that we are willing to pay
in the name of equity. But solutions which equalize group errors do not in general mediate
a clean tradeoff in which losses in accuracy on more advantaged groups result in increases
in accuracy on less advantaged groups: instead, generically (i.e. except in the very special
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case in which the Bayes optimal error is identical for all groups), a constraint of equalizing
group error rates may require artificially increasing the error on at least one group, without
any corresponding benefit to any other group.
A partial answer to this criticism of standard notions of group fairness is the classical notion
of minimax fairness, recently studied by [27, 106] in the context of supervised learning.
Minimax fairness asks for a model which minimizes the error of the group most disadvantaged
by the model—i.e. the group with maximum group error. In doing so, it realizes the promise
of equal error solutions in that it trades off higher error on populations more advantaged
by the model for lower error on populations less advantaged by the model when this is
possible—but without artificially increasing the error of any group when doing so. Indeed,
it is not hard to see that a minimax model necessarily weakly Pareto dominates an equal
error rate model, in the sense that group errors are only lower in the minimax solution
simultaneously for all groups.
This narrative is most sensible if there are only two demographic groups of interest. If
there are more than two groups, there may be many different minimax optimal models
that have very different error profiles for groups other than the max error group. How
should we choose amongst these? Prior work [27] has broken ties by optimizing for overall
classification accuracy. But why should we entirely give up on the goal of optimizing for
the most disadvantaged, partially enunciated in the motivation of minimax fairness, once
we have fixed the error of only one of many groups?
In this paper we propose the natural continuation of this idea, which we call lexicographic
minimax fairness. Informally speaking, this notion recurses on the idea that we wish to
minimize the cost of the least well off. A model that satisfies lexicographic fairness, which
we call a lexifair model, will minimize the maximum error γ1 on any group, amongst all
possible models (i.e. a lexifair model is a also a minimax model). Further, amongst the set of
all minimax models, a lexifair model must minimize the error of the group with the second
highest error γ2 . Amongst all of these models, it further minimizes the error of the group
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with the third highest error γ3 , and so on.5
3.1.1. Our Contributions
Our first contribution is a definition of (approximate) lexicographic minimax fairness. Correctly defining an actionable notion of lexicographic minimax fairness is surprisingly subtle.
For standard computational and statistical reasons, it will not be possible to exactly match
the distributional lexicographically optimal error rates γ1 , γ2 , γ3 , etc. But as we will observe, these lexicographically optimal error rates can be arbitrarily unstable, in the sense
that amongst the set of models that have minimax error larger than γ1 by even an arbitrarily small margin, the value of the optimal lexifair error on the third highest error group
γ31 can be arbitrarily larger than γ3 (See our example in Section 3.2.1). An implication of
this is that the vectors of errors γ, γ 1 representing exact lexifair solutions in and out of
sample can be entirely incomparable and arbitrarily different from one another. Hence we
need a definition of approximate lexifairness that accounts for this instability, and allows
for sensible statements about approximation and generalization.
Another challenge arises in the interaction between our definitions and our (desired) algorithms. A constraint on the highest error amongst all groups, which arises in defining
minimax error, is convex, and hence amenable to algorithmic optimization. However, naive
specifications of lexifairness involve constraints on the second highest group errors, the
third highest group errors, and more generally kth highest errors. These are non-convex
constraints when taken in isolation. However, as it turns out, a constraint on the second
highest error becomes convex when we restrict attention to minimax optimal classifiers, and
more generally, a constraint on the kth highest error becomes convex once the values of the
lower order group errors are constrained to their lexifair values. We show this by giving
a clearly convex variant of our lexifair definition, specified by exponentially many linear
constraints, which replace constraints on the k’th highest error groups with constraints on
the sums of all k-tuples of group errors. We then show that our definition of “convex lexi5

It is easy to see that there are cases in which a lexifair model may have arbitrarily smaller errors than
a minimax model on all but the worst-off group.
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fairness” is equivalent to our original notion of lexifairness, at least in the exact case (absent
approximation). We give our formal definitions in Section 3.2.1.
With our notion of approximate lexifairness in hand and our convexified constraints, we
give oracle-efficient algorithms for finding approximate lexifair models in both the regression and classification case. This means that our algorithms are efficient reductions to the
problem of unconstrained (that is, standard non-fair) learning over the same model class.
Despite the worst-case intractability of most natural learning problems even absent fairness
considerations, a desirable feature of oracle-efficient algorithms is that they can be implemented using any of the common and practical heursitics for non-fair learning, often with
good empirical success [4, 79, 92, 129].
Our algorithms are based on solving the corresponding constrained optimization problem
by recasting it as a (Lagrangian) minmax optimization problem, and using no-regret dynamics. Because our “convexified” lexifairness constraints are exponentially numerous, the
“constraint player” in our formulation has exponentially many strategies — but as we show,
we can efficiently optimize over her strategy space using an efficient separation oracle. Hence
the constraint player can always play according to a “best response” strategy in our simulated dynamics. When our base model class is continuous and our loss function convex
(as it is with e.g. linear regression), then the “learner” in our dynamics can play gradient
descent over parameter space. In this case, our oracle efficient-algorithms are in fact fully
polynomial time algorithms because our reduction to weighted learning problems involves
only non-negative weights, which preserves convexity. In the classification case, when our
loss function is non-convex, we can convexify it by considering the set of all probability
distributions over base models. Here the parameters we optimize over become the weights
of the probability distribution, and our loss function (i.e. the expected loss over the choice
of a random model) becomes linear in our (enormous) parameter space. In this case, we are
effectively solving a linear program that has both exponentially many variables and exponentially many constraints — but we are nevertheless able to do so in an oracle-efficient

34

manner by making appropriate use of the Follow the Perturbed Leader algorithm [83] for
no-regret learning.
Finally, we prove a generalization theorem, showing that if we have a dataset S (sampled
i.i.d. from an underlying distribution) that has sufficiently many samples from each group,
and if we have a model that is approximately lexifair for S, then the model is also approximately lexifair on the underlying distribution. This is significantly more involved than just
a standard uniform convergence argument — which would simply state that our in and out
of sample errors on each group are close to one another — because approximate lexifairness
additionally depends on the precise relationship between these group errors. Nevertheless,
we show that uniform convergence is a sufficient condition to guarantee that in-sample
lexifairness bounds correspond to out of sample lexifairness bounds.
3.1.2. Related Work
There are many notions of group or statistical fairness that are studied in the fair machine
learning literature, which are generally concerned with equalizing various measures of error
across protected groups; see e.g. [13, 111] for surveys of many such metrics.
Minimax solutions are a classical approach to fairness that have been used in many contexts
including scheduling, fair division, and clustering (see e.g. [9, 20, 24, 65, 127]). A number
of these works employ techniques for solving two-player zero-sum games as part of their
algorithmic solution [20, 24]. This is the same general algorithmic framework that we use.
More recently, minimax group error has been proposed as a fairness solution concept for
classification problems in machine learning [27, 102, 106]. These works generally do not
specify how to choose between multiple minimax solutions, with the exception of [27], which
gives algorithms for choosing the solution with smallest overall classification error subject
to the minimax constraint.
Lexicographic minimax fairness has been studied in the fair division literature for tasks
such as quota allocation in mobile networks, load balancing, and network design [6, 26,
29, 112, 118, 119, 122, 142, 148]. As far as we know, we are the first to study lexicographic
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fairness in a learning context in which the quantities of interest must be estimated, and hence
the first to identify the sensitivity issues that arise when defining approximate notions of
lexicographic fairness.
An alternative approach to learning one classifier for all groups is to learn decoupled classifiers [46, 136], i.e. a separate classifier for each group. The decoupling of error rates across
all groups eliminates tradeoffs between groups, and hence results in classifiers that are lexicographically fair (within the class of decoupled classifiers). But there are at least three
important reasons one might want to learn a single classifier (the approach we take) rather
than a separate classifier for each group. The first is that learning separate classifiers for each
group requires that the groups be disjoint, which is not needed in our approach. For example, we could divide the population into groups according to race, gender, and age—despite
the fact that individuals will fall into multiple groups simultaneously. In other words, our
algorithms can be used to obtain subgroup or intersectional fairness [64, 71, 80, 90, 92, 97].
Second, learning separate classifiers for each group requires that protected group membership be used explicitly at classification time, which can be undesirable or illegal in important
applications. Finally, learning a single classifier allows for the possibility of transfer learning,
whereby a small sample from some group can be partially made up for by larger quantities
of data from other (nevertheless related) groups.

3.2. Model and Definitions
Let Z “ X ˆ Y be an arbitrary data domain. Each data point in our setting is a pair
z “ px, yq where x P X is the feature vector and y P Y is the response variable (i.e. the
label). Let X consist of points belonging to K (not necessarily disjoint) groups G1 , . . . , GK ,
so we can write X “ YK
k“1 Gk . We write P to denote an arbitrary distribution over Z, and Pk
to denote the marginal distribution induced by P on the kth group Gk ˆ Y. Let S “ tzi uni“1
be a data set of size n, which for the purposes of proving generalization bounds, we will take
to consist of n data points drawn i.i.d. from P. Denote the points in S that are contained
in Gk by Gk , so we can write S “ YK
k“1 Gk .
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Let H Ď th : X Ñ Yu be the model class of interest, and let L : H ˆ Z Ñ R` be a loss
function that takes a data point z and a model h as inputs, and outputs the loss of h on z.
For instance, in the case of classification and zero-one loss, we have Lph, zq “ 1 rhpxq ‰ ys.
We will abuse notation and write Lz p¨q for Lp¨, zq for any data point z. Throughout the
paper, for any distribution P, we write the expected loss of a model h over P as:

LP phq fi Lph, Pq fi Ez„P rLz phqs

We slightly abuse notation and write LS phq to denote the empirical loss on a dataset S.
Here and throughout the paper when S plays the role of a distribution, we interpret that
as the uniform distribution over the points in S, and accordingly, z „ S as a point sampled
uniformly at random from S.
Until Section 3.7, we will work exclusively with sample quantities, and so for simplicity
of notation, let us define Lk phq fi LGk phq to denote the sample loss of a model h on the
k’th group. When necessary, we will write Lk ph, Pq to denote LPk phq, the corresponding
distributional loss of h on the k’th group. For any model h and any data set S “ Yk tGk u, let
h̄S be the ordering induced on the groups tGk uK
k“1 by the loss of h, breaking ties arbitrarily.
In other words, h̄S : rKs Ñ rKs is any bijection such that the following condition holds:
Lh̄S p1q phq ě Lh̄S p2q phq ě . . . ě Lh̄S pKq phq. The corresponding distributional ordering of the
groups by any model h is defined similarly: for any model h and any distribution P over
Z, let h̄P : rKs Ñ rKs be the ordering induced on the groups tGk uK
k“1 by the expected loss
of h, breaking ties arbitrarily. In other words, h̄P is any bijection such that the following
condition holds: Lh̄P p1q ph, Pq ě Lh̄P p2q ph, Pq ě . . . ě Lh̄P pKq ph, Pq. When the distribution
(data set) is clear from context, we elide the dependence on the distribution (data set) and
simply write h̄ for h̄P (h̄S ).
Our definition of lexifairness will be given recursively. At the base level, we define Hp0q “ H
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to be the set of all models in our class. Then recursively for all 1 ď j ď K, we define:

γj fi

min Lh̄pjq phq,

hPHpj´1q

)
!
Hpjq fi h P Hpj´1q : Lh̄pjq phq “ γj

In words, γj is the smallest error that any model in Hpj´1q obtains on the group that has
the jth highest error, and Hpjq is the set of all models in Hpj´1q that attain this minimum
— i.e. that have jth highest error equal to γj . Thus, γ1 is the minimax error — i.e. the
highest group error for the model that is chosen to minimize the maximum group error.
Similarly, γ2 is the error of the second highest group for all minimax optimal models that
further minimize the error of the second highest group, and so on. With this notation in
hand, we can define exact lexifairness as follows:
Definition 3.2.1 (Exact Lexicographic Fairness). Let 1 ď ℓ ď K. We say a model h P H
satisfies level-ℓ (exact) lexicographic fairness (lexifairness) if for all j ď ℓ, Lh̄pjq phq ď γj .
Minimax fairness corresponds to level-1 lexifairness. This is a definition of exact lexifairness,
in that it permits no approximation to the error rates — i.e. we require Lh̄pjq phq ď γj for all
j, and hence Lh̄pjq phq “ γj for all j. For a variety of reasons, we will need definitions that
tolerate approximation. For example, because we inevitably have to train on a fixed dataset,
but want our guarantees to generalize to new datasets drawn from the same distribution,
we will need to accommodate statistical approximation. The optimization techniques we
will bring to bear will also only be able to approximate lexifairness, even in sample. But it
turns out that defining a sensible approximate notion of lexifairness is more subtle than it
first appears.
3.2.1. Approximate Lexifairness: Stability and Convexity
We begin with the “obvious” but ultimately flawed definition of approximate lexifairness
(Definition 3.2.2), and then explain why it is lacking in stability. This will lead us to the
definitions we finally adopt: Definition 3.2.3 and its convexified version (Definition 3.2.4),
which we show is equivalent (Claim 3), and for which we can develop efficient algorithms.
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The Challenge of Stability
The most natural seeming definition of approximate lexifairness begins with our notion of
exact lexifairness (Definition 3.2.1), and adds slack to all of the inequalities contained within.
1 that
In other words, we attempt to find a model that has sorted group errors γ11 , γ21 , . . . , γK

pointwise approximate the optimal lexifair vector of sorted group errors γ1 , . . . , γK .
Definition 3.2.2 (A Flawed Definition). Let 1 ď ℓ ď K and α ě 0. We say a model h P H
satisfies pℓ, αq-lexicographic fairness if for all j ď ℓ, Lh̄pjq phq ď γj ` α.
To see the problem with the above definition, consider a setting with three groups, and a
model class H that contains all distributions (or randomized classifiers) over two pure classifiers th1 , h2 u. Imagine that h1 induces the (unsorted) vector of group error rates x0.5, 0.5, 0y,
and h2 induces the (unsorted) vector of group error rates x0.5 ` 2α, 0, 0.5y, for some arbitrarily small α ą 0. Note that it is easy to construct distributions over labeled instances
with exactly these group error vectors by simply arranging each classifier to disagree with
the labels on the specified fraction of a group. So, for simplicity we abstract away the data
and directly discuss the error vectors.
The minimax group error for this model class is γ1 “ 0.5, and is achieved only by h1 which
has error 0.5 on the first and second groups. Since the largest group error of h2 is also on the
first group with value 0.5 ` 2α ą 0.5, any distribution over th1 , h2 u that places a non-zero
probability on h2 will therefore violate the (exact) minimax constraint. This in turn implies
that Hp1q “ th1 u. Therefore, the only exact lexifair model is h1 and thus γ1 “ 0.5, γ2 “ 0.5,
γ3 “ 0.
However, imagine that because of estimation error (as is inevitable if we are learning based
on a finite sample) or optimization error (since we generally don’t have access to exact
optimization oracles in learning settings), we slightly misestimate the minimax group error
γ1 to be γ11 “ 0.5 ` α. If we now optimize, allowing the largest group error to be as much
as γ11 “ 0.5 ` α, we may now find randomized classifiers which put weight as large as 0.5
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on h2 . The uniform distribution over th1 , h2 u induces the unsorted vector of group errors
x0.5 ` α, 0.25, 0.25y. The induced error on the second group (which is now also the group
with second largest error) of 0.25 is considerably smaller than γ2 “ 0.5. So far this appears
to be all right, since γ21 ă γ2 . But if we now attempt to optimize the error of the third
highest error γ31 , subject to the constraint that the largest group error is (close to) γ11 and
the second largest group error is (close to) γ21 , we now find that we are forced to settle for
third highest group error γ31 « 0.25, which is considerably larger than the value of the third
highest group’s error of γ3 “ 0 in the exact lexifair solution.
This example highlights a fundamental instability of our first (flawed) attempt at defining
approximate lexifairness: even arbitrarily small estimation (or optimization) error introduced to the minimax error rate γ1 can result in large, non-monotonic effects for later group
errors — enforcing even a valid upper bound on γ1 can cause γ3 to increase substantially,
and these effects compound even further if we have more than three groups.
A Stable and Convex Definition
With the proceeding example of the instability inherent in our (flawed) Definition 3.2.2, we
now give the definition of approximate lexifairness that we begin with:
Definition 3.2.3 (Approximate Lexicographic Fairness). Fix a distribution P. Let 1 ď
ℓ ď K and α ě 0. For any sequence of mappings ⃗ϵ “ pϵ1 , ϵ2 , . . . , ϵℓ q where ϵj P RH , define
ϵ pPq fi H, and recursively for all 1 ď j ď ℓ define:
H⃗p0q

#
ϵ
H⃗pjq
pPq

fi

+
hP

ϵ
H⃗pj´1q
pPq

: Lh̄pjq ph, Pq ď

min

ϵ
gPH⃗pj´1q
pPq

Lḡpjq pg, Pq ` ϵj phq

and let }⃗ϵ}8 “ max1ďjďℓ maxhPH ϵj phq. We say a model h P H satisfies pℓ, αq-lexicographic
fairness (“lexifairness”) with respect to P if there exists ⃗ϵ with }⃗ϵ}8 ď α such that for all
j ď ℓ:
Lh̄pjq ph, Pq ď

min

ϵ
gPH⃗pj´1q
pPq

Lḡpjq pg, Pq ` ϵj phq ` α
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When we prove bounds on empirical lexifairness, we simply take the distribution to be the
uniform distribution over the data set S. When the distribution is clear from context, we
ϵ and elide the dependence on the distribution.
will write H⃗pjq

Note that there are two distinctions between Definition 3.2.3 and Definition 3.2.2. First, the
ϵ now incorporate some ϵ p¨q slack in their parameterization which
recursively defined sets H⃗pjq
j

will help capture statistical (or optimization) error. Second (and crucially), we now call a
solution pℓ, αq-approximately lexifair if it satisfies our requirements for some sequence of
relaxations ⃗ϵ that is component-wise less than α for all models h. It is this second point that
avoids the instability and non-monotonicity that arises from Definition 3.2.2. We observe
that Definition 3.2.3 is a strict weakening of Definition 3.2.2:
Claim 1. Definition 3.2.3 is a relaxation of Definition 3.2.2: if a model satisfies pℓ, αqlexicographic fairness according to Definition 3.2.2, then it also satisfies pℓ, αq-lexicographic
fairness according to Definition 3.2.3.

Proof. If a model satisfies pℓ, αq-lexicographic fairness according to Definition 3.2.2, then
by taking ⃗ϵ “ ⃗0, it also meets the conditions of Definition 3.2.3.

We now face another definitional challenge. A priori, Definition 3.2.3 appears to be highly
non-convex, because it constrains the second highest group error, the the third highest
group error, etc.6 This is in contrast to standard equal-error notions of fairness, or minimax
fairness (which constrains only the highest group error) that are convex in the sense that a
distribution over fair models remains fair. Without convexity of this sort, the algorithmic
problem of finding a fair model becomes much more challenging. But in fact (at least for
α “ 0), Definition 3.2.3 does give a convex constraint. To see this, we first introduce an
6

E.g., if we have two groups and two models which induce group errors p0.5, 0q and p0, 0.5q respectively,
both solutions have a second-highest error of 0 — but convex combinations have a second highest error
strictly greater than 0. So absent other structure, upper bounding the second highest group error of a
model corresponds to a non-convex constraint. But note that in this two-group example, the non-convexity
dissapears if we restrict attention to minimax optimal models. This is what we will take advantage of more
generally.
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alternative notion of convex lexifairness, and then show that it actually represents the exact
same constraint as lexifairness when the approximation parameter α “ 0.
Definition 3.2.4 (Convex Lexicographic Fairness). Fix a distribution P. Let 1 ď ℓ ď K and
⃗ϵ pPq fi H,
α ě 0. For any sequence of mappings ⃗ϵ “ pϵ1 , ϵ2 , . . . , ϵℓ q where ϵj P RH , define Fp0q

and recursively for all 1 ď j ď ℓ define:
⃗ϵ
pPq fi
Fpjq
#

hP

⃗ϵ
pPq
Fpj´1q

:

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

j
ÿ

Lir ph, Pq ď

r“1

min

max

j
ÿ

⃗
ϵ
pPq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1
gPFpj´1q

+
Lir pg, Pq ` ϵj phq

and let }⃗ϵ}8 “ max1ďjďℓ maxhPH ϵj phq. We say a model h P H satisfies pℓ, αq-convex lexicographic fairness with respect to P if there exists ⃗ϵ with }⃗ϵ}8 ď α such that for all j ď ℓ:

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

j
ÿ
r“1

Lir ph, Pq ď

min

max

j
ÿ

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pPq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

Lir pg, Pq ` ϵj phq ` α.

When we prove bounds on empirical convex lexifairness, we simply take the distribution to
be the uniform distribution over the data set S. When the distribution is clear from context,
⃗ϵ and elide the dependence on the distribution.
we will write Fpjq

Here, we have replaced constraints on the j’th highest group error with constraints on
the sum of group errors over all « K j subsets of groups of size j. This has replaced a
single constraint with many constraints, but each is convex, and hence the resulting set of
⃗ϵ is convex. We will formally prove this in the following claim.
constraints defined by Fpjq
⃗ϵ ). Let L : H Ñ R
Claim 2 (Convexity of Fpjq
z
ě0 be a convex loss function. If the initial

model class H is convex, then for all j and all ⃗ϵ such that the mappings ϵj P RH are concave,
⃗ϵ is convex.
the set Fpjq

The proof of this claim proceeds by straightforward induction. We note that while some
classes of models naturally satisfy the convexity conditions of the above claim with respect to
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their corresponding parameters (e.g. linear and logistic regression), this claim will apply to
arbitrary classification models with zero-one loss as well. In these settings, we will convexify
the class of models by considering the set of all probability distributions over deterministic
models. The loss of a distribution (i.e. a randomized model) is then defined as the expected
loss, when the model is sampled from the corresponding distribution. Hence, by linearity of
expectation, our loss functions will be convex (linear) in the parameters — i.e. the weights
— of these distributions.
It turns out that our notion of convex lexifairness is identical to our notion of lexifairness
(and so our original definition in fact specified a convex set of constraints), at least when
the approximation parameter α “ 0. We prove this in the following claim:
⃗ϵ and H⃗ϵ when ⃗
Claim 3 (Relationship between Fpjq
ϵ “ ⃗0). For all j, and ⃗ϵ “ ⃗0, we have
pjq
⃗ϵ “ H⃗ϵ .
Fpjq
pjq

The intuition for the claim is the following. The sets Hpjq in Definition 3.2.3 constrain the
error of the group that has the j’th highest error. In contrast, the sets Fpjq from Definition
3.2.4 constrain the sum of the errors for all possible j-tuples of groups. Amongst all of these
constraints, the binding one will be the constraint corresponding to the j groups that have
the largest errors. But because (inductively) the errors of the top j ´ 1 error groups have
already been appropriately constrained in Fpj´1q , this reduces to a constraint on the j’th
highest error group, as desired. These constraints are numerous, but each is convex, and so
the resulting set of constraints can be seen to be convex.
We emphasize that despite the complexity of our final Definition 3.2.4, what we have shown
is that it is in fact a relaxation of our initial, natural definition of exact lexifairness (Definition 3.2.1) — and in particular Definitions 3.2.1, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4 coincide exactly when
α “ 0. We do not know the precise relationship between our definitions of approximate
lexifairness and approximate convex lexifairness for α ą 0 — but because both are smooth
relaxations of the same base definition, both should be viewed as capturing the same intu-
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ition as Definition 3.2.1 (exact lexifairness) when α is small.

3.3. Game Theory and No-Regret Learning Preliminaries
3.3.1. No-Regret Dynamics
In this subsection, we briefly review the seminal result of Freund and Schapire [57]: Under
certain conditions, two-player zero-sum games can be (approximately) solved by having
access to a no-regret online learning algorithm for one of the players.
Suppose in this subsection that S1 and S2 are two vector spaces over the field of real
numbers. Consider a zero-sum game with two players: a player with strategies in S1 (the
minimization player) and another player with strategies in S2 (the maximization player).
Let U : S1 ˆ S2 Ñ Rě0 be the payoff function of this game. For every strategy s1 P S1 of
player one and every strategy s2 P S2 of player two, the first player gets utility ´U ps1 , s2 q
and the second player gets utility U ps1 , s2 q.
Definition 3.3.1 (Approximate Equilibrium). A pair of strategies ps1 , s2 q P S1 ˆ S2 is said
to be a ν-approximate minimax equilibrium of the game if the following conditions hold:

U ps1 , s2 q ´ min
U ps11 , s2 q ď ν,
1
s1 PS1

max U ps1 , s12 q ´ U ps1 , s2 q ď ν

s12 PS2

In other words, ps1 , s2 q is a ν-approximate equilibrium of the game if neither player can
gain more than ν by deviating from their strategies.
Freund and Schapire [57] proposed an efficient framework for approximately solving the
game: In an iterative fashion, have one of the players play according to a no-regret learning
algorithm, and let the second player (approximately) best respond to the play of the first
player. The empirical average of each player’s actions over a sufficiently long sequence of
such play will form an approximate equilibrium of the game. The formal statement is given
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (No-Regret Dynamics [57]). Let S1 and S2 be convex, and suppose the utility
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function U is convex-concave: U p¨, s2 q : S1 Ñ Rě0 is convex for all s2 P S2 , and U ps1 , ¨q :
S2 Ñ Rě0 is concave for all s1 P S1 . Let ps11 , s21 , . . . , sT1 q be the sequence of play for the first
player, and let ps12 , s22 , . . . , sT2 q be the sequence of play for the second player. Suppose for
ν1 , ν2 ě 0, the regret of the players jointly satisfies
T
ÿ

U pst1 , st2 q

´ min

t“1

Let s̄1 “

1
T

řT

t
t“1 s1

s1 PS1

T
ÿ

U ps1 , st2 q

ď ν1 T,

t“1

P S1 and s̄2 “

1
T

řT

t
t“1 s2

max

s2 PS2

T
ÿ
t“1

U pst1 , s2 q

T
ÿ

´

U pst1 , st2 q ď ν2 T

t“1

P S2 be the empirical average play of the

players. We have that the pair ps̄1 , s̄2 q is a pν1 ` ν2 q-approximate equilibrium of the game.
No regret online learning algorithms are algorithms that can guarantee the conditions of
Theorem 1 against arbitrary adversaries. We will use two no-regret online learning algorithms: Online Projected Gradient Descent, which we will use in regression settings in which
models are represented by parameters in a Euclidean space, and Follow the Perturbed Leader
(FTPL), which we will use in binary classification settings. We will make use of these noregret learning algorithms in our proposed algorithm for learning a lexifair model.

3.4. Finding Lexifair Models
In this section we focus on developing the tools required to prove the following (informally
stated) theorem. The formal claims are provided in Theorems 4 and 5.
Theorem 2 (Informal). Suppose the model class H is convex and compact, and that the
loss function Lz : H Ñ Rě0 is convex for all data points z P Z. There exists an efficient algorithm that returns a model which is pℓ, αq-convex lexicographic fair (according to
Definition 3.2.4), for any given ℓ and α.
We will propose algorithms for both classification and regression settings. The algorithms we
propose proceed inductively to solve the minimax problems defined recursively by our convex
lexifair definition. The first minimax problem is the one that minimizes the maximum group
error rate: minhPH maxkPrKs Lk phq. Let us denote the estimated value (computed by the first
phase of our algorithm) for this minimax problem by η1 . The second minimax problem is
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minimizing the maximum sum of any two group error rates subject to the constraint that
all group error rates are at most η1 : the estimated value for this minimax problem is called
η2 . The rest of the minimax problems are defined in a similar inductive fashion: suppose at
round j ď ℓ, we are given some estimates pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 q for the first j ´ 1 minimax values.
Now using these estimates, the new minimax problem for the sum of any j group error rates
can be stated as follows.
#
min

max

hPH:
@rďj´1,@ti1 ,...,ir uĎrKs
Li1 phq`...`Lir phqďηr

ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

j
ÿ

+
Lir phq

(3.1)

r“1

We can reformulate this problem by calling the objective maxti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

řj

r“1 Lir phq

:“ ηj

and introducing a new set of constraints which require that any sum of j group error rates
must be at most ηj . Note that this new formulation introduces a new variable, ηj , to the
optimization problem. We therefore have that the optimization problem (3.1) is equivalent
to
min
hPH,ηj Pr0,j¨LM s:

ηj fi OPTj pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 q

(3.2)

@rďj,@ti1 ,...,ir uĎrKs

Li1 phq`...`Lir phqďηr

which is a constrained convex optimization problem given that the model class H and
the loss function L are convex. Here LM “ maxz,h Lz phq is an upper bound on the loss
function which identifies the range of feasible values for ηj : r0, j ¨ LM s. Recall that in this
round, pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 q are given from the previous rounds, and ηj is a variable in the optimization problem. We denote the optimal value of the optimization problem (3.2) by
OPTj pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 q.
3.4.1. Formulation as a Two-Player Zero-Sum Game
Optimization problem (3.2) is written as a constrained optimization problem, but we can
express it equally well as an unconstrained minimax problem via Lagrangian duality. The
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corresponding Lagrangian can be written as:

Lj pph, ηj q, λq “ ηj `

j
ÿ

ÿ

λti1 ,i2 ,...,ir u ¨ pLi1 phq ` . . . ` Lir phq ´ ηr q

(3.3)

r“1 ti1 ,...,ir uĎrKs

where we introduce one dual variable λ for every inequality constraint in the optimization
problem (3.2), and index the dual variables by their corresponding constraint. Therefore,
` ˘
ř
there are qj “ jr“1 Kr dual variables in this round. Solving optimization problem (3.2) is
equivalent to solving the following minimax problem:

min

max Lj pph, ηj q, λq “ max
q

hPH,ηj Pr0,j¨LM s λPRqj

min

j hPH,ηj Pr0,j¨LM s
λPRě0

ě0

Lj pph, ηj q, λq

(3.4)

where the minimax theorem holds because 1) the range of the primal variables, i.e. H and
r0, j ¨ LM s, is convex and compact, the range for the dual variable (Rqě0 ) is convex, and 2)
Lj pph, ηj q, λq is convex in its primal variables ph, ηj q and concave in the dual variable λ.
Therefore we focus on solving the minimax problem (3.4) which can be seen as solving a
two-player zero-sum game with payoff function Lj pph, ηj q, λq. Using the no-regret dynamics
of [57] (see Section 3.3.1), we will have the primal player (or Learner ) with strategies
ph, ηj q P H ˆ r0, j ¨ LM s play a no-regret learning algorithm and let the dual player (or
q

j
: }λ}1 ď Bu best respond. Here we place
Auditor ) with strategies λ P Λj “ tλ P Rě0

an upper bound B on the ℓ1 -norm of the dual variable to guarantee convergence of our
algorithms. This nuisance parameter will be set optimally in our algorithms, and we note
that the minimax theorem continues to hold in the presence of this upper bound on λ. We
will first analyze the best response problem for both players — i.e. the problem of optimizing
the Lagrangian for one of the players fixing the strategy of the other player.
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3.4.2. The Auditor’s Best Response
Fixing the ph, ηj q variables of the Learner and the estimated values pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 q from
previous rounds, the Auditor can best respond by solving

argmax Lj pph, ηj q, λq ” argmax
λPΛj

λPΛj

j
ÿ

ÿ

λti1 ,i2 ,...,ir u ¨ pLi1 phq ` . . . ` Lir phq ´ ηr q

r“1 ti1 ,...,ir uĎrKs

Since the objective is linear in the dual variables λ, the Auditor can without loss of generality
best respond by putting all its mass B on the variable λti1 ,i2 ,...,ir u corresponding to the most
violated constraint, if one exists. In particular, given any model h P H and any ordering h̄
induced by h on the groups, we have that the Auditor’s best response λbest ph, ηj q is

λbest ph, ηj q “

$
’
’
&0 P Rqj

if @r ď j : Lh̄p1q phq ` . . . ` Lh̄prq phq ď ηr

’
’
%λ‹ P Rqj

if Dr ď j : Lh̄p1q phq ` . . . ` Lh̄prq phq ą ηr

where the entries of λ‹ are defined as follows.

λ‹ti1 ,i2 ,...,ir u

$
’
’
&B

if ti1 , i2 , . . . , ir u “ th̄p1q, h̄p2q, . . . , h̄pr‹ qu

“
’
’
%0

(3.5)

Otherwise

´
¯
where r‹ P argmaxrďj Lh̄p1q phq ` . . . ` Lh̄prq phq ´ ηr .
Note that the Auditor’s best response can be computed efficiently because it only requires
sorting the vector of error rates across K groups. We summarize the best response algorithm
for the Auditor in Algorithm 4.
3.4.3. The Learner’s Best Response
Given dual weights λ P Λj chosen by the Auditor, the Learner can best respond by solving

Lj pph, ηj q, λq .

argmin
hPH,ηj Pr0,j¨LM s
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Algorithm 4 The Auditor’s Best Response (λbest ): jth round
Input: Learner’s play ph, ηj q, previous estimates pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 q
Compute Lk phq for all groups k P rKs.
Find the top j elements of vector pL1 phq, . . . , LK phqq and call them: Lh̄p1q phq ě . . . ě
Lh̄pjq phq.
if @r ď j : Lh̄p1q phq ` . . . ` Lh̄prq phq ď ηr then λout “ 0;
¯
´
else Let r‹ P argmaxrďj Lh̄p1q phq ` . . . ` Lh̄prq phq ´ ηr , λout “ λ‹ as in Equation (3.5) ;
Output: λout P Λj
We note that the objective function Lj pph, ηj q, λq can be decomposed into three terms: one
that depends only on the model h, another that depends only on ηj , and finally one that is
constant (with respect to ph, ηj q). Therefore, this optimization problem is separable for the
Learner — the decomposition is formally described below.

Lj pph, ηj q, λq “ L1j ph, λq ` L2j pηj , λq ` Cj pλq

(3.6)

where

L1j ph, λq

K
ÿ

fi

wr pλqLr phq, where wr pλq fi

r“1

j´1
ÿ

ÿ

λtr,i2 ,...,is u

(3.7)

s“0 ti2 ,...,is uĎrKsztru

¨
L2j pηj , λq fi ˝1 ´

˛
ÿ

λti1 ,i2 ,...,ij u ‚ηj

(3.8)

ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

Cj pλq fi ´

j´1
ÿ

ÿ

λti1 ,i2 ,...,ir u ¨ ηr

(3.9)

r“1 ti1 ,...,ir uĎrKs

Given this decomposition of the Lagrangian, the best response ph, ηj q of the Learner to the
variables λ of the Auditor is as follows:
˜
ph, ηj q “

¸

argmin L1j ph, λq , argmin L2j pηj , λq
hPH

ηj Pr0,j¨LM s

Note that the first optimization problem is a weighted minimization problem over the class
H, and the second one is a simple minimization of a linear function. Furthermore, even
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though in general computing the sums in Equations (3.7) and (3.8) can be computationally
hard (because they are sums over exponentially many terms), when the Auditor is best
responding (which will be the case in our algorithms), these sums can be computed efficiently.
We formally state this claim in Fact 1.
Fact 1. When the Auditor is using its best response algorithm (Algorithm 4) to respond
to the Learner, the Auditor will either output zero or identify a single subset C of groups
(|C| ď j) on which the constraints are violated maximally. In the former case, wr pλq “ 0
ř
for all r and 1 ´ ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs λti1 ,i2 ,...,ij u “ 1. In the latter case, we have
wr pλq “ B ¨ 1 rr P Cs ,

1´

ÿ

λti1 ,i2 ,...,ij u “ 1 ´ B ¨ 1 r|C| “ js

ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

3.4.4. Solving the Game with No-Regret Dynamics
Having analyzed the best response problem for both players, we now focus on developing efficient algorithms to approximately solve the two-player zero-sum game defined above, which
corresponds to finding an approximate convex lexifair model. The algorithms we propose
use no-regret dynamics (see Section 3.3.1) in which the Learner plays a no-regret learning
algorithm and the Auditor best responds according to Algorithm 4. As a consequence, we
get that the empirical average of the played strategies ppĥ, η̂j q, λ̂q of the players over the
course of the iterative algorithms will form a ν-approximate equilibrium of the game for
some small value of ν ě 0 (according to Definition 3.3.1). Then, by the following theorem,
we can turn these equilibrium guarantees into the fairness guarantees of the output model
ĥ.
We remark that what we mean by the empirical average will depend on the setting. If we
are in a setting in which the loss function is convex in the model parameters (e.g. logistic
or linear regression), then we can actually average the model parameters, and output a
single deterministic model. Alternately, if we are in a classification setting in which the loss
function (e.g. zero-one loss) is non-convex in the model parameters, then by averaging, we
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mean using the randomized model that corresponds to the uniform distribution over the
empirical play history.
Theorem 3. At round j, let pη̂1 , . . . , η̂j´1 q be any given estimated minimax values from the
previous rounds and let the strategies ppĥ, η̂j q, λ̂q form a ν-approximate equilibrium of the
game for this round, i.e.,
´
¯
Lj pĥ, η̂j q, λ̂ ď

min
hPH,ηj Pr0,j¨LM s

´
¯
Lj ph, ηj q, λ̂ `ν,

´
¯
´
¯
Lj pĥ, η̂j q, λ̂ ě max Lj pĥ, η̂j q, λ ´ν
λPΛj

We have that
η̂j ď OP Tj pη̂1 , . . . , η̂j´1 q ` 2ν
and for all r ď j,
max
ti1 ,...,ir uĎrKs

r
ÿ

Lir pĥq ď η̂r `

s“1

jLM ` 2ν
.
B

We will next instantiate this general result to give concrete algorithms for learning convex
lexifair models in the regression and classification settings respectively.

3.5. Finding Lexifair Regression Models
Suppose in this section that Y Ď R and H is a class of models in which each model is
parametrized by some d-dimensional vector in Rd : H “ thθ : θ P Θu where Θ Ď Rd . In this
parametric setting we can think of each parameter θ P Θ as a model and write the loss
function as a function of θ. Suppose the loss function Lz : Θ Ñ Rě0 is differentiable for
all z.7 We will have the Learner play according to the Online Projected Gradient Descent
algorithm where the gradients of the corresponding loss function of the game for the Learner
(i.e. Lj ppθ, ηj q, λq) can be computed using Equations (3.7) and (3.8), and the decomposition
given in (3.6):

∇θ Lj ppθ, ηj q, λq “ ∇θ L1j pθ, λq “

K
ÿ

wr pλq∇θ Lr pθq,

r“1
7

If it is not differentiable we can use sub-gradients instead of gradients.
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(3.10)

Algorithm 5 LexiFairReg: Finding a Lexifair Regression Model
Input: S “ YK
k“1 Gk data set consisting of K groups, pℓ, αq desired fairness parameters, loss
function parameters LM and G, diameter D of the model class Θ
for j “ 1, 2, . . . , ℓ do
2
2
2
M
Set Tj “ 4j pGD`LMαq4 p2α`jLM q Set Bj “ α`jL
pθ̂j , η̂j q “ RegNRpTj , Bj ; η̂1 , . . . , η̂j´1 q
α
(Calling Algorithm 6)
end
Output: pℓ, αq-convex lexifair model θ̂ℓ
Algorithm 6 RegNR: jth round
Input: Number of rounds T , dual variable upper bound B, previous estimates pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 q
jLM?
D?
Set learning rates η “ jBG
and η 1 “ p1`Bq
Initialize the Learner: θ1 P Θ, ηj1 P r0, j¨LM s
T
T
for t “ 1, 2, . . . , T do
Learner plays pθt , ηjt q Auditor best responds: λt “ λbest pθt , ηjt ; pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 qq using Algorithm 4 Learner updates its actions using Projected Gradient Descent:
`
˘
θt`1 “ ProjΘ θt ´ η ¨ ∇θ Lj pθt , ηjt , λt q
`
˘
ηjt`1 “ Projr0,j¨LM s ηjt ´ η 1 ¨ ∇ηj Lj pθt , ηjt , λt q
where the gradients are given in Equations (3.10) and (3.11).
end
Output: the average play θ̂ “

1
T

řT

t“1 θ

t

P Θ, and η̂j “

∇ηj Lj ppθ, ηj q, λq “ ∇ηj L2j pηj , λq “ 1 ´

1
T

řT

t
t“1 ηj

ÿ

P r0, j ¨ LM s.
λti1 ,i2 ,...,ij u .

(3.11)

ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

The algorithm for this setting is given as Algorithm 5, which makes calls to a subroutine (Algorithm 6) that solves the two-player zero-sum games defined above by having the Learner
play Online Projected Gradient Descent and the Auditor best respond using Algorithm 4.
Note that since the Auditor is best responding, computing the sums in Equations (3.10)
and (3.11) can be done efficiently per Fact 1.
Theorem 4 (Lexifairness for Regression). Suppose Θ Ď Rd is convex, compact, and bounded
with diameter D: supθ,θ1 PΘ }θ ´ θ1 }2 ď D. Suppose the loss function Lz : Θ Ñ Rě0 is convex
and that there exists constants LM and G such that Lz p¨q ď LM and }∇θ Lz p¨q}2 ď G, for
all data points z P Z. We have that for any ℓ ď K and any α ě 0, the model θ̂ℓ P Θ output
by Algorithm 5 is pℓ, αq-convex lexicographic fair.

52

3.6. Finding Lexifair Classification Models
Suppose in this section that Y “ t0, 1u and our model class H is the probability simplex
over a class of deterministic binary classifiers. We slightly abuse notation and write H for
the given class of deterministic classifiers and write ∆H fi tp : p is a distribution over Hu
for the probability simplex, and work with ∆H as our model class. Let the loss function be
zero-one loss: for any h P H: Lz phq “ 1 thpxq ‰ yu. The loss of any randomized model p on
data point z is defined as the expected loss of h on z when h is sampled from H according
to the distribution p. In other words,

Lz ppq fi Eh„p rLz phqs ,

which is convex (linear) in the model p (weights of the distribution). We will also assume
that the model class H has finite VC dimension: dH ă 8. Sauer’s Lemma below will then
imply that for any finite dataset, H induces only finitely many labelings. This will serve
two purposes. First, it allows us to write the optimization problem as a linear program with
finitely many variables, and therefore appeal to strong duality. Second, it allows us to pose
the Learner’s best response problem as an n-dimensional linear optimization problem, over
the only exponentially many labelings of the n data points. This is what will allow us to
apply Follow the Perturbed Leader and obtain oracle-efficient no-regret learning guarantees
for the Learner. Here we are following an approach similar to that of [90].
Lemma 3.6.1 (Sauer’s Lemma). Let S “ tzi “ pxi , yi quni“1 be a data set of size n and H
be a model class with VC dimension dH . Let HpSq fi tphpx1 q, hpx2 q, . . . , hpxn qq : h P Hu be
the set of all labelings induced by H on data set S. We have that |HpSq| “ OpndH q.
Recall that given some λ P Λj of the Auditor, the best response of the Learner is separable
and given by
˜
pp, ηj q “

¸

argmin L1j pp, λq , argmin L2j pηj , λq ,
pP∆H

ηj Pr0,js

where L1j pp, λq and L2j pηj , λq are given in Equations (3.7) and (3.8), respectively, and we
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use LM “ 1 because our loss function in this section is the zero-one loss. We can now apply
Sauer’s Lemma and the fact that L1j pp, λq is linear in the weights of the distribution p to
rewrite the first optimization problem as

argmin L1j pp, λq

Sauer’s
ÝÑ

pP∆H

argmin L1j pp, λq

linearity
ÝÑ

pP∆HpSq

argmin L1j ph, λq ,
hPHpSq

which is an optimization problem over finitely many variables (weights over HpSq). Note
we can further rewrite this optimization problem as a cost sensitive classification problem
which can be solved by calling a Cost Sensitive Classification Oracle for H (CSC(H)). Recall
ř
from Equation (3.7) that L1j ph, λq “ K
r“1 wr pλqLr phq. We have that

argmin

K
ÿ

n
ÿ
␣

wr pλqLr phq ” argmin

hPHpSq r“1

(
c1i pλqhpxi q ` c0i pλq p1 ´ hpxi qq

hPHpSq i“1

where c1i pλq “ p1 ´ yi q

řK

r“1 pwr pλq{nr q1 ti

P Gr u is the cost of classifying data point i as

řK

P Gr u is the cost of classifying

a positive (1) example, and c0i pλq “ yi

r“1 pwr pλq{nr q1 ti

data point i as a negative (0) example. Here nr is the size of the r’th group: nr “ |Gr |. By
using a linear transformation of the cost vectors, we have

argmin

K
ÿ

wr pλqLr phq ” argmin

hPHpSq r“1

n
ÿ

ci pλqhpxi q

hPHpSq i“1

where the vector of costs is given as follows:

@1 ď i ď n :

Let us also define cpλq fi 1 ´

ci pλq fi p1 ´ 2yi q

ř

K
ÿ
wr pλq
1 ti P Gr u
nr
r“1

ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs λti1 ,i2 ,...,ij u

which is the coefficient of ηj in

L2j pηj , λq. We can therefore write the best response of the Learner to λ P Λj of the Auditor
in the classification setting of this section as
˜
ph, ηj q “

argmin

n
ÿ

¸
ci pλqhpxi q, argmin cpλqηj

hPHpSq i“1

ηj Pr0,js
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Now to get no-regret guarantees for the Learner we use the Follow the Perturbed Leader
(FTPL) algorithm. At any round t of the two-player zero-sum game, given the history
pλ1 , . . . , λt´1 q (best response plays) of the Auditor, the Learner solves
˜
ph, ηj q “

argmin

n
ÿ

˜ ˜
ci

hPHpSq i“1

¸
ÿ

λs

săt

1
` ξi
η

¸

˜ ˜
hpxi q, argmin c
ηj Pr0,js

¸
ÿ

1
` 1ξ
η

λs

săt

¸

¸
ηj

where ξ, ξi „ U nif ormr0, 1s for all i. At any round t, let’s denote the true distributions
(one over HpSq and another over the interval r0, js) maintained by the Learner’s FTPL
algorithm by pt and Dt . Since pt is a distribution over an exponentially large domain
(|HpSq| “ OpndH q), we can only represent a sparse version of it efficiently by sampling from
it. On the other hand, Dt , which is a one dimensional distribution, can be represented by
a scaled Bernoulli random variable as follows:
˜
t

t

D “ j ¨ Bernpq q where

t

¸

˜
1

q “ min 1, ´η c

ÿ

s

λ

¸

« ˜
¨1 c

săt

ÿ

s

λ

ff¸
ď0

săt

The algorithm for this setting is given in Algorithm 7 which makes calls to a subroutine that
implements the no-regret dynamics described above (Algorithm 8). Note that as mentioned
earlier, we cannot efficiently represent the FTPL distribution pt for the Learner, and therefore, we work with the empirical distribution p̂t of m i.i.d. draws from pt in Algorithm 8.
This makes the best response plays of the Auditor (to the pair pp̂t , Dt q), approximate best
responses to the actual FTPL distributions ppt , Dt q of the Learner, and consequently, the
Auditor accumulates some regret over the course of the algorithm.
Finally, note that the no-regret dynamics of Algorithm 8 must output the average play:
ř
ř
pp̄, D̄q where p̄ “ p1{T q Tt“1 pt and D̄ “ p1{T q Tt“1 Dt . However, once again we cannot
represent the average play p̄ efficiently because it can be a distribution over an exponentially
large domain. We therefore need to sample from this distribution and take the empirical
distribution of this sample as our final output, and this final sampling scheme will introduce
additional error on top of the regret of the players. Putting it all together, which requires
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Algorithm 7 LexiFairClf: Finding a Lexifair Classification Model
Input: S “ YK
k“1 Gk data set consisting of K groups, pℓ, αq desired fairness parameters
Let n “ |S| and nmin “ mink |Gk | for j “ 1, 2, . . . , ℓ do
2 3

n
Set Tj “ 256p2α`jq
Set mj “
Set Bj “ α`j
α
α4 n2min
ClfNRpTj , Bj , mj ; η̂1 , . . . , η̂j´1 q (Calling Algorithm 8)
end
Output: pℓ, αq-convex lexifair model p̂ℓ

K 2 n2min Tj logp4jKTj {δq
2n3

pp̂j , η̂j q “

carefully analyzing the game, including the regret of the players and the additional error
due to sampling from p̄, results in the following Theorem.
Theorem 5 (Lexifairness for Classification). Let H be any class of binary classifiers with
finite VC dimension, and let Lz ppq “ Eh„p rLz phqs for any randomized model p P ∆H where
Lz phq “ 1 thpxq ‰ yu is the zero-one loss. Fix any ℓ ď K and any α ě 0. We have that
for any δ ą 00, with probability at least 1 ´ δ, the model p̂ℓ P ∆H output by Algorithm 7 is
pℓ, αq-convex lexicographic fair.

3.7. Generalization
In this section, we turn our attention to out of sample bounds. Standard uniform convergence
statements would tell us that if we have enough samples from every group, then our insample group errors are good estimates of our out of sample group errors. However, this
alone does not directly imply that we satisfy approximate lexifairness out of sample. We
prove this is the case below. Our ability to prove out of sample bounds crucially relies on our
definitional choices that removed the instability of the naive Definition 3.2.2. Specifically,
we show that if:
1. Our base class H satisfies a standard uniform convergence bound across every group
(so that we can control the maximum gap between in and out of sample error across
every h P H, within each group k), and
2. We have a model that is approximately convex lexifair on our dataset S „ P n , then
then our model is also appropriately convex lexifair on the underlying distribution (with
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Algorithm 8 ClfNR: jth round
Input: T number of rounds, B dual variable’s upper bound, m number of samples to draw,
previous estimates b
pη1 , . . . , ηj´1 q b
nmin
B
Learner p̂1 P

Set learning rates η “

1
nT ,

η1 “

1
1`B

1
T

where nmin is the size of the smallest group.

Initialize the
∆H, D1 P ∆pr0, jsq for t “ 1, 2, . . . , T do
Learner plays actions pp̂t , Dt q Auditor Best ř
Responds: λt “ λbest pp̂t , Ex„Dt rxsq using
t
Algorithm 4 Update the running sum: λ̄ “ sďt λs Sample from the Learner’s FTPL
distribution:
for s = 1,2, . . . , m do
Draw ξi „ U r0, 1s for all i ď n. Call the oracle CSCpHq to solve
˙
n ˆ
ÿ
` t˘ 1
ci λ̄ ` ξi hpxi q
h “ argmin
η
hPH i“1
s

end
t`1 “ j ¨ Bernpq t q where
Let p̂t`1 be
the empirical
distribution
over ths um
s“1 Let D
`
`
˘
“
`
˘
‰˘
q t “ min 1, ´η 1 c λ̄t ¨ 1 c λ̄t ď 0
end
ř
Sample from the average distribution p̄ “ T1 Tt“1 pt :
for s = 1,2, . . . , m do
Draw a random number t P rT s Draw ξi „ U r0, 1s for all i ď n. Call the oracle CSCpHq
to solve
˙
n ˆ
ÿ
` t˘ 1
s
ci λ̄ ` ξi hpxi q
h “ argmin
η
hPH i“1
end
s um .
Let p̂ be the empirical distribution over thř
s“1
1
Let D̄ be the average distribution: D̄ “ T Tt“1 Dt .
Let η̂j “ Ex„D̄ rxs.
Output: randomized model p̂ P ∆H, and estimate η̂j P r0, js.
some loss in the approximation parameter).
Theorem 6 (Generalization for Convex Lexifairness). Fix any distribution P. Suppose for
every δ ą 0, there exists βpδq such that the following uniform convergence bound holds.
„
Pr
S

max
hPH,kPrKs

ȷ
|Lk ph, Sq ´ Lk ph, Pq| ą βpδq ă δ

where S is a data set sampled i.i.d. from P. We have that for every data set S sampled
i.i.d. from P, if a model h satisfies pℓ, αq-convex lexicographic fairness with respect to S,
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then with probability at least 1 ´ δ it also satisfies pℓ, α1 q-convex lexicographic fairness with
respect to P for α1 “ α ` 2ℓβpδq.

Proof. Fix a distribution P and a data set S sampled i.i.d. from P. Suppose h satisfies
pℓ, αq-convex lexicographic fairness with respect to S. Therefore, according to our convex
lexifairness definition, there exists a sequence of mappings ⃗ϵ “ pϵ1 , . . . , ϵℓ q where ϵj P RH ,
⃗ϵ pSqu such that
and a sequence of function classes tFpjq
j

"
*
1
ϵj ph q ď α
max max
1

1ďjďℓ

h PH

and that for all j ď ℓ:
j
ÿ

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

Lir ph, Sq ď

r“1

min

j
ÿ

max

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pSq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

Lir pg, Sq ` ϵj phq ` α

(3.12)

⃗ϵ pSq “ H and that for all j P rℓs,
where recall that Fp0q

⃗ϵ
Fpjq
pSq “
#
1

h P

⃗ϵ
Fpj´1q
pSq

:

j
ÿ

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

1

Lir ph , Sq ď

r“1

min

j
ÿ

max

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pSq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

+
1

Lir pg, Sq ` ϵj ph q

Let us define a mapping νj1 : H Ñ R such that for every h1 P H,

νj1 ph1 q

fi

j
ÿ

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

1

Lir ph , Pq ´

r“1

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

j
ÿ

Lir ph1 , Sq

r“1

and let

νj2 fi

min

max

j
ÿ

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pSq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

Lir pg, Sq ´

min

max

j
ÿ

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pSq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

Lir pg, Pq

⃗
τ pPq be defined
Now define for every h1 P H, τj ph1 q fi ϵj ph1 q ` νj1 ph1 q ` νj2 and let Fpjq

according to our convex lexifairness definition with the sequence of mappings defined by
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⃗
τ pPq “ H, and for all j P rℓs,
⃗τ “ pτ1 , . . . , τℓ q. In other words, Fp0q

⃗
τ
pPq “
Fpjq
#
⃗
τ
h1 P Fpj´1q
pPq :

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

j
ÿ

Lir ph1 , Pq ď

r“1

min

max

j
ÿ

⃗
τ
gPFpj´1q
pPq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

+
Lir pg, Pq ` τj ph1 q

⃗
τ pPq “ F ⃗ϵ pSq.
Claim 4. For all j, Fpjq
pjq

⃗
τ pPq “ F ⃗ϵ pSq “ H. For j ě 1, we
Proof. We use induction on j. For j “ 0, we have Fp0q
p0q

have

⃗
τ
h1 P Fpjq
pPq
⃗
τ
Ø h1 P Fpj´1q
pPq,

1

Øh P

⃗ϵ
Fpj´1q
pSq,

⃗ϵ
Ø h1 P Fpj´1q
pSq,

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

j
ÿ

Lir ph1 , Pq ď

r“1
j
ÿ

1

Lir ph , Pq ď

r“1
j
ÿ

Lir ph1 , Sq ď

r“1

min

max

j
ÿ

⃗
τ
gPFpj´1q
pPq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

min

max

min

max

j
ÿ

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pSq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pSq

ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

j
ÿ

Lir pg, Pq ` τj ph1 q

Lir pg, Pq ` τj ph1 q
Lir pg, Sq ` ϵj ph1 q

r“1

⃗ϵ
Ø h1 P Fpjq
pSq

⃗

⃗
τ
⃗ϵ
where the second line follows from the induction assumption (Fpj´1q
pPq “ Fpj´1q
pSq) and

the third line follows from the definition of τj . This establishes our claim.
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We have that for all j ď ℓ, the model h satisfies

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

j
ÿ

Lir ph, Pq “

r“1

ď

“

“

j
ÿ

max
ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

Lir ph, Sq ` νj1 phq

r“1

min

max

min

max

j
ÿ

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pSq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

⃗
ϵ
gPFpj´1q
pSq

ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs

min

max

j
ÿ

Lir pg, Sq ` ϵj phq ` α ` νj1 phq
Lir pg, Pq ` νj2 ` ϵj phq ` α ` νj1 phq

r“1
j
ÿ

⃗
τ
gPFpj´1q
pPq ti1 ,...,ij uĎrKs r“1

Lir pg, Pq ` τj phq ` α

where the first inequality follows from Equation (3.12). The third line follows from the
definition of νj2 . The last equality follows from Claim 4 and the fact that τj phq “ ϵj phq `
νj1 phq`νj2 . The proof is complete by the uniform convergence bound provided in the theorem
statement. With probability at least 1 ´ δ over the random draws of the data set S, we have
maxh1 PH |νj1 ph1 q| ď jβpδq and |νj2 | ď jβpδq, and hence for all j ď ℓ,

}τ }8

"
*
1
“ max max
τj ph q
1ďjďℓ h1 PH
"
*
"
*
1
1 1
2
ď max max
ϵj ph q ` max max
|νj ph q| ` |νj |
1
1
1ďjďℓ

1ďjďℓ

h PH

h PH

ď α ` 2lβpδq

We can now instantiate the above theorem in a classification setting in which we have VCtype convergence bounds. A corollary that we get by applying standard uniform convergence
bounds for finite VC classes is the following:
Corollary 1 (Generalization for Convex Lexifairness: Classification Setting). Suppose H
is a class of binary classifiers with VC dimension dH and let Lz ppq “ Eh„p rLz phqs for any
randomized model p P ∆H where Lz phq “ 1 thpxq ‰ yu is the zero-one loss. We have that
for every P, every data set S ” tGk uk of size n sampled i.i.d. from P, if a model p P ∆H
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satisfies pℓ, αq-convex lexicographic fairness with respect to S, then with probability at least
1 ´ δ it also satisfies pℓ, 2αq-convex lexicographic fairness with respect to P provided that
ˆ
min |Gk | “ Ω

1ďkďK

l2 pdH log pnq ` log pK{δqq
α2
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˙

Chapter 4
Private Fair Learning
Motivated by settings in which predictive models may be required to be non-discriminatory
with respect to certain attributes (such as race), but even collecting the sensitive attribute
may be forbidden or restricted, we initiate the study of fair learning under the constraint
of differential privacy. We design two learning algorithms that simultaneously promise differential privacy and equalized odds, a “fairness” condition that corresponds to equalizing
false positive and negative rates across protected groups. Our first algorithm is a private
implementation of the equalized odds post-processing approach of [67]. This algorithm is
appealingly simple, but must be able to use protected group membership explicitly at test
time, which can be viewed as a form of “disparate treatment”. Our second algorithm is a
differentially private version of the oracle-efficient in-processing approach of [3] that can be
used to find the optimal fair classifier, given access to a subroutine that can solve the original (not necessarily fair) learning problem. This algorithm is more complex but need not
have access to protected group membership at test time. We identify new tradeoffs between
fairness, accuracy, and privacy that emerge only when requiring all three properties, and
show that these tradeoffs can be milder if group membership may be used at test time. We
conclude with a brief experimental evaluation.

4.1. Introduction
Large-scale algorithmic decision making, often driven by machine learning on consumer
data, has increasingly run afoul of various social norms, laws and regulations. A prominent
concern is when a learned model exhibits discrimination against some demographic group,
perhaps based on race or gender. Concerns over such algorithmic discrimination have led to
a recent flurry of research on fairness in machine learning, which includes both new tools and
methods for designing fair models, and studies of the tradeoffs between predictive accuracy
and fairness [2].
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At the same time, both recent and longstanding laws and regulations often restrict the
use of “sensitive” or protected attributes in algorithmic decision-making. U.S. law prevents
the use of race in the development or deployment of consumer lending or credit scoring
models, and recent provisions in the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
restrict or prevent even the collection of racial data for consumers. These two developments
— the demand for non-discriminatory algorithms and models on the one hand, and the
restriction on the collection or use of protected attributes on the other — present technical
conundrums, since the most straightforward methods for ensuring fairness generally require
knowing or using the attribute being protected. It seems difficult to guarantee that a trained
model is not discriminating against (say) a racial group if we cannot even identify members
of that group in the data.
A recent line of work [94, 138] made these cogent observations, and proposed an interesting
solution employing the cryptographic tool of secure multiparty computation (commonly
abbreviated MPC ). In this model, we imagine a commercial entity with access to consumer
data that excludes race, but this entity would like to build a predictive model for, say,
commercial lending, under the constraint that the model be non-discriminatory by race
with respect to some standard fairness notion (e.g. equality of false rejection rates). In
order to do so, the company engages in MPC with a set of regulatory agencies, which are
either trusted parties holding consumers’ race data [138], or hold among them a secret
sharing of race data, provided by the consumers themselves [94]. Together the company and
the regulators apply standard fair machine learning techniques in a distributed fashion. In
this way the company never directly accesses the race data, but still manages to produce
a fair model, which is the output of the MPC. The guarantee provided by this solution is
the standard one of MPC — namely, the company learns nothing more than whatever is
implied by its own consumer data, and the fair model returned by the protocol .
Our point of departure stems from our assertion that MPC is the wrong guarantee to
give if our motivation is ensuring that data about an individual’s race does not “leak”
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to the company via the model. In particular, MPC implies nothing about what individual
information can already be inferred from the learned model itself . The guarantee we prefer is
that the company’s data and the fair model do not leak anything about an individual’s race
beyond what can be inferred from “population level” correlations. That is, the fair model
should not leak anything beyond inferences that could be carried out even if the individual
in question had declined to provide her racial identity. This is exactly the type of promise
made by differential privacy [36], but not by MPC.
The insufficiency of MPC. To emphasize the fact that concerns over leakage of protected
attributes under the guarantee of MPC are more than hypothetical, we describe a natural
example where this leakage would actually occur.
Example. An SVM model, trained in the standard way, is represented by the underlying
support vectors, which are just data points from the training data. Thus, if race is a feature
represented in the training data, an SVM model computed under MPC reveals the race of the
individuals represented in the support vectors. This is the case even if race is uncorrelated
with all other features and labels, in which case differential privacy would prevent such
inferences. We note that there are differentially private implementations of SVMs.
The reader might object that, in this example, the algorithm is trained to use racial data
at test time, and so the output of the algorithm is directly affected by race. But there are
also examples in which the same problems with MPC can arise even when race is not an
input to the learned model, and race is again uncorrelated with the company’s data. We also
note that SVMs are just an extreme case of a learned model fitting, and thus potentially
revealing, its training data. For example, points from the training set can also be recovered
from trained neural networks [133].
Our approach: differential privacy. These examples show that cryptographic approaches
to “locking up” sensitive information during a training process are insufficient as a privacy
mechanism — we need to explicitly reason about what can be inferred from the output of a
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learning algorithm, not simply say that we cannot learn more than such inferences. In this
paper we thus instead consider the problem of designing fair learning algorithms that also
promise differential privacy with respect to consumer race, and thus give strong guarantees
about what can be inferred from the learned model.
We note that the guarantee of differential privacy is somewhat subtle, and does not promise
that the company will be unable to infer race. For example, it might be that a feature that
the company already has, such as zip codes, is perfectly correlated with race, and a computation that is differentially private might reveal this correlation. In this case, the company
will be able to infer racial information about its customers. However, differential privacy
prevents leakage of individual racial data beyond what can be inferred from population-level
correlations.
Like [138], our approach can be viewed as a collaboration between a company holding nonsensitive consumer data and a regulator holding sensitive data. Our algorithms allow the
regulator to build fair models from the combined data set (potentially also under MPC)
in a way that ensures the company, or any other party with access to the model or its
decisions, cannot infer the race of any consumer in the data much more accurately than
they could do from population-level statistics alone. Thus, we comply with the spirit of laws
and regulations asking that sensitive attributes not be leaked, while still allowing them to
be used to enforce fairness.
4.1.1. Our Results
We study the problem of learning classifiers from data with protected attributes. More
specifically, we are given a class of classifiers H and we output a randomized classifier in
∆pHq (i.e. a distribution over H). The training data consists of m individual data points
of the form pX, A, Y q. Here X P X is the vector of unprotected attributes, A P A is the
protected attribute and Y P t0, 1u is the binary label. As discussed above, our algorithms
achieve three goals simultaneously:
• Differential privacy: Our learning algorithms satisfy differential privacy [36] with
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respect to protected attributes. (They need not be differentially private with respect
to the unprotected attributes X — although sometimes are.)
• Fairness: Our learning algorithms guarantee approximate notions of statistical fairness across the groups specified by the protected attribute. The particular statistical
fairness notion we focus on is Equalized Odds [67], which in the binary classification
case reduces to asking that false positive rates and false negative rates be approximately equal, conditional on all values of the protected attribute (but our techniques
apply to other notions of statistical fairness as well, including statistical parity).
• Accuracy: Our output classifier has error rate comparable to non-private benchmarks
in ∆pHq consistent with the fairness constraints.
We evaluate fairness and error as in-sample quantities. Out-of-sample generalization for
both error and fairness follow from standard sample-complexity bounds in learning theory,
and so we elide this complication for clarity (but see e.g. the treatment in [89] for formal
generalization bounds).
We start with a simple extension of the post-processing approach of [67]. Their algorithm
starts with a possibly unfair classifier Yp and derives a fair classifier by mixing Yp with
classifiers which are based on protected attributes. This involves solving a linear program
which takes quantities q̂ŷay as input. Here q̂ŷay is the fraction of data points with Yp “ ŷ, A “
a, Y “ y. To make this approach differentially private with respect to protected attributes,
we start with Yp which is learned without using protected attributes and we use standard
techniques to perturb the q̂ŷay ’s before feeding them into the linear program, in a way that
guarantees differential privacy. We analyze the additional error and fairness violation that
results from the perturbation. Detailed results can be found in Section 4.3.
Although having the virtue of being exceedingly simple, this first approach has two significant drawbacks. First, even without privacy, this post-processing approach does not in
general produce classifiers with error that is comparable to that of the best fair classifiers,
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and our privacy preserving modification inherits this limitation. Second, and often more
importantly, this post-processing approach crucially requires that protected attributes can
be used at test time, and this isn’t feasible (or legal) in certain applications. Even when it
is, if racial information is held only by a regulator, although it may be feasible to train a
model once using MPC, it probably is not feasible to make test-time decisions repeatedly
using MPC.
We then consider the approach of [3], which we refer to it as in-processing (to distinguish
it from post-processing). They give an oracle-efficient algorithm, which assumes access to
a subroutine that can optimally solve classification problems absent a fairness constraint
(in practice, and in our experiments, these “oracles” are implemented using simple learning heuristics). Their approach does not have either of the above drawbacks: it does not
require that protected features be available at test time, and it is guaranteed to produce
the approximately optimal fair classifier. The algorithm is correspondingly more complicated. The main idea of their approach (following the presentation of [89]) is to show that
the optimal fair classifier can be found as the equilibrium of a zero-sum game between a
“Learner” who selects classifiers in H and an “Auditor” who finds fairness violations. This
equilibrium can be approximated by iterative play of the game, in which the Auditor plays
exponentiated gradient descent and the Learner plays best responses (computed via an efficient cost-sensitive classification oracle). To make this approach private, we add Laplace
noise to the gradients used by the Auditor and we let the Learner run the exponential
mechanism (or some other private learning oracle) to compute approximate best responses.
Our technical contribution is to show that the Learner and the Auditor still converge to an
approximate equilibrium despite the noise introduced for privacy. Detailed results can be
found in Section 4.4.
One of the most interesting aspects of our results is an inherent tradeoff that arises between
privacy, accuracy, and fairness, that doesn’t arise when any two of these desiderata are
considered alone. This manifests itself as the parameter “B” in our in-processing result (see
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Table 2) which mediates the tradeoff between error, fairness and privacy. This parameter also
appears in the (non-private) algorithm of [3]—but there it serves only to mediate a tradeoff
between fairness and running time. At a high level, the reason for this difference is that
without the need for privacy, we can increase the number of iterations of the algorithm to
decrease the error to any desired level. However, when we also need to protect privacy, there
is an additional tradeoff, and increasing the number of iterations also requires increasing
the scale of the gradient perturbations, which may not always decrease error.
This tradeoff exhibits an additional interesting feature. Recall that as we discussed above,
the in-processing approach works even if we can not use protected attributes at test time.
But if we are allowed to use protected attributes at test time, we are able to obtain a
better tradeoff between these quantities — essentially eliminating the role of the variable B
that would otherwise mediate this tradeoff. We give details of this improvement in section
4.4.1 (for this result, we also need to relax the fairness requirement from Equalized Odds
to Equalized False Positive Rates). The main step in the proof is to show that, for small
constant B and H containing certain “maximally discriminatory” classifiers which make
decisions solely on the basis of group membership, we can give a better characterization of
the Learner’s strategy at the approximate equilibrium of the zero-sum game.
Finally, we provide evidence that using protected attributes at test time is necessary for
obtaining this better tradeoff. In Section 4.4.2, we consider the sensitivity of computing the
error of the optimal classifier subject to fairness constraints. We show that this sensitivity
can be substantially higher when the classifier cannot use protected attributes at test time,
which shows that higher error must be introduced to estimate this error privately.
4.1.2. Related Work
The literature on algorithmic fairness is growing rapidly, and is by now far too extensive
to exhaustively cover here. See [23] for a recent survey. Our work builds directly on that
of [67], [3], and [89]. In particular, [67] introduces the “equalized odds” definition that we
take as our primary fairness goal, and gave a simple post-processing algorithm that we
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Algorithm

Assumptions
on H

Fairness
Guarantee

Needs
access to A
at test time?

Does it
guarantee
privacy of
X as well?

DP-postprocessing

None

Equalized
Odds

Yes

No

dH ă 8
dH :“ V CpHq

Equalized
Odds

No

No

|H| ă 8

Equalized
Odds

No

Yes

r
O

|H| ă 8,
H has maximally
discriminatory
classifiers

Equalized
False Positive
Rate

Yes

Yes

r
O

DP-oracle-learner

Error

´
r
O

|A|
mϵ

ˆ
r
O

¯

b
B
min q̂ay

ˆ

b
B
min q̂ay

ˆ
|A|
min q̂ay

b

Fairness Violation

´

8

r
O

˙
|A|dH
mϵ

ˆ
r
B ´1 ` O

˙
|A| lnp|H|q
mϵ

b
1
min q̂ay

ˆ
r
O

¯

b
1
min q̂ay

ˆ
r
B ´1 ` O

˙
|A| lnp|H|q
mϵ

1
min q̂ay mϵ

|A|
min q̂ay

b

˙
|A|dH
mϵ

˙
|A| lnp|H|q
mϵ

˙
|A| lnp|H|q
mϵ

Table 2: Summary of Results for Our Differentially Private Fair Learning Algorithms. In this table, m is
the training sample size, q̂ay is the fraction of data with A “ a and Y “ y, |A| is the number of protected
groups, and ϵ is the privacy parameter. B is explained in text. For all but the marked error bound, the
comparison benchmark is the optimal fair classifier. The marked bound is compared to a weaker benchmark:
the outcome of the non-private post-processing procedure.

modify to make differentially private. [3] derives an “oracle efficient” algorithm which can
optimally solve the fair empirical risk minimization problem (for a variety of statistical
fairness constraints, including equalized odds) given oracles (implemented with heuristics)
for the unconstrained learning problem. [89] generalize this algorithm to be able to handle
infinitely many protected groups. We give a differentially private version of [3] as well.
Our paper is directly inspired by [94], who study how to train fair machine learning models
by encrypting sensitive attributes and applying secure multiparty computation (SMC). We
share the goal of [94]: we want to train fair classifiers without leaking information about
an individual’s race through their participation in the training. Our starting point is the
observation that differential privacy, rather than secure multiparty computation, is the right
tool for this.
We use differential privacy [36] as our notion of individual privacy, which has become an
influential “solution concept” for data privacy in the last decade. See [32] for a survey. We
make use of standard tools from this literature, including the Laplace mechanism [36], the
exponential mechanism [108] and composition theorems [34, 38].
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4.2. Model and Preliminaries
Suppose we are given a data set of m individuals drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution
P where each individual is described by a tuple pX, A, Y q. X P X forms a vector of unprotected attributes, A P A is the protected attribute where |A| ă 8, and Y P Y is a binary
p
label. Without loss of generality, we write A “ t0, 1, . . . , |A| ´ 1u and let Y “ t0, 1u. Let P
denote the empirical distribution of the observed data. Our primary goal is to develop an
algorithm to learn a (possibly randomized) fair classifier Yp , with an algorithm that guarantees the privacy of the sensitive attributes A. By privacy, we mean differential privacy,
and by fairness, we mean (approximate versions of) the Equalized Odds condition of [67].
Both of these notions are parameterized: differential privacy has a parameter ϵ, and the approximate fairness constraint is parameterized by γ. Our main interest is in characterizing
the tradeoff between ϵ, γ, and classification error.
4.2.1. Notations
• P and E refer to the probability and expectation operators taken with respect to the
p and E
p are the corresponding empirical versions.
true underlying distribution P. P
• We will use notation FPa pYp q and TPa pYp q to refer to the false and true positive rates
of Yp on the subpopulation tA “ au.
”
ı
FPa pYp q “ P Yp “ 1|A “ a, Y “ 0

,

”
ı
TPa pYp q “ P Yp “ 1|A “ a, Y “ 1

x a pYp q and TP
x a pYp q are used to refer to the empirical false and true positive rates.
FP
∆FPa pYp q “ |FPa pYp q ´ FP0 pYp q| and ∆TPa pYp q “ |TPa pYp q ´ TP0 pYp q| are used to
x a pYp q and
measure Yp ’s false and true positive rate discrepancies across groups. ∆FP
x a pYp q are the corresponding empirical versions.
∆TP
p Yp “ ŷ, A “ a, Y “ ys is the empirical fraction of the data with Yp “ ŷ, A “ a,
• q̂ŷay “ Pr
p
and Y “ y. With slight abuse of notation, we will use q̂ay “ PrA
“ a, Y “ ys “
q̂1ay ` q̂0ay to denote the empirical fraction of the data with A “ a and Y “ y. We
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will see that mina,y q̂ay shows up in our analyses and plays a role in the performance
of our algorithms.
p Yp ‰ Y s is the training error of the classifier Yp . Given a randomized
• errp
x Yp q “ Pr
”
ı
p
x
“ Eh„Q PrhpXq
classifier Q P ∆pHq, errpQq
‰Ys .
4.2.2. Fairness
Definition 4.2.1 (γ-Equalized Odds Fairness). We say a classifier Yp satisfies the γEqualized Odds condition with respect to the attribute A, if for all a, a1 P A, the false
and true positive rates of Yp in the subpopulations tA “ au and tA “ a1 u are within γ of
one another. In other words, for all a, a1 P A,
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇFPa pYp q ´ FPa1 pYp qˇ ď γ

,

ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇTPa pYp q ´ TPa1 pYp qˇ ď γ

The above constraint involves quadratically many inequalities in |A|. It will be more convenient to instead work with a slightly different formulation of γ-Equalized Odds in which we
constrain the difference between false and true positive rates in the subpopulation tA “ au
and the corresponding rates for tA “ 0u to be at most γ for all a ‰ 0. The choice of group 0
as an anchor is arbitrary and without loss of generality. The result is a set of only linearly
many constraints. For all a P A:
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
∆FPa pYp q “ ˇFPa pYp q ´ FP0 pYp qˇ ď γ

,

ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
∆TPa pYp q “ ˇTPa pYp q ´ TP0 pYp qˇ ď γ

Since the distribution P is not known, we will work with empirical versions of the above
quantities, in which all the probabilities will be taken with respect to the empirical distribup Since we will generally be dealing with this definition of fairness,
tion of the observed data P.
we will use the shortened term “γ-fair ” throughout the paper to refer to “γ-Equalized Odds
fair ”.
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4.2.3. Differential Privacy
Let D be a data universe from which a database D of size m is drawn and let M be an
algorithm that takes the database D as input and outputs M pDq P O. Informally speaking,
differential privacy requires that the addition or removal of a single data entry should have
little (distributional) effect on the output of the mechanism. In other words, for every pair
of neighboring databases D „ D1 P Dm that differ in at most one entry, differential privacy
requires that the distribution of M pDq and M pD1 q are “close” to each other where closeness
are measured by the privacy parameters ϵ and δ.
Definition 4.2.2 (pϵ, δq-Differential Privacy (DP) [36]). A randomized algorithm M :
Dm Ñ O is said to be pϵ, δq-differentially private if for all pairs of neighboring databases
D, D1 P Dm and all O Ď O,
“
‰
P rM pDq P Os ď eϵ P M pD1 q P O ` δ

where P is taken with respect to the randomness of M . if δ “ 0, M is said to be ϵ-DP.
Recall that our data universe is D “ pX , A, Yq, which will be convenient to partition as
pX , Yq ˆ A. Given a dataset D of size m, we will write it as a pair D “ pDI , DS q where
DI P pX , Yqm represents the insensitive attributes and DS P Am represents the sensitive
attributes. We will sometimes incidentally guarantee differential privacy over the entire
data universe D (see Table 2), but our main goal will be to promise differential privacy
only with respect to the sensitive attributes. Write DS „ DS1 to denote that DS and DS1
differ in exactly one coordinate (i.e. in one person’s group membership). An algorithm is
pϵ, δq-differentially private in the sensitive attributes if for all DI P pX , Yqm and for all
DS „ DS1 P Am and for all O Ď O, we have:
“
‰
P rM pDI , DS q P Os ď eϵ P M pDI , DS1 q P O ` δ
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Differentially private mechanisms usually work by deliberately injecting perturbations into
quantities computed from the sensitive data set, and used as part of the computation. The
injected perturbation is sometimes “explicitly” in the form of a (zero-mean) noise sampled
from a known distribution, say Laplace or Gaussian, where the scale of noise is calibrated
to the sensitivity of the query function to the input data. However, in some other cases, the
noise is “implicitly” injected by maintaining a distribution over a set of possible outcomes
for the algorithm and outputting a sample from that distribution. The Laplace or Gaussian
mechanisms which are two standard techniques to achieve differential privacy follow the
former approach by adding Laplace or Gaussian noise of appropriate scale to the outcome
of computation, respectively. The Exponential mechanism instead falls into the latter case
and is often used when an object, say a classifier, with optimal utility is to be chosen
privately. In the setting of this paper, to guarantee the privacy of the sensitive attribute A
in our algorithms, we will be using the Laplace and the Exponential Mechanisms which are
briefly reviewed below. See [32] for a more detailed discussion and analysis.
Let’s start with the Laplace mechanism which, as stated before, perturbs the given query
function f with zero-mean Laplace noise calibrated to the ℓ1 -sensitivity of the query function. The ℓ1 -sensitivity of a function is essentially how much a function would change in ℓ1
norm if one changed at most one entry of the database.
Definition 4.2.3 (ℓ1 -sensitivity of a function). The ℓ1 -sensitivity of f : Dm Ñ Rk is
›
›
∆f “ max ›f pDq ´ f pD1 q›1
D,D 1 PD m
D„D1

Definition 4.2.4 (Laplace Mechanism [36]). Given a query function f : Dm Ñ Rk , a
database D P Dm , and a privacy parameter ϵ, the Laplace mechanism outputs:

frϵ pDq “ f pDq ` pW1 , . . . , Wk q
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where Wi ’s are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap p∆f {ϵq.
Keep in mind that besides having privacy, we would like the privately computed query frϵ pDq
to have some reasonable accuracy. The following theorem which uses standard tail bounds
for a Laplace random variable formalizes the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy for the
Laplace mechanism.
Theorem 4.2.1 (Privacy vs. Accuracy of the Laplace Mechanism [36]). The Laplace mechanism guarantees ϵ-differential privacy and that with probability at least 1 ´ δ,

||frϵ pDq ´ f pDq ||8 ď ln

˙
ˆ ˙ ˆ
∆f
k
¨
δ
ϵ

While the Laplace mechanism is often used when the task at hand is to calculate a bounded
numeric query (e.g. mean, median), the Exponential mechanism is used when the goal is to
output an object (e.g. a classifier) with maximum utility (i.e. minimum loss). To formalize
the exponential mechanism, let ℓ : Dm ˆ H Ñ R be a loss function that given an input
database D P Dm and h P H, specifies the loss of h on D by ℓ pD, hq. Without a privacy
constraint, the goal would be to output argminhPH ℓ pD, hq for the given database D, but
when privacy is required, the private algorithm must output argminhPH ℓ pD, hq with some
“perturbation” which is formalized in the following definition. Let ∆ℓ be the sensitivity of
the loss function ℓ with respect to the database argument D. In other words,

ˇ
`
˘ˇ
∆ℓ “ max max ˇℓ pD, hq ´ ℓ D1 , h ˇ
hPH

D,D 1 PD m
D„D1

Definition 4.2.5 (Exponential Mechansim [108]). Given a database D P Dm and a privacy
parameter ϵ, output h P H with probability proportional to exp p´ϵℓpD, hq{2∆ℓq.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Privacy vs. Accuracy of the Exponential Mechanism [108]). Let h‹ “
argminhPH ℓ pD, hq and r
hϵ P H be the output of the Exponential mechanism. We have that
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r
hϵ is ϵ-DP and that with probability at least 1 ´ δ,
ˆ
|ℓpD, r
hϵ q ´ ℓ pD, h‹ q | ď ln

|H|
δ

˙ ˆ
˙
2∆ℓ
¨
ϵ

4.3. Differentially Private Fair Learning: Post-processing
In this section we will present our first differentially private fair learning algorithm which will
be called DP-postprocessing. The DP-postprocessing algorithm is a private variant of
the fair learning algorithm introduced in [67] where decisions made by an arbitrary base
classifier Yp have their false and true positive rates equalized across different groups tA “ au
in a post-processing step. Due to the desire for privacy of the sensitive attribute A, we
assume the base classifier Yp is trained only on the unprotected attributes X and that A is
used only for the post-processing step.
The proposed algorithm of [67] derives a fair classifier Ypp by mixing Yp with classifiers depending on the protected attributes. Ypp is specified by a parameter p “ ppŷa qŷ,a , a vector
of probabilities such that pŷa :“ PrYpp “ 1|Yp “ ŷ, A “ as. Among all fair Ypp ’s, the one with
minimum error can be found by solving a linear program whose coefficients depend only
on the q̂ŷay quantities, and thus privacy will be achieved if these quantities are calculated
privately using the Laplace mechanism. Once we do this, the differential privacy guarantees of the algorithm will follow from the post-processing property. While the approach
is straightforward and simply implementable, the privately learned classifier will need to
explicitly take as input the sensitive attribute A at test time which is not feasible (or legal)
in all applications.
We have the DP-postprocessing algorithm written in Algorithm 9. Notice as discussed
above, to guarantee differential privacy of the protected attribute, Algorithm 9 computes
Ă (4.1). In this
q̃ŷay (a noisy version of q̂ŷay ) and then feeds q̃ŷay into the linear program LP
Ă TP)
Ă are defined with respect to q̃ŷay
linear program, terms with tildes (e.g. q̃ay , err,
Ă FP,
instead of q̂ŷay . We analyze the performance of Algorithm 9 in Theorem 4.3.1. The main
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step of the proof is to understand how the introduced noise propagates to the solution of
the linear program.
Ă ϵ-Differentially Private Linear Program
LP:
argmin
p

Ă Ypp q
errp
4 ln p4|A|{βq
mintq̃a0 , q̃00 umϵ
Ă a pYpp q ď γ ` 4 ln p4|A|{βq
∆TP
mintq̃a1 , q̃01 umϵ

Ă a pYpp q ď γ `
s.t. @a P A ∆FP
a‰0

0 ď pŷa ď 1

(4.1)

@ŷ, a

´ ¯
ř
ř
err
Ă Ypp :“ ŷ,a pq̃ŷa0 ´ q̃ŷa1 q ¨ pŷa ` ŷ,a q̃ŷa1
ˇ
ˇ
´ ¯
´
¯
´
¯
Ă a pYp q ¨ p1a ` 1 ´ FP
Ă a pYp q ¨ p0a ´ FP
Ă 0 pYp q ¨ p10 ´ 1 ´ FP
Ă 0 pYp q ¨ p00 ˇˇ
Ă a Ypp :“ ˇˇFP
∆FP
ˇ
ˇ
´
¯
´
¯
´ ¯
Ă a pYp q ¨ p1a ` 1 ´ TP
Ă a pYp q ¨ p0a ´ TP
Ă 0 pYp q ¨ p10 ´ 1 ´ TP
Ă 0 pYp q ¨ p00 ˇˇ
Ă a Ypp :“ ˇˇTP
∆TP

Algorithm 9 ϵ-differentially private fair classification: DP-postprocessing
Input: privacy parameter ϵ,
confidence parameter β, fairness violation γ,
training examples tpXi , Ai , Yi qum
i“1
➔ Train the base classifier Yp on tpXi , Yi qum
i“1 .
p
p
➔ Calculate q̂ŷay “ PrY “ ŷ, A “ a, Y “ ys.
i.i.d.

➔ Sample Wŷay „ Lap p2{mϵq for all ŷ, a, y.
➔ Perturb each q̂ŷay : q̃ŷay “ q̂ŷay ` Wŷay .
Ă (4.1) to get the minimizer p̃‹ .
➔ Solve LP
Output: p̃‹ , the trained classifier Yp
Theorem 4.3.1 (Error-Privacy, Fairness-Privacy Tradeoffs). Suppose

mintq̂ay u ą 4 ln p4|A|{βq { pmϵq
a,y

Let pp‹ be the optimal γ-fair solution of the non-private post-processing algorithm of [67]
Ă (4.1). With
and let pr‹ be the output of Algorithm 9 which is the optimal solution of LP
probability at least 1 ´ β,
´ ¯
´ ¯ 24|A| ln p4|A|{βq
x Yppr‹ ď err
err
x Yppp‹ `
mϵ
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and for all a ‰ 0,
´ ¯
x a Yppr‹ ď γ `
∆FP

8 ln p4|A|{βq
mintq̂a0 , q̂00 umϵ ´ 4 ln p4|A|{βq

´ ¯
x a Yppr‹ ď γ `
∆TP

8 ln p4|A|{βq
mintq̂a1 , q̂01 umϵ ´ 4 ln p4|A|{βq

We emphasize that the accuracy guarantee stated in Theorem 4.3.1 is relative to the nonprivate post-processing algorithm, not relative to the optimal fair classifier. This is because
the non-private post-processing algorithm itself has no such optimality guarantees: its main
virtue is simplicity. In the next section, we analyze a more complicated algorithm that is
competitive with the optimal fair classifier.

4.4. Differentially Private Fair Learning: In-processing
γ-fair ERM Problem
min
QP∆pHq

x
errpQq

x a pQq ď γ
s.t. @a P A: ∆FP

(4.2)

a‰0

x a pQq ď γ
∆TP

In this section we will introduce our second differentially private fair learning algorithm
which will be called DP-oracle-learner and is based on the algorithm presented in [3].
Essentially, [3] reduces the γ-fair learning problem (4.2) into the following Lagrangian minmax problem:
min
QP∆pHq

max
λPΛ

LpQ, λq :“ errpQq
x
` λJ rppQq

(4.3)

Here H is a given class of binary classifiers with dH “ V CDpHq ă 8 and ∆pHq is the set
of all randomized classifiers that can be obtained by functions in H. rppQq is a vector of
fairness violations of the classifier Q across groups, and λ P Λ “ tλ : ||λ||1 ď Bu is the
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dual variable where the bound B is chosen to ensure convergence. In this work,
»

fi
x a pQq ´ FP
x 0 pQq ´ γ
FP

—
ffi
—
ffi
— FP
x 0 pQq ´ FP
x a pQq ´ γ ffi
—
ffi
rppQq :“ —
ffi
—x
ffi
x
TP
pQq
´
TP
pQq
´
γ
— a
ffi
0
–
fl
x
x
TP0 pQq ´ TPa pQq ´ γ

P R4p|A|´1q

aPA

,

»
fi
λpa,0,`q
—
ffi
—
ffi
—λ
ffi
pa,0,´q
—
ffi
λ“—
ffi
—
ffi
λ
— pa,1,`q ffi
–
fl
λpa,1,´q

P R4p|A|´1q

aPA

a‰0

a‰0

The method developed by [3], in the language of [89] gives a reduction from finding an optimal fair classifier to finding the equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum game played between
a “Learner” (Q-player) who needs to solve an unconstrained learning problem (given access
to an efficient cost-sensitive classification oracle) and an “Auditor” (λ-player) who finds
fairness violations. In an iterative framework, having the learner play its best response and
the auditor play a no-regret learning algorithm (we use exponentiated gradient descent, or
“multiplicative weights”) guarantees convergence of the average plays to the equilibrium
([56]).
In Algorithm 11, to make the above approach differentially private, Laplace mechanism
is used by the Auditor when computing the gradients and we let the Learner run the
exponential mechanism (or some other private learning oracle) to compute approximate
best responses. This is the differentially private equivalent of assuming access to a perfect
oracle, as is done in [3, 89]. In practice, the exponential mechanism would be substituted for
a computationally efficient private learner with heuristic accuracy guarantees. Subroutine 10
reduces the Learner’s best response problem to privately solving a cost sensitive classification
problem solved with a private oracle CSCϵ1 pHq. Here we sketch the main steps of analyzing
Algorithm 11.
We assume in this section that the VC dimension of H (“ dH ) is finite, in which case the
set of strategies for the Learner reduces to ∆pHpSqq, where HpSq is the set of all possible labellings induced on S :“ tXi um
i“1 by H. In other words, HpSq “ tphpX1 q, . . . , hpXm qq|h P Hu
and recall that |HpSq| ď OpmdH q by Sauer’s Lemma. Note that since the privacy of the
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protected attribute A is required, we need A to be excluded from the domain of functions in
H (“A-blind classification”) and accordingly, from the set S. Because otherwise there might
be some privacy loss of A through using HpSq as the range of the exponential mechanism for
the private Learner. This assumption is of course not necessary if one is willing to instead
assume |H| ă 8. We will have a discussion later where we state our guarantees assuming
|H| ă 8 instead of dH ă 8. Note that having HpSq as the range of the exponential mechanism used by the private Learner implies the privacy of the unprotected attributes X is not
guaranteed. However, in the more general setting where |H| ă 8 is assumed, the privacy of
the unprotected attributes comes for free as there will be no reduction of H to HpSq.
1

Algorithm 10 BESTϵh
1
Input: λ, training examples tpXi , Ai , Yi qum
i“1 , privacy guarantee ϵ
for i “ 1, . . . , m do
Ci0 Ð 1tYi ‰ 0u
ř λpa,Yi ,`q ´λpa,Yi ,´q
λ
´λpAi ,Yi ,´q
Ci1 Ð 1tYi ‰ 1u ` pAi ,Yi ,`q
1tAi ‰ 0u ´
1tAi “ 0u
q̂A Y
q̂A Y
i i

aPA

i i

a‰0

end
‹
Call CSCϵ1 pHq with tXi , Ci0 , Ci1 um
i“1 to get h .
Output: h‹
Algorithm 11 pϵ, δq-differentially private fair classification: DP-oracle-learner
Input: privacy parameters pϵ, δq,
bound B, VC dimension dH , confidence parameter β, fairness violation γ,
training examples tpXi , Ai , Yi qum
i“1
c
a
B ln p4|A| ´ 3qmϵ
1 ln p4|A| ´ 3q
a
T Ð
, ηÐ
2
T
2 p2|A|B ` 1q ln p1{δq pdH ln pmq ` ln p2{βqq
θr1 Ð 0 P R4p|A|´1q
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
rt,k Ð B řexppθrt,k q
λ

for 1 ď k ď 4p|A| ´ 1q
a
r
r t q with ϵ1 “ ϵ{p4 T lnp1{δqq
ht Ð BESTh pλ
1`

k1
ϵ1

exppθrt,k1 q

?
8|A| T lnp1{δq
i.i.d.
Sample Wt P R4p|A|´1q where Wt,k „ Lapp pmina,y tq̂ay um´1q¨ϵ q
rrt Ð rpt pr
ht q ` Wt
θrt`1 Ð θrt ` η rrt

end
r Ð 1 řT r
Q
t“1 ht ,
T
r
r λq
Output: pQ,

rÐ
λ

1
T

řT

t“1 λt

r
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We first bound the regret of the Learner and the Auditor in Lemma 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 by
understanding how the introduced noise affect these regrets. Proofs of these Lemmas follow
from the “sensitivity” and “accuracy” of the private players.
Lemma 4.4.1 (Regret of the Private Learner). Suppose tr
ht uTt“1 is the sequence of best
r t uT by the private Learner over T rounds. We have that with probability at
responses to tλ
t“1
least 1 ´ β{2,
T
1 ÿ r r
1
Lpht , λt q ´
T t“1
T

min
QP∆pHq

T
ÿ

rtq ď
LpQ, λ

8 p2|A|B ` 1q

t“1

a
T ln p1{δq pdH ln pmq ` ln p2T {βqq
pmina,y tq̂ay um ´ 1q ¨ ϵ

r t uT be the sequence of exponentiated
Lemma 4.4.2 (Regret of the Private Auditor). Let tλ
t“1
gradient descent plays (with learning rate η) by the private Auditor to given tr
ht uTt“1 of the
private Learner over T rounds. We have that with probability at least 1 ´ β{2,
T

T

ÿ
1
1 ÿ r r
Lpht , λt q ď
max
Lpr
ht , λq ´
T λPΛ t“1
T t“1
¸2
˜
a
4|A| T lnp1{δq lnp8T |A|{βq
B lnp4|A| ´ 3q
` 4ηB 1 `
pmina,y tq̂ay um ´ 1q ¨ ϵ
ηT

Now in Theorem 4.4.3, given the regret bounds of Lemma 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, we can characterize the average plays of both players. This theorem provides a formal guarantee that the
r of Algorithm 11 forms a “ν-approximate equilibrium” of the game between
r λq
output pQ,
the Learner and the Auditor (where ν is specified in the theorem). This property essentially
means neither play would gain more than ν if they palyed an strategy other than the ones
output by the Algorithm.
r be the output of Algorithm 11. We have that with probability
r λq
Theorem 4.4.3. Let pQ,
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r is a ν-approximate solution of the game, i.e.,
r λq
at least 1 ´ β, pQ,

r ď LpQ, λq
r `ν
r λq
LpQ,

for all Q P ∆pHq

r ě LpQ,
r λq
r λq ´ ν
LpQ,

for all λ P Λ

and that
d

¨
r˝
ν“O

B
mina,y tq̂ay u

˛
a
|A| ln p1{δq pdH lnpmq ` ln p1{βqq ‚
mϵ

r notation.
where we hide further logarithmic dependence on m, ϵ, and |A| under the O
We are now ready to conclude the DP-oracle-learner algorithm’s analysis with the main
theorem of this subsection that provides high probability bounds on the accuracy and
r of Algorithm 11. These bounds can be viewed as revealing
fairness violation of the output Q
the inherent tradeoff between privacy of the algorithm and accuracy or fairness of the output
classifier where a stronger privacy guarantee (i.e. smaller ϵ and δ) will lead to weaker
accuracy and fairness guarantees.
r be the output of
r λq
Theorem 4.4.4 (Error-Privacy, Fairness-Privacy Tradeoffs). Let pQ,
Algorithm 11 and let Q‹ be the solution to the non-private γ-fair ERM problem 4.2. We
have that with probability at least 1 ´ β,

r ď errpQ
errp
x Qq
x ‹ q ` 2ν

and for all a ‰ 0,
x a pQq
r ď γ ` 1 ` 2ν
∆FP
B
1
`
2ν
x a pQq
r ďγ`
∆TP
B
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where
d

¨
r˝
ν“O

B
mina,y tq̂ay u

˛
a
|A| lnp1{δq pdH lnpmq ` lnp1{βqq ‚
mϵ

Remark 4.4.1. Notice the bounds stated above reveal a tradeoff between accuracy and
fairness violation that we may control through the parameter B. As B gets increased, the
upper bound on error will get looser while the one on fairness violation gets tighter. We will
consider a setting in the next subsection where we can remove this extra tradeoff and choose
B as small as possible — at the cost of requiring that the classifiers be able to use protected
attributes at test time.
We assumed so far in this section that the protected attribute A is not available to the
classifiers in H (“A-blind” classification) and stated all our bounds in terms of dH . In the
more general setting where classifiers in H could depend on A (“A-aware” classification),
similar results hold. The only change to make is to replace lnpmdH q with lnp|H|q in Algorithm
11 (when computing the number of iterations T ) and in the bounds. See Theorem 4.4.5 for
this generalization.
Theorem 4.4.5 (Error-Privacy, Fairness-Privacy Tradeoffs). Suppose |H| ă 8 and let
r be the output of Algorithm 11 that runs for
r λq
pQ,
a
B lnp4|A| ´ 3qmϵ
a
T “
2 p2|A|B ` 1q ln p1{δq pln p|H|q ` ln p2{βqq
iterations, and let Q‹ be the solution to the non-private γ-fair ERM problem 4.2. We have
that with probability at least 1 ´ β,

r ď errpQ
x Qq
x ‹ q ` 2ν
errp
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and for all a ‰ 0,
x a pQq
r ď γ ` 1 ` 2ν
∆FP
B
1
`
2ν
x a pQq
r ďγ`
∆TP
B
where
d

¨
B
r˝
ν“O
mina,y tq̂ay u

˛
a
|A| ln p1{δq pln p|H|{βqq ‚
mϵ

4.4.1. An Extension: Better Tradeoffs for A-aware Classification
In this subsection we show that if we only ask for equalized false positive rates (instead
of equalized odds, which also requires equalized true positive rates), and moreover, if we
assume H includes all “maximally discriminatory” classifiers (see Assumption 4.4.1), the
fairness violation guarantees given in Theorem 4.4.5 can be improved. As a consequence,
the tradeoff discussed in Remark 4.4.1 will be no longer an issue. Thus, in this subsection,
we are interested in solving the γ-fair ERM Problem 4.4 which now only has false positive
parity constraints.
γ-fair ERM Problem
min
QP∆pHq

errpQq
x
(4.4)

x a pQq ď γ
s.t. @a P A: ∆FP
a‰0

Assumption 4.4.1. H includes all maximally discriminatory classifiers (i.e. group indicator functions): tha pX, Aq “ 1A“a , h̄a pX, Aq “ 1A‰a |a P Au Ď H.
Theorem 4.4.6 (Error-Privacy, Fairness-Privacy Tradeoffs). Suppose |H| ă 8, B ą |A|´1,
r be the output of Algorithm 11, and let Q‹ be the
r λq
and let Assumption 4.4.1 hold. Let pQ,
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solution to the γ-fair ERM problem 4.4. We have that with probability at least 1 ´ β,

r ď errpQ
errp
x Qq
x ‹ q ` 2ν

and for all a ‰ 0,

x a pQq
r ďγ`
∆FP

2ν
B ´ p|A| ´ 1q

4.4.2. A Separation: A-blind vs. A-aware Classification
In this subsection we show that the sensitivity of the accuracy of the optimal classifier
subject to fairness constraints can be substantially higher if it is prohibited from using
sensitive attributes at test time. This implies that higher error must be introduced when
estimating this accuracy subject to differential privacy. This shows a fundamental tension
between the goals of trading off privacy and approximate equalized odds, with the goal of
preventing disparate treatment. Given a data set D of m individuals, define f pDq to be
the optimal error rate in the γ-fair ERM problem 4.4 which is constrained to have a false
positive rate disparity of at most γ.
Consider the following problem instance. Let X be the unprotected attribute taking value
in X “ tU, V u, and let A be the protected attribute taking value in A “ tR, Bu. Suppose H
consists of two classifiers h0 and hU where h0 pX, Aq “ 0 and hU pX, Aq “ 1X“U . Notice that
both h0 and hU depend only on the unprotected attribute. Consider two other classifiers hR
and hB that depend on the protected attribute: hR pX, Aq “ 1A“R and hB pX, Aq “ 1A“B .
Theorem 4.4.7. Consider γ ą 1{m and data sets with mina q̂a0 ě C for some constant
C ą 0. If H “ th0 , hU u, the sensitivity of f is Ωp1{pγmqq. If the “maximally discriminatory”
classifier hR and hB are included in H as well, i.e. H “ th0 , hU , hR , hB u, the sensitivity of
f is Op1{mq.
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Figure 4: Left figure shows the Pareto frontier of error and (equalized odds) fairness violation for the DPoracle-learner algorithm on the Communities dataset across different privacy parameters . Right figure shows
the corresponding Pareto curves for the DP-postprocessing algorithm. Each point on the private curves is
averaged over many rounds to reduce the effect of noise variance. See text for details.

4.5. Experimental Evaluation
As a proof of concept, we empirically evaluate our two algorithms on a common fairness
benchmark dataset: the Communities and Crime dataset9 from the UC Irvine Machine
Learning Repository. We refer the reader to [88] for an outline of potential fairness concerns
present in the dataset. We clean and preprocess the data identically to [88]. Our main
experimental goal is to obtain, for both algorithms, the Pareto frontier of error and fairness
violation tradeoffs for different levels of differential privacy. To elaborate, for a given setting
of input parameters, we start with the target fairness violation bound γ “ 0 and then
increase it over a rich pre-specified subset of r0, 1s while recording for each γ the error and
the (realized) fairness violation of the classifier output by the algorithm. We take H to be
the class of linear threshold functions, β “ 0.05, and δ “ 10´7 .
Logistic regression is used as the base classifier of the DP-postprocessing algorithm in
our experiments. To implement the Learner’s cost-sensitive classification oracle used in the
DP-oracle-learner algorithm, following [88], we build a regression-based linear predictor
9

Briefly, each record in this dataset summarizes aggregate socioeconomic information about both the
citizens and police force in a particular U.S. community, and the problem is to predict whether the community
has a high rate of violent crime.
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for each vector of costs (C0 and C1 ), and classify a point according to the lowest predicted
cost. We made this private following the method of [132]: computing each regression as
pX T Xq´1 X T Cb , and adding appropriately scaled Laplace noise to both X T X and X T Cb .
Note when the sensitive attribute A is not included in X, noise need not be added to X T X
as we only need to guarantee the privacy of A.
The theory is ambiguous in its predictions about which algorithm should perform better: the
“privacy cost” is higher for the in-processing algorithm, but the benchmark that the postprocessing algorithm competes with is weaker. We would generally expect therefore that on
sufficiently large datasets, the in-processing algorithm would obtain better tradeoffs, but on
small datasets, the post-processing algorithm would.
Our experimental results appear in Fig. 4. Indeed, on our relatively small dataset (m « 2K),
the post-processing algorithm can obtain good tradeoffs between accuracy and fairness at
meaningful levels of ϵ, whereas the in-processing algorithm cannot. Nevertheless, we can
empirically obtain the “shape” of the Pareto curve trading off accuracy and fairness for
unreasonable levels of ϵ using our algorithm. This is still valuable, because the value of ϵ
obtained by our algorithms predictably decreases as the dataset size m increases without
otherwise changing the dynamics of the algorithm. For example, if we “upsampled” our
dataset by a factor of 10 (i.e. taking 10 copies of the dataset), the result would be a reasonably sized dataset of m « 20K. Our algorithm run on this upsampled dataset would obtain
the same tradeoff curve but now with meaningful values of ϵ. In the left panel of Fig. 4, ϵ is
the actual privacy parameter used in the experiments; while ϵ1 is the value that the privacy
parameter would take on the dataset that was upsampled by a factor of 10.
Recall that the post-processing approach requires the use of the protected attribute at
test time, but the in-processing approach does not. Our results therefore suggest that the
requirement that we not use the protected attribute at test time might be burdensome if
we also want the protections of differential privacy and have only small dataset sizes. In
contrast, it can be overcome with the in-processing algorithm at larger dataset sizes.
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Chapter 5
Multiaccurate Proxies for Downstream Fairness
In this chapter, we study the problem of training a model that must obey demographic
fairness conditions when the sensitive features are not available at training time — in
other words, how can we train a model to be fair by race when we don’t have data about
race? We adopt a fairness pipeline perspective, in which an “upstream” learner that does
have access to the sensitive features will learn a proxy model for these features from the
other attributes. The goal of the proxy is to allow a general “downstream” learner — with
minimal assumptions on their prediction task — to be able to use the proxy to train a model
that is fair with respect to the true sensitive features. We show that obeying multiaccuracy
constraints with respect to the downstream model class suffices for this purpose, and provide
sample- and oracle efficient-algorithms and generalization bounds for learning such proxies.
In general, multiaccuracy can be much easier to satisfy than classification accuracy, and can
be satisfied even when the sensitive features are hard to predict.

5.1. Introduction
There are various settings in which there is a desire to train a model that is fair with
respect to some sensitive features (e.g. race and gender), but in which the values for these
features are unavailable in the training data. This might be for legal reasons (e.g. in the
United States it is against the law to use race as an input to consumer lending models), or
for policy reasons (e.g. many large consumer-facing organizations choose not to ask their
customers for such information). This leads to an apparent technical conundrum: How can
we be fair by race if we don’t have data about race?
Standard practice when attempting to enforce statistical fairness constraints in the absence
of sensitive data is to attempt to predict individual sensitive features z—like race—using
proxies ẑ that predict z from other available features x. For example, the popular “Bayesian
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Improved Surname Geocoding” method [50] attempts to predict race from an individual’s
location and surname. But what properties should ẑ have, and how can we achieve them
algorithmically? The answer is not obvious. Suppose for a moment that z P t0, 1u is binary
valued. It has been observed in prior work that training a binary valued ẑ to minimize
classification error can yield a proxy that results in substantial bias even when used to solve
the easier auditing problem (i.e. bias detection only, not bias mitigation) on a downstream
predictive model h [11, 18]. Finding a proxy for the learning problem is only harder.
5.1.1. Our Model and Results
We envision a pipeline model in which an upstream Proxy Learner (PL) has access to a data
set with sensitive features, but without knowledge of what learning problems a variety of
Downstream Learners (DLs) might want to solve. We consider two cases: either the PL has
access to samples of labels from the distribution over problems that the DLs are interested
in, or else hypothesizes that the labels the DLs wish to learn can be predicted using models
from some binary-valued function class. The DLs do not have access to the sensitive features
z. The goal of the PL is to train a proxy model ẑ that tries to predict the conditional
expectation of z, conditional on the other observable features x. A good proxy will have the
property that for most DLs, training subject to demographic fairness constraints imposed
via the proxy ẑ will result in the same model that would have been obtained from imposing
constraints directly on z. In the body of the paper we focus on equal error rate constraints,
but in the appendix we show how our techniques extend to other standard measures of
demographic fairness, including statistical parity and false positive/negative rate equality.
We make a connection between the PL’s problem and multiaccuracy as defined by [72],
which informally asks that a model ẑ be statistically unbiased on a large collection of sets
G. We note that if our proxy ẑ is appropriately multiaccurate over groups defined by a
function class H, then it serves as a good proxy for downstream fair learning problems
over the hypothesis class H. For statistical parity, we simply need multiaccuracy over the
collection of sets G “ H — i.e. the collection of sets corresponding to points that each
h P H labels as positive. Past work gives algorithms for learning multiaccurate functions
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ẑ with respect to any collection of groups such that membership in those groups can be
determined at test time — which it can, in the case of groups defined by a known function
class H [72]. Because statistical parity is a fairness constraint that is defined independently
of the labels, a proxy ẑ that is multiaccurate with respect to H can be used to solve any
downstream learning problem over H subject to a statistical parity constraint. For an equal
error fairness constraint, we require that ẑ satisfy multiaccuracy over a collection of sets G
corresponding to error regions of each h P H. Whether an individual falls into such an error
region is not observable by a deployed classifier (since this depends on the unobserved label
y), and so we must develop new algorithms for this case. These error regions depend on
the labelling function (i.e. the learning problem), and so to serve as a good proxy for many
different downstream learning problems, ẑ must be multiaccurate with respect to the error
regions defined using many different labelling functions. We provide two ways to do this:
1. If the labelling functions come from a distribution over problems, then we show how
to take a polynomially sized sample from this distribution, and use it to train a proxy
ẑ that is a good proxy for most learning problems in the distribution (i.e. we give a
PAC-style bound with respect to the problem distribution).
2. If the labelling functions come from a bounded VC-class we can optimize over, then
we show how to train a proxy ẑ that is a good proxy for every labelling function
generated from that class.
In all cases, our algorithms are oracle efficient, meaning they are efficient reductions to
standard empirical risk minimization problems.
5.1.2. Related Work
Using proxies for race and ethnicity is standard practice in financial and other settings in
which sensitive features are often unavailable but fairness is a concern. Common features
used for prediction include surname, first name, and geographic location [50, 140, 146].
Several papers, beginning with [18], have considered the problem of evaluating measures of
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statistical fairness on a fixed classifier using a proxy for the sensitive attribute of interest.
[18] characterize the bias that is introduced in estimating the degree to which a fixed
classifier violates the statistical parity (also known as demographic disparity) condition,
when a proxy representing a thresholding of the conditional probability of a binary sensitive
attribute is used. They also show that when the proxy is computed using the same features
as the downstream classification, the true conditional expectation of the protected attribute
(conditional on the non-sensitive features) can be used to give an unbiased estimate of the
demographic disparity. [11] embark on a similar study for evaluating disparities in false
positive and negative rates, and characterize the distortion factor of a proxy as a function
of properties of the underlying distribution, and propose estimating this distortion factor
and then trying to correct for it.
Several papers also aim at postprocessing or training fair models without sensitive features.
[10] consider perturbations of sensitive features (e.g. as they might be if labelled using
crowdsourced workers) and give conditions (such as conditional independence of the noisy
sensitive features and the predicted label) under which post-processing a fixed classifier
to equalize false positive or negative rates as measured under the proxy will reduce the
true disparity between false positive or negative rates subject to the true sensitive features.
In similar noise models, [141] propose robust optimization based approaches to fairness
constrained training with noisy sensitive features and [109] consider the problem of fair
subset selection. [101] propose to solve a minimax optimization problem over an enormous
set of “computationally identifiable” subgroups, under the premise that if there exists a
good proxy for a sensitive feature, then it will be included as one of these computationally
identifiable groups defined with respect to the other features. This is related to the notion
of subgroup fairness studied by [89] and [72] — but this approach generally leads to a
degradation in accuracy.
A related line of work considers cryptographic solutions in a setting in which the relevant
sensitive features for individuals are available—held by a third party in [137], or by the

90

individuals themselves in [93]—but can only be accessed via cryptographic means like secure
multiparty computation. Similarly, [76] studies the case in which the sensitive features can
only be used in a differentially private way. These papers are similarly motivated, but
operate in a very different setting.
Several papers study fairness constraints in pipelines, in which an individual is subject to a
sequence of classification decisions, and study how the effects of these constraints compound
[15, 47, 85]. Many results in this literature are negative. Our paper gives a positive result
in this setting.

5.2. Model and Preliminaries
Let Ω “ X ˆ Z ˆ Y be an arbitrary data domain. Each data point is a triplet ω “ px, z, yq,
where x P X is the feature vector excluding the sensitive attributes, z P Z is a vector of
sensitive attributes, and y P Y “ t0, 1u is the binary label. In this paper we take Z “ t0, 1uK ,
and every z P Z is a K-dimensional binary vector representing which groups (out of K
groups) an individual is a member of. For instance, in a case with K “ 4 groups, an
individual with z “ p0, 1, 0, 1q is a member of the second and fourth groups. We will use zk
to denote the kth entry of z.
We assume there exists a distribution P over the unlabeled data domain X ˆ Z. We assume
the labels are generated by functions in some domain F Ď tf : X ˆZ Ñ Yu. In other words,
for any data point ω “ px, z, yq P Ω, there exists a function f P F such that y “ f px, zq. This
is without loss of generality if we make no assumptions on the complexity of F — in this case,
functions f can be randomized and represent arbitrary conditional label distributions, and
will be the setting we operate in when we assume there is a distribution over F. Alternately,
we can make assumptions about the capacity of F, and then aim to form good proxies for
every labelling function in F. The data generation process can be viewed as first drawing
px, zq from P, and then letting y “ f px, zq for some f P F. We may additionally assume
there exists a probability distribution Q over F. More details are discussed later on.
Our primary goal in this paper is to learn a proxy for z as a function of features x, which
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we write as ẑ, such that any downstream classifier satisfies a variety of fairness constraints
with respect to the learned proxy ẑ if and only if it satisfies the same fairness constraints
with respect to the true underlying z, up to small approximation. Let G Ď tg : X Ñ r0, M su
be a class of functions that map a feature vector x P X to a real-valued number in r0, M s.
Given G, our goal will be to learn ẑ “ pẑ1 , . . . , ẑK q such that for all k, ẑk P G. The kth
component of ẑ can be interpreted as a real-valued predictor for zk .
We assume the downstream learning task for which we want to guarantee fairness can
be cast as learning over a hypothesis class H Ď th : X Ñ Yu. Thus the goal of the
DLs will be to learn h P H such that h satisfies some statistical notion of fairness. These
fairness notions generally require that a statistic of the learned classifier be (approximately)
equalized across different groups. While our methods will apply to a broad class of fairness
notions including statistical parity and equalized false positive and negative rates (see the
appendix for details), in the body we focus on equalized error fairness which requires that
the error rate of the learned classifier be (approximately) equalized across groups. In other
words, h P H satisfies equalized error fairness if:

@k1 , k2 P rKs :

Pr rhpxq ‰ y|zk1 “ 1s « Pr rhpxq ‰ y|zk2 “ 1s

(5.1)

We first make the following simple, yet important, observation that will allow us to write
fairness constraints, usually defined with respect to binary valued group membership, using
a real valued proxy. The proof is given in the appendix.
Claim 5. For every k P rKs, we have

Pr rhpxq ‰ y|zk “ 1s “

E rzk 1 rhpxq ‰ yss
E rzk s

(5.2)

Observe that the expression on the right hand side of Equation (5.2) could be evaluated
even if the sensitive feature labels z were real valued rather than binary valued. We exploit
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this to be able to evaluate these equalized error fairness constraints with our real valued
proxies ẑ. Observe that if we have a proxy ẑ P G, such that for a particular classifier h P H:

@k P rKs :

E rzk 1 rhpxq ‰ yss
E rẑk pxq1 rhpxq ‰ yss
«
E rzk s
E rẑk pxqs

(5.3)

then if h satisfies proxy fairness constraints defined by the proxy ẑ, i.e., constraints of the
form:
@k1 , k2 P rKs :

E rẑk1 pxq1 rhpxq ‰ yss
E rẑk2 pxq1 rhpxq ‰ yss
«
E rẑk1 pxqs
E rẑk2 pxqs

(5.4)

it will also satisfy the original fairness constraints with respect to the real sensitive groups
z and vice versa (Equation (5.1)). If the condition in Equation (5.3) is satisfied for every
h P H, then the proxy fairness constraints (Equation (5.4)) can without loss be used to
optimize over all fair classifiers in H. With this idea in mind, we can formally define a
(good) proxy. The constraints we ask for can be interpreted as so-called multiaccuracy
or mean consistency constraints as studied by [72, 82], defined over the error regions of
hypotheses in the class H: ttpx, yq : hpxq ‰ yu : h P Hu. We will consider two different
settings for modelling a multiplicity of downstream learning problems: 1) when there exists
a distribution over F and we want our guarantee to hold with high probability over a draw
of f from this distribution, and 2) when we want our guarantee to hold for every f P F.
Definition 5.2.1 (Proxy). Fix a distribution P over pX ˆ Zq and a distribution Q over
F. We say ẑ is an pα, βq-proxy for z with respect to pP, Qq, if with probability 1 ´ β over
the draw of f „ Q: for all classifiers h P H, and all groups k P rKs,
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ Epx,zq„P rzk 1 rhpxq ‰ f px, zqss Epx,zq„P rẑk pxq1 rhpxq ‰ f px, zqss ˇ
ˇďα
ˇ
´
ˇ
ˇ
Epx,zq„P rzk s
Epx,zq„P rẑk pxqs
If the above condition holds for every f P F, we say ẑ is an α-proxy with respect to P. When
providing in sample guarantees, we take the distributions to be the uniform distributions
over the data set. When distributions are clear from context, we simply write that ẑ is an
pα, βq-proxy.
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Do such proxies exist? We first show the existence of perfect proxies, under the assumption
that the sensitive features and the labels are conditionally independent given the other
features. Note that this conditional independence assumption can be satisfied in a number
of ways — and in particular is always satisfied if either the sensitive features or the labels
can be determined as a function of the non-sensitive features — even if the relationship is
arbitrarily complex. For example this will be the case for prediction tasks in which human
beings are near perfect. The proxy that we exhibit below is the conditional expectation
defined over the underlying joint distribution on x and z, and hence will generally not be
learnable from polynomially sized samples. Subsequently, we will demonstrate that we can
obtain proxies that can be learned with modest sample complexity. We note in the appendix
that perfect proxies always exist (without requiring a conditional independence assumption)
for statistical parity fairness.
Claim 6 (Existence of a Proxy). For any distribution P over X ˆ Z, ẑpxq “ E rz|xs is an
α-proxy with respect to P, for α “ 0, provided that z and y are independent conditioned on
x.
The proof is provided in the appendix.
Modelling the Proxy Learner (PL). The PL wants to learn a proxy in ẑ P G K as
defined in Definition 5.2.1. Solving this problem requires the knowledge of distributions;
however, typically we will only have samples. Therefore, we assume the PL has access to
a data set, which consists of two components: 1) S “ tpxi , zi quni“1 which is a sample of n
individuals from X ˆ Z represented by their non-sensitive features and sensitive attributes.
Throughout we will take S to be n i.i.d. draws from the underlying distribution P. 2)
F “ tfj um
j“1 which is a sample of m labeling functions (or learning tasks) taken from F.
The PL does not observe the actual functions fj P F but instead observes the realized labels
of functions in F on our data set of individuals S: Y “ tyij “ fj pxi , zi qui,j . The empirical
problem of the PL is to find a proxy ẑ with respect to the observed data sets. In this paper
we have the PL optimize squared error subject to the constraints given by the definition of
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a proxy:

minimize
ẑk P G
subject to

n
1ÿ
pzik ´ ẑk pxi qq2
n i“1
řn
řn
1 rhpxi q ‰ yij s
ẑk pxi q1 rhpxi q ‰ yij s
i“1 zik
řn
“ i“1 řn
, @j P rms, h P H
i“1 zik
i“1 ẑk pxi q

(5.5)

Note this formulation gives us a decomposition of learning ẑ “ pẑ1 , . . . , ẑK q P G K into
learning each component ẑk P G separately.
Modelling the Downstream Learner (DL).

The DLs want to solve fair learning prob-

lems using models in some class H Ď th : X Ñ Yu subject to the equalized error fairness
constraint given in Equation (5.1). The DL does not have access to the sensitive attribute
z and instead is given the proxy ẑ P G K learned by the PL. Thus, for a given learning task
represented by some f P F (which in turn determines the label y “ f px, zq), the DL solves
the following learning task subject to proxy fairness constraints.
minimize
hPH

E rerr ph; px, yqqs

subject to

E rẑk2 pxq1 rhpxq ‰ yss
E rẑk1 pxq1 rhpxq ‰ yss
«
, @k1 , k2 P rKs
E rẑk1 pxqs
E rẑk2 pxqs

(5.6)

where err is some arbitrary objective function, and all expectations here are taken with
respect to a draw of an individual px, zq from P. Observe that if ẑ is an α-proxy, then this is
equivalent to solving the original fairness constrained learning problem (defined with respect
to the true demographic features z) in which the fairness constraints have slack at most 2α.
In addition, we observe that pα, βq-proxies approximately preserve group-wise error, false
positive, or false negative rates for all downstream h P H. Therefore, although we focus
on a particular class of fairness constraints, they can be used to optimize any objective or
enforce any constraint that depends only on these error rates. This includes in particular
minimax group fairness [27, 105] and lexicographic fairness [28]. We remind the reader that
our focus in this paper is to solve the problem of the PL, and hence, we avoid standard
issues that the DL will face, such as relating empirical and distributional quantities (these
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issues are identical whether the DL uses the sensitive features z directly or a proxy ẑ).
Game Theory and Online Learning Basics.

In our analysis, we rely on several key

concepts in game theory and online learning which we summarize here. Consider a zero-sum
game between two players, a Learner with strategies in S1 and an Auditor with strategies
in S2 . The payoff function of the game is U : S1 ˆ S2 Ñ Rě0 .
Definition 5.2.2 (Approximate Equilibrium). A pair of strategies ps1 , s2 q P S1 ˆ S2 is said
to be a ν-approximate minimax equilibrium of the game if the following conditions hold:

U ps1 , s2 q ´ min
U ps11 , s2 q ď ν,
1
s1 PS1

max U ps1 , s12 q ´ U ps1 , s2 q ď ν

s12 PS2

Freund and Schapire [56] show that if a sequence of actions for the two players jointly has
low regret, then the uniform distribution over each player’s actions forms an approximate
equilibrium:
Theorem 7 (No-Regret Dynamics [56]). Let S1 and S2 be convex, and suppose U p¨, s2 q :
S1 Ñ Rě0 is convex for all s2 P S2 and U ps1 , ¨q : S2 Ñ Rě0 is concave for all s1 P S1 . Let
ps11 , s21 , . . . , sT1 q and ps12 , s22 , . . . , sT2 q be sequences of actions for each player. If for ν1 , ν2 ě 0,
the regret of the players jointly satisfies
T
ÿ
t“1

U pst1 , st2 q ´ min

s1 PS1

T
ÿ

U ps1 , st2 q ď ν1 T,

t“1

max

s2 PS2

T
ÿ
t“1

U pst1 , s2 q ´

T
ÿ

U pst1 , st2 q ď ν2 T

t“1

ř
then the pair ps̄1 , s̄2 q is a pν1 ` ν2 q-approximate equilibrium, where s̄1 “ T1 Tt“1 st1 P S1 and
ř
s̄2 “ T1 Tt“1 st2 P S2 are the uniform distributions over the action sequences.

5.3. Learning a Proxy from Data
We now give a general oracle efficient algorithm that the Proxy Learner can use to learn
a proxy, whenever the underlying proxy class G K is expressive enough to contain one. Our
algorithm is in fact a general method for obtaining a multiaccurate regression function ẑ
with respect to an arbitrary collection of sets — we instantiate it with sets defined by the
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error regions of classifiers h P H. In contrast to the algorithms for multiaccurate learning
given by [72, 98], our new algorithm has the advantage that it does not need to be able to
evaluate which sets a new example is a member of at test time (but has the disadvantage
that it must operate over a sufficiently expressive model class). This is crucial for us, because
we will not know whether a new example x falls into the error region of a classifier h before
we learn its label.
Our derivation proceeds as follows. First, we rewrite the constraints in Program (5.5) as a
large linear program. We then appeal to strong duality to derive the Lagrangian of the linear
program. We note that computing an approximately optimal solution to the linear program
corresponds to finding approximate equilibrium strategies for both players in the game in
which one player “The Learner” controls the primal variables and aims to minimize the
Lagrangian value, and the other player “The Auditor” controls the dual variables and aims
to maximize the Lagrangian value. Finally, if we construct our algorithm in such a way that
it simulates repeated play of the Lagrangian game such that both players have sufficiently
small regret, we can apply Theorem 7 to conclude that our empirical play converges to an
approximate equilibrium of the game. In our algorithm, the Learner approximately best
responds to the mixed strategy of the Auditor – who plays Follow the Perturbed Leader
(FTPL) [84] (see the appendix for details). Note that it is the functions played by the
Learner that will eventually form the proxy output by the Proxy Learner.
Our algorithm will be oracle efficient: it will make polynomially many calls to oracles that
solve ERM problems over H and G. The specific types of oracles that we need are defined
as follows.
Definition 5.3.1 (Cost Sensitive Classification Oracle for H). An instance of a Cost Sensitive Classification problem, or a CSC problem, for the class H is given by a set of n tuples
txi , c0i , c1i uni“1 such that cli corresponds to the cost for predicting label l on sample xi . Given
such an instance as input, a CSCpHq oracle finds a hypothesis h P H that minimizes the
‰
ř “
total cost across all points: h P argminh1 PH ni“1 h1 pxi qc1i ` p1 ´ h1 pxi qqc0i .
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Definition 5.3.2 (Empirical Risk Minimization Oracle for G). An empirical risk minimization oracle for a class G (abbreviated ERM pGq) takes as input a data set S consisting of
n samples and a loss function L, and finds a function g P G that minimizes the empirical
ř
loss, i.e., g P argming1 PG ni“1 Lpg 1 , Si q.
Specifying the Linear Program.

To transform Program (5.5) into a linear program

amenable to our two-player zero sum game formulation, we do the following: 1) we break
the constraints of Program (5.5), which are given as equality of fractions, into joint equality
of their numerators and denominators. 2) We expand G to the set of distributions over G:
we will find a distribution p P ∆pGq, where ∆pGq is the set of probability distributions over
G, and further linearize our objective function and constraints by taking expectations with
respect to the variable p P ∆pGq. 3) Finally, we ensure that we have finitely many variables
and constraints by assuming that H and G have bounded complexity. In particular, given a
data set S, we can write constraints corresponding to every h P HpSq fi tphpx1 q, . . . , hpxn qq :
h P Hu where HpSq includes the set of all possible labelings induced by H on S. Note that
as long as H has finite VC dimension dH , Sauer’s Lemma implies |HpSq| “ OpndH q, and
therefore we will have only finitely many constraints. Second, instead of working with the
entire class G, for some appropriately chosen ϵ, and given our data set S, we can optimize
over (distributions over) an ϵ-covering of G with respect to the data set S, which we call GpSq.
As long as the class G has finite pseudo-dimension dG , it is known that |GpSq| “ Opϵ´dG q,
and therefore we reduce our primal variables from distributions over G to distributions over
GpSq which will guarantee that we have finitely many variables in our optimization problem.
We provide more details in the appendix. Given these considerations, we therefore formulate
the constrained ERM problem of the PL as follows: for every group k P rKs, the PL solves

98

min
pk P ∆pGpSqq
s.t.

n
”
ı
1ÿ
Eẑk „pk pzik ´ ẑk pxi qq2
n i“1
řn
rẑ px qs
i“1 E
řẑkn„pk k i ´ 1 “ 0,
i“1 zik
n
ÿ
pzik ´ Eẑk „pk rẑk pxi qsq 1 rhpxi q ‰ yij s “ 0,@j P rms, @h P HpSq

(5.7)

i“1

We will solve this constrained optimization problem by simulating a zero sum two player
game on the Lagrangian dual. Given dual variables λ P Rd (where d “ 1 ` m|HpSq|) we
have that the Lagrangian of Program (5.7) is given by:
n
ı
”
1ÿ
(5.8)
Eẑk „pk pzik ´ ẑk pxi qq2
n i“1
»
fi
ˆ řn
˙
n
ÿ
ÿ
—
ffi
i“1 ẑk pxi q
ř
pzik ´ ẑk pxi qq 1 rhpxi q ‰ yij sffi
` Eẑk „pk —
λ
´
1
`
λ
h,j
n
– 0
fl
i“1 zik
i“1

Lpλ, pk q “

hPHpSq
jPrms

Given the Lagrangian, we now have that solving linear program (5.7) is equivalent to solving
the following minimax problem:

min

max Lpλ, pk q “ max

pk P∆pGpSqq λPRd

min

λPRd pk P∆pGpSqq

Lpλ, pk q

(5.9)

where the minimax theorem holds because the range of the primal variable, i.e. ∆pGpSqq,
is convex and compact, the range of the dual variable, i.e. Rd , is convex, and that the
Lagrangian function L is linear in both primal and dual variables. Therefore we focus on
solving the minimax problem (5.9) which can be seen as a two player zero sum game between
the primal player (the Learner) who is controlling pk , and the dual player (the Auditor)
who is controlling λ. Using no-regret dynamics, we will have the Learner deploy its best
response strategy in every round which will be reduced to a call to ERM pGq, and will let
the Auditor with strategies in Λ “ tλ “ pλ0 , λ1 q P Rd : |λ0 | ď C0 , }λ1 “ pλh,j qh,j }1 ď Cu
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play according to Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL). We place upper bounds (C0 and
C) on the components of the dual variable to guarantee convergence of our algorithm; note
that the minimax theorem continues to hold in the presence of these upper bounds. We will
set these upper bounds optimally in our algorithm to guarantee the desired convergence.
Our algorithm is fully described in Algorithm 12, and its guarantee is given in Theorem 8.
The algorithm returns a distribution over the proxy class but we can turn the distribution
into a deterministic regression function that defines a proxy, by simply taking the expectation with respect to that distribution. We note that the Auditor will employ FTPL for the
constraints that depend on h, calling upon the cost sensitive classification oracle.
Given an action ẑk of the Learner, we write LCpẑk q for the vector of costs for labelling
each data point as 1. Note that this formulation allows us to cast our seemingly nonlinear
problem as an n-dimension linear optimization problem, which we do by viewing our costs
as the inner product of the outputs of a classifier h on the n points and the corresponding
cost vector. See the Appendix for a derivation of the costs.
We denote the true distribution over λ1 maintained by the Auditor’s FTPL algorithm by
Qtk . Because Qtk is a distribution over an exponentially large domain pOpndH qq, we can only
aim to represent a sparse version, which we do by efficiently sampling from Qtk ; we call the
empirical distribution Q̂tk . We represent the Auditor’s learned distribution over λ0 by Pkt ,
˘
`
and we find that Pkt :“ C0 2Bernpptk q ´ 1 is a scaled Bernoulli distribution with success
probability ptk , where ptk is given in Algorithm 12. When we sample λ “ pλ0 , λ1 q from the
product distribution Pkt ˆ Q̂tk , this means that we are drawing λ0 from Pkt and λ1 from Q̂tk .
More details are in the appendix.
Theorem 8 (α-Proxy for m labeling functions taken from F). Fix any α, and δ. Suppose
H has finite VC dimension, and G has finite pseudo-dimension. Suppose ∆pGqK contains a
0-proxy. Then given access to oracles CSCpHq and ERM pGq, we have that with probability
at least 1 ´ δ, Algorithm 12 returns a distribution p̂ P ∆pGqK such that ẑpxq fi Eg„p̂ rgpxqs “
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Algorithm 12 Learning a Proxy
Input: Data set txi , yij , zi uni“1 @j P rms, target proxy parameter α, target confidence parameter δ, upper bound M on proxy values, groups křP rKs
Set dual variable upper bounds:
C “ C0 “ pM 2 p1 ` nM q{2α ni“1 zik q ` 1 V
Rc
¯ ř
´
Set iteration count: T “
2p1 ` nM q n3{2 CM ` C0 řnnMzik {α ni“1 zik
i“1
Q
U
ř
TK
2
2
2
2
Set sample count: W “ p1 ` nM q n C M logp 2δ q{ pα ni“1 zik q2
b
b
řn
1
1
1
1 “ i“1 zik
Set learning rates of FTPL: η “ CM
,
η
nT
C0 nM
T
for k “ 1 to K do
Initialize ẑk0 “ 0̄ for t “ 1 to T do
Sample from the Auditor’s FTPL distribution
for w “ 1 to W do
Draw a random vector ξ w uniformly at random from r0, 1sn
Use the oracle CSCpHq to compute:
ř
1
phw,t , j w,t q “ argminhPH,jPrms ´ t1 ăt |xLCj pẑkt q, hy| ` η1 xξ w , hy
‰
“
w,t “ 21 xLC w,t pẑ t q, hw,t y ą 0 ´ 1
Find sign of λw,t
j
k
hw,t ,j w,t : q
“
‰
w,t ˆ C1 h “ hw,t , j “ j w,t
Let λ1w,t be defined as λw,t
h,j “ q
end
Let Q̂tk be the empirical distribution
over λ1w,t ˘
`
Set distribution over λt0 : Pkt “ C”0 2Bernppt q ´ 1 where
ı
ptk “ minp1, ´η 1 p

řn
i“1 ẑk pxi q
ř
n
i“1 zik

´ 1q1

The Learner best responds:

ẑkt

řn
i“1 ẑk pxi q
ř
n
i“1 zik

´1ă0 q

“ argminẑk PG Eλ„P t ˆQ̂t Lpẑk , λq by calling ERM pGq.
k

end
end
Output: p̂ = uniform distribution over tẑ 1 ,...,ẑ T u
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k

p1{T q

řT

t“1 ẑt pxq

is an α-proxy.

5.4. Proxies for the Entire Class of Labeling Functions
Finally, we show that with minor adaptations, and given access to the right oracle, one can
learn a proxy for an entire class of labeling functions F, instead of only a finite sample
of m functions from F. Accordingly, our data set here only consists of n individual S “
tpxi , zi quni“1 , with no observed labels, as our goal is to learn a proxy which is good for every
f P F. In this case, the second set of constraints in Program (5.7) will be re-written as:
ÿn
i“1

pzik ´ Eẑk „pk rẑk pxi qsq 1 rhpxi q ‰ f pxi , zi qs “ 0, @f P F, @h P H

Note that 1rhpxi q ‰ f pxi , zi qs “ 1rph ‘ f qpxi , zi q “ 1s where h ‘ f denotes the XOR
of h and f over the X ˆ Z domain: ph ‘ f qpx, zq “ hpxq ‘ f px, zq. Define H ‘ F “
th ‘ f : h P H, f P Fu. Then, we can rewrite the above constraint as

ÿn
i“1

pzik ´ Eẑk „pk rẑk pxi qsq 1 rgpxi , zi q “ 1s “ 0, @g P H ‘ F

Therefore, assuming access to a cost sensitive classification oracle for H ‘ F, we can solve
the corresponding optimization problem in an oracle-efficient manner. Beyond this change,
the algorithm is nearly identical to Algorithm 12, so details are relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 9 (α-Proxy for the entire F). Fix any α, and δ. Suppose H and F have finite
VC dimension, and G has finite pseudo-dimension. Suppose ∆pGqK contains a 0-proxy.
Then given access to oracles CSCpH ‘ Fq and ERM pGq, we have that with probability at
least 1 ´ δ, Algorithm 12 returns a distribution p̂ P ∆pGqK such that ẑpxq fi Eg„p̂ rgpxqs “
ř
p1{T q Tt“1 ẑt pxq is an α-proxy.

5.5. Generalization Theorems
In this section, we provide generalization guarantees for a proxy using a uniform convergence
approach. First, in Theorem 10, we consider the case where there is no distribution over the
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class of labeling functions F, and we want to form a good proxy for every labelling function
in F; in particular, we show how many samples in S „ P n are required to guarantee (with
high probability over S) that every ẑ that is a good proxy with respect to the sample S is
also a good proxy with respect to the underlying distribution of the data points P. Second,
in Theorem 11, we consider the case where there is a distribution Q over the class of labeling
functions F, in addition to the distribution P over individuals; in particular, we show how
many samples in S „ P n and F „ Qm are required to guarantee (with high probability over
S and F ) that every ẑ that is a good proxy with respect to the sample pS, F q is also a good
proxy with respect to the distributions pP, Qq. We point out that our uniform convergence
bounds are taken over the entire ∆pGqK , not only G K , because our algorithm outputs an
object in ∆pGqK .
It turns out that the sample complexity of learning such proxies can be characterized by
the pseudo-dimension (P dim) of the proxy class G, which is a standard notion used in
the learning theory literature (see for e.g. [70]) to measure the complexity of a real-valued
function class. While we provide the formal definition of pseudo-dimension in the appendix,
we note a couple of facts regarding this notion. First, pseudo-dimension generalizes the
notion of VC dimension (V Cdim) which is typically used to measure the complexity of
binary function classes.
Fact 2 ([70]). If H Ď th : X Ñ t0, 1uu, then P dimpHq “ V CdimpHq.
Second, if G is a class of d-dimensional linear proxies, then P dimpGq “ d (we study this
linear proxy case in the appendix), because it is known that:
Fact 3 ([70]). If G Ď tg : X Ñ Ru forms a vector space of dimension d, then P dimpGq “ d.
With this notion of pseudo-dimension in hand, we formally state our first generalization
theorem below in Theorem 10. We note that in addition to the pseudo-dimension of G,
our sample complexity bound depends on the VC dimension of H and F as well because
we take a uniform convergence approach that requires bounding the difference of empirical
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and distributional expectations appearing in the definition of the proxy, for all classifiers
h P H, and all learning tasks f P F. The sample complexity bound will further depend
polynomially on M (a uniform upper bound for functions in G), µ (smallest probability
measure of groups), and µG (smallest probability measure of groups, determined by proxies
in G). The proof of this theorem is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 10 (Generalization over P). Fix any ϵ and δ. Fix a distribution P over X ˆ Z.
Suppose P dimpGq “ dG , V CdimpFq “ dF , and V CdimpHq “ dH . We have that with
probability at least 1 ´ δ over S „ P n , every ẑ that is an α-proxy with respect to the data
set S is also an pα ` ϵq-proxy with respect to the underlying distribution P, provided that
˜
n “ Ω̃

M 2 pdG ` max tdH , dF u ` log pK{δqq
µµ2G pmin tµ, µG uq2 ϵ2

¸

␣
(
where µ “ min1ďkďK Epx,zq„P rzk s , µG “ inf ẑPG min1ďkďK Epx,zq„P rẑk pxqs .
Remark 1. We remark that Theorem 10 subsumes the case when there is only one, or
more generally, finitely many learning tasks, because it is known that if |F| ă 8, then we
have dF ď log p|F|q.
We note that the sample complexity bound of Theorem 10 grows with the VC dimension of
F, i.e., we are assuming F has bounded complexity (dF ă 8). In our next generalization
theorem, we consider the setting where there is a distribution over F from which an i.i.d.
sample is collected. This distributional modeling allows us to make no assumption on the
complexity of F, i.e., F can have dF “ 8. This allows us to handle real labels, without the
need to make any assumptions about their underlying complexity. The proof of Theorem 11
is provided in the appendix.
Theorem 11 (Generalization over P and Q). Fix any ϵ, δ, and β. Fix a distribution P
over X ˆ Z, and a distribution Q over F. Suppose P dimpGq “ dG , and V CdimpHq “ dH .
We have that with probability at least 1 ´ δ over S „ P n and F „ Qm , every ẑ that is an
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pα, 0q-proxy with respect to the data set pS, F q is also a ppα ` ϵq{β, βq-proxy with respect to
the underlying distributions pP, Qq, provided that
˜
n “ Ω̃

M 2 pdG ` max tdH , log pmqu ` log pK{δqq
µµ2G pmin tµ, µG uq2 ϵ2
˜

m “ Ω̃

M 2 pKdG log p|supppPq|q ` log p1{δqq
µ2G pmin tµ, µG uq2 ϵ4

¸

¸

Remark 2. Our bounds contain the term µG because they are algorithm independent uniform convergence bounds. The algorithms we give in this paper however always produce a ẑ
that satisfies ES rẑk pxqs ě p1{2qES rzk s in sample. Together with standard arguments, this
allows us to give generalization guarantees for our algorithms that remove the dependence
on µG . Technically, this follows from applying our uniform convergence theorems to the class
G K pµq ” tẑ P G K : @k, Epx,zq„P rẑk pxqs “ Ωpµqu.

5.6. Conclusion and Discussion
We have shown that it is possible to efficiently train proxies that can stand in for missing
sensitive features to effectively train downstream classifiers subject to a variety of demographic fairness constraints. We caution however that proxies — even when well trained
— should continue to be viewed as a second best solution, to be used only when sensitive
features are impossible to collect. Our theorems demonstrate that proxies trained using our
methods can stand in as near perfect substitutes for sensitive features in downstream training tasks, but these results crucially depend on the assumption that the data that the Proxy
Learner uses to train its proxy is distributed identically to the data that the Downstream
Learner uses, and has labels from the same problem distribution. In real applications, either
of these assumptions can fail (or can become false due to distribution shift, even if they
are true at the moment that the proxy is trained). A risk of relying on proxies is that the
Learner might be blind to these failures. Without other guardrails, proxies could also be
used to explicitly engage in discrimination, and so should be used only in the context of
enforcing and auditing fairness constraints.
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II

Data Privacy and Beyond

Chapter 6
Adaptive Data Analysis and Differential Privacy
In this chapter, we give a new proof of the “transfer theorem” underlying adaptive data
analysis: that any mechanism for answering adaptively chosen statistical queries that is
differentially private and sample-accurate is also accurate out-of-sample. Our new proof is
elementary and gives structural insights that we expect will be useful elsewhere. We show:
1) that differential privacy ensures that the expectation of any query on the conditional
distribution on datasets induced by the transcript of the interaction is close to its true value
on the data distribution, and 2) sample accuracy on its own ensures that any query answer
produced by the mechanism is close to its conditional expectation with high probability.
This second claim follows from a thought experiment in which we imagine that the dataset
is resampled from the conditional distribution after the mechanism has committed to its
answers. The transfer theorem then follows by summing these two bounds, and in particular,
avoids the “monitor argument” used to derive high probability bounds in prior work.
An upshot of our new proof technique is that the concrete bounds we obtain are substantially
better than the best previously known bounds, even though the improvements are in the
constants, rather than the asymptotics (which are known to be tight). As we show, our new
bounds outperform the naive “sample-splitting” baseline at dramatically smaller dataset
sizes compared to the previous state of the art, bringing techniques from this literature
closer to practicality.

6.1. Introduction
Many data analysis pipelines are adaptive: the choice of which analysis to run next depends on the outcome of previous analyses. Common examples include variable selection
for regression problems and hyper-parameter optimization in large-scale machine learning
problems: in both cases, common practice involves repeatedly evaluating a series of models
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on the same dataset. Unfortunately, this kind of adaptive re-use of data invalidates many
traditional methods of avoiding over-fitting and false discovery, and has been blamed in
part for the recent flood of non-reproducible findings in the empirical sciences [58].
There is a simple way around this problem: don’t re-use data. This idea suggests a baseline
called data splitting: to perform k analyses on a dataset, randomly partition the dataset
into k disjoint parts, and perform each analysis on a fresh part. The standard “holdout
method” is the special case of k “ 2. Unfortunately, this natural baseline makes poor use
of data: in particular, the data requirements of this method grow linearly with the number
of analyses k to be performed.
A recent literature starting with Dwork et al. [44] shows how to give a significant asymptotic improvement over this baseline via a connection to differential privacy: rather than
computing and reporting exact sample quantities, perturb these quantities with noise. This
line of work established a powerful transfer theorem, that informally says that any analysis
that is simultaneously differentially private and accurate in-sample will also be accurate
out-of-sample. The best analysis of this technique shows that for a broad class of analyses
?
and a target accuracy goal, the data requirements grow only with k — a quadratic improvement over the baseline [12]. Moreover, it is known that in the worst case, this cannot
be improved asymptotically [66, 134]. Unfortunately, thus far this literature has had little
impact on practice. One major reason for this is that although the more sophisticated techniques from this literature give asymptotic improvements over the sample-splitting baseline,
the concrete bounds do not actually improve on the baseline until the dataset is enormous.
This remains true even after optimizing the constants that arise from the arguments of
[44] or [12], and appears to be a fundamental limitation of their proof techniques [125].
In this paper, we give a new proof of the transfer theorem connecting differential privacy
and in-sample accuracy to out-of-sample accuracy. Our proof is based on a simple insight
that arises from imagining a “resampling” experiment, and in particular yields an improved
concrete bound that beats the sample-splitting baseline at dramatically smaller data set
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sizes n compared to prior work. In fact, at reasonable dataset sizes, the magnitude of the
improvement arising from our new theorem is significantly larger than the improvement
between the bounds of Bassily et al. [12] and Dwork et al. [44]: see Figure 5.

Max Queries Answered with Width = 0.1 and Uniform Coverage 95.0%

25000

Sample Splitting Baseline
Optimized BNSSSU
DFHPRR
Our Bound

Number of Queries k

20000
15000
10000
5000
0

200000 400000 600000 800000 1000000 1200000 1400000 1600000
Data Set Size n

Figure 5: A comparison of the number of adaptive linear queries that can be answered using the Gaussian
mechanism as analyzed by our transfer theorem (Theorem 6.3.5), the numerically optimized variant of the
bound from Bassily et al. [12] as derived in [125], and the original transfer theorem from [44]. We plot for
each dataset size n, the number of queries k that can be answered while guaranteeing confidence intervals
around the answer that have width α “ 0.1 and uniform coverage probability 1 ´ β “ 0.95. We compare
with the naive sample splitting baseline that simply splits the dataset into k pieces and answers each query
with the empirical answer on a fresh piece.

6.1.1. Proof Techniques
Prior Work

Consider an unknown data distribution P over a data-domain X , and a

dataset S „ P n consisting of n i.i.d. draws from P. It is a folklore observation (attributed
to Frank McSherry) that if a predicate q : X Ñ r0, 1s is selected by an ϵ-differentially private
algorithm M acting on S, then it will generalize in expectation (or have low bias) in the sense
ř
that |Eq„M pSq rEx„P rqpxqs ´ n1 xPS qpxqs| « ϵ. But bounds on bias are not enough to yield
confidence intervals (except through Markov’s inequality), and so prior work has focused on
strengthening the above observation into a high probability bound. For small ϵ, the optimal
ř
2
bound has the asymptotic form: Prq„M pSq r|Ex„P rqpxqs ´ n1 xPS qpxq| ě ϵs ď e´Opϵ nq [12].
Note that this bound does not refer to the estimated answers supplied to the data analyst:
it says only that a differentially private data analyst is unlikely to be able to find a query
whose average value on the dataset differs substantially from its expectation. Pairing this
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with a simultaneous high probability bound on the in-sample accuracy of a mechanism—
that it supplies answers a such that with high probability the empirical error is small:
ř
Pra„M pSq r|a ´ n1 xPS qpxq| ě αs ď β—yields a bound on out-of-sample accuracy via the
triangle inequality.
Dwork et al. [44] proved their high probability bound via a direct computation on the
moments of empirical query values, but this technique was unable to achieve the optimal
rate. Bassily et al. [12] proved a bound with the optimal rate by introducing the ingenious
monitor technique. This important technique has subsequently found other uses [53, 116,
135], but is a heavy hammer that seems unavoidably to yield large constant overhead, even
after numeric optimization [125].
Our Approach

We take a fundamentally different approach by directly providing high

probability bounds on the out-of-sample accuracy |a ´ Ex„P rqpxqs| of mechanisms that are
both differentially private and accurate in-sample. Our elementary approach is motivated by
the following thought experiment: in actuality, the dataset S is fixed before any interaction
with M begins. However, imagine that after the entire interaction with M is complete,
the dataset S is resampled from the conditional distribution Q on datasets conditioned on
the output of M . This thought experiment doesn’t alter the joint distribution on datasets
and outputs, and so any in-sample accuracy guarantees that M has continue to hold under
this hypothetical re-sampling experiment. But because the empirical value of the queries
on the re-sampled dataset are likely to be close to their expected value over the conditional
distribution Q, the only way the mechanism can promise to be sample-accurate with high
probability is if it provides answers that are close to their expected value over the conditional
distribution with high probability.
This focuses attention on the conditional distribution on datasets induced by differentially
private transcripts. But it is not hard to show that a consequence of differential privacy
is that the conditional expectation of any query must be close to its expectation over the
data distribution with high probability. In contrast to prior work, this argument directly
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leverages high-probability in-sample accuracy guarantees of a private mechanism to derive
high-probability out-of-sample guarantees, without the need for additional machinery like
the monitor argument of [12].
6.1.2. Further Related Work
The study of “adaptive data analysis” was initiated by Dwork et al. [41, 44] who provided
upper bounds via a connection to differential privacy, and Hardt and Ullman [66] who
provided lower bounds via a connection to fingerprinting codes. The upper bounds were
subsequently strengthened by Bassily et al. [12], and the lower bounds by Steinke and
Ullman [134] to be (essentially) matching, asymptotically. The upper bounds were optimized
by Rogers et al. [125], which we use in our comparisons. Subsequent work proved transfer
theorems related to other quantities like description length bounds [40] and compression
schemes [25], and expanded the types of analyses whose generalization properties we could
reason about via a connection to a quantity called approximate max information [40, 123].
Feldman and Steinke [51, 52] gave improved methods that could guarantee out-of-sample
accuracy bounds that depended on query variance. Neel and Roth [113] extend the transfer
theorems from this literature to the related problem of adaptive data gathering, which
was identified by Nie et al. [115]. Ligett and Shenfeld [104] give an algorithmic stability
notion they call local statistical stability (also defined with respect to a conditional data
distribution) that they show asymptotically characterizes the ability of mechanisms to offer
high probability out-of-sample generalization guarantees for linear queries. A related line of
work initiated by Russo and Zou [126] and extended by Xu and Raginsky [144] starts with
weaker assumptions on the mechanism (mutual information bounds), and derives weaker
conclusions (bounds on bias, rather than high probability generalization guarantees).
A more recent line of work aims at mitigating the fact that the worst-case bounds deriving
from transfer theorems do not give non-trivial guarantees on reasonably sized datasets.
Zrnic and Hardt [149] show that better bounds can be derived under the assumption that
the data analyst is restricted in various ways to not be fully adaptive. Feldman et al. [54]
showed that overfitting by a classifier because of test-set re-use is mitigated in multi-label
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prediction problems, compared to binary prediction problems. Rogers et al. [125] gave a
method for certifying the correctness of heuristically guessed confidence intervals, which
they show often out-perform the theoretical guarantees by orders of magnitude.
Finally, Elder [48, 49] proposed a Bayesian reformulation of the adaptive data analysis
problem. In the model of [48], the data distribution P is assumed to itself be drawn from
a prior that is commonly known to the data analyst and mechanism. In contrast, we work
in the standard adversarial setting originally introduced by Dwork et al. [44] in which the
mechanism must offer guarantees for worst case data distributions and analysts, and focus
our attention on conditional distributions purely as a proof technique.

6.2. Preliminaries
Let X be an abstract data domain, and let P be an arbitrary distribution over X . A dataset
of size n is a collection of n data records: S “ tSi uni“1 P X n . We study datasets sampled
i.i.d. from P: S „ P n . We will write S to denote the random variable and x for realizations
of this random variable. A linear query is a function q : X ˚ Ñ r0, 1s that takes the following
empirical average form when acting on a data set S P X n :

qpSq “

n
1ÿ
qpSi q.
n i“1

We will be interested in estimating the expectations of linear queries over P. Abusing
notation, given a distribution D over datasets, we write qpDq to denote the expectation of
q over datasets drawn from D, and write Si „ S to denote a datapoint sampled uniformly
at random from a dataset S. Note that for linear queries we have:

qpDq “ ES„D rqpSqs “ ES„D,Si „S rqpSi qs.
We note that for linear queries, when the dataset distribution D “ P n , we have qpP n q “
Ex„P rqpxqs, which we write as qpPq when the notation is clear from context. However,
the more general definition will be useful because we will need to evaluate the expectation
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of q over other (non-product) distributions over datasets in our arguments, and we will
generalize beyond linear queries in Appendices 6.A and 6.B.
Given a family of queries Q, a statistical estimator is a (possibly stateful) randomized
algorithm M : X n ˆ Q˚ Ñ R˚ parameterized by a dataset S that interactively takes as
input a stream of queries qi P Q, and provides answers ai P R. An analyst is an arbitrary
randomized algorithm A : R˚ Ñ Q˚ that generates a stream of queries and receives a stream
of answers (which can inform the next queries it generates). When an analyst interacts
with a statistical estimator, they generate a transcript of their interaction π P Π where
Π “ pQˆRq˚ is the space of all transcripts. Throughout we write Π to denote the transcript’s
random variable and π for its realizations.
Algorithm 13 InteractpM, A; Sq: An Analyst Interacting with a Statistical Estimator
Input: A statistical estimator M , an analyst A, and a dataset S P X n .
for t “ 1 to k do
The analyst generates a query qt Ð Apa1 , . . . , at´1 q and sends it to the statistical estimator.
The statistical estimator generates an answer at Ð M pS; qt q.
end
Output: transcript Π “ ppq1 , a1 q, . . . , pqk , ak qq.

The interaction is summarized in Algorithm 13, and we write InteractpM, A; Sq to refer to
it. When M and A are clear from context, we will abbreviate this notation and write simply
IpSq. When we refer to an indexed query qj , this is implicitly a function of the transcript
π. Given a transcript π P Π, write Qπ to denote the conditional distribution on datasets
conditional on Π “ π: Qπ “ pP n q|InteractpM, A; Sq “ π. Note that Qπ will no longer
generally be a product distribution. We will be interested in evaluating uniform accuracy
bounds, which control the worst-case error over all queries:
Definition 6.2.1. M satisfies pα, βq-sample accuracy if for every data analyst A and every
data distribution P,

Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

rmax |qj pSq ´ aj | ě αs ď β.
j
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We say M satisfies pα, βq-distributional accuracy if for every data analyst A and every data
distribution P,
Pr

rmax |qj pP n q ´ aj | ě αs ď β.

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

j

We will be interested in interactions I that satisfy differential privacy.
Definition 6.2.2 ([35]). Two datasets S, S 1 P X n are neighbors if they differ in at most
one coordinate. An interaction InteractpM, ¨; ¨q satisfies pϵ, δq-differential privacy if for all
data analysts A, pairs of neighboring datasets S, S 1 P X n , and for all events E Ď Π:
rΠ P Es ď eϵ ¨

Pr

Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

Pr

rΠ P Es ` δ.

Π„InteractpM,A;S 1 q

If InteractpM, ¨; ¨q satisfies pϵ, δq-differential privacy, we will also say that M satisfies pϵ, δqdifferential privacy.
We introduce a novel quantity that will be crucial to our argument: it captures the effect
of the transcript on the change in the expectation of a query contained in the transcript.
Definition 6.2.3. An interaction InteractpM, A; ¨q is called pϵ, δq-posterior sensitive if for
every data distribution P:

Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

rmax |qj pP n q ´ qj pQΠ q| ě ϵs ď δ.
j

6.3. An Elementary Proof of the Transfer Theorem
6.3.1. A General Transfer Theorem
In this section we prove a general transfer theorem for sample accurate mechanisms with
low posterior sensitivity. In Section 6.3.2 we prove that differentially private mechanisms
have low posterior sensitivity.
Theorem 6.3.1 (General Transfer Theorem). Suppose that InteractpM, A; ¨q is an pα, βq-
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sample accurate, pϵ, δq-posterior sensitive interaction. Then for every c ą 0 it also satisfies:

Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

β
`δ
c

rmax |aj ´ qj pPq| ą α ` c ` ϵs ď
j

i.e. it is pα1 , β 1 q-distributionally accurate for α1 “ α ` c ` ϵ and β 1 “

β
c

` δ.

The theorem follows easily from a change in perspective driven by an elementary observation. Imagine that after the interaction is run and results in a transcript π, the dataset S is
resampled from its conditional distribution Qπ . This does not change the joint distribution
on datasets and transcripts. This simple claim is formalized below: its elementary proof
appears in Appendix 6.C.
Lemma 6.3.2 (Resampling Lemma). Let E Ď X n ˆ Π be any event. Then:

Pr

rpS, Πq P Es “

S„P n ,Π„IpSq

Pr

S„P n ,Π„IpSq,S 1 „QΠ

rpS 1 , Πq P Es

The change in perspective suggested by the resampling lemma makes it easy to see why
the following must be true: any sample-accurate mechanism must in fact be accurate with
respect to the conditional distribution it induces. This is because if it can first commit
to answers, and guarantee that they are sample-accurate after the dataset is resampled
from the conditional, the answers it committed to must have been close to the conditional
means, because it is likely that the empirical answers on the resampled dataset will be. This
argument is generic and does not use differential privacy.
Lemma 6.3.3. Suppose that M is pα, βq-sample accurate. Then for every c ą 0 it also
satisfies:
Pr

rmax |aj ´ qj pQΠ q| ą α ` cs ď

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

j

β
c

Proof. Denote by j ˚ pπq “ argmax|aj ´ qj pQπ q|. Given α ě 0 and c ą 0, and expanding the
j

115

definition of qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q we get:
‰
aj ˚ pΠq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ą α ` c
S„P n ,Π„IpSq
„
ȷ
“
‰
1
“
Pr
E
aj ˚ pΠq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pS q ´ α ą c
S„P n ,Π„IpSq S 1 „QΠ
„
ȷ
“
␣
(‰
1
˚
˚
ď
Pr
E
max aj pΠq ´ qj pΠq pS q ´ α, 0 ą c
S„P n ,Π„IpSq S 1 „QΠ
„
ȷ
p1q 1
“
␣
(‰
1
˚
˚
E
E
max
a
´
q
pS
q
´
α,
0
ď
j pΠq
j pΠq
c S„P n ,Π„IpSq S 1 „QΠ
„
ȷ
p2q 1
“
‰
1
ď
E
Pr a ˚ ´ qj ˚ pΠq pS q ´ α ą 0
c S„P n ,Π„IpSq S 1 „QΠ j pΠq
“
‰
1
“
Pr
aj ˚ pΠq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pS 1 q ą α
n
1
c S„P ,Π„IpSq,S „QΠ
“
‰
p3q 1
“
Pr
aj ˚ pΠq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pSq ą α
c S„P n ,Π„IpSq
Pr

“

Here, inequality (1) follows from Markov’s inequality, inequality (2) follows from the fact
that aj ˚ pΠq ´qj ˚ pΠq pS 1 q´α ď 1, and equality 3 follows from the Resampling Lemma (Lemma
6.3.2). Repeating this argument for qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ´ aj ˚ pΠq yields a symmetric bound, so by
combining the two with the guarantee of pα, βq-sample accuracy we get,
ˇ
ˇ
‰
‰
“ˇ
“ˇ
ˇaj ˚ pΠq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pSqˇ ą α ď β
ˇaj ˚ pΠq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ qˇ ą α ` c ď 1
Pr
c S„P n ,Π„IpSq
c
S„P n ,Π„IpSq
Pr

Because sample accuracy implies accuracy with respect to the conditional distribution,
together with a bound on posterior sensitivity, the transfer theorem follows immediately:

Proof of Theorem 6.3.1. By the triangle inequality:

max |aj ´ qj pPq| ď max |ai ´ qi pQΠ q| ` max |ql pQΠ q ´ ql pPq|.
j

i

l

Lemma 6.3.3 bounds the first term by α`c with probability 1´ βc over Π, and the definition
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of posterior sensitivity bounds the second term by ϵ with probability 1 ´ δ over Π, which
concludes the proof.
6.3.2. A Transfer Theorem for Differential Privacy
In this section we prove a transfer theorem for differentially private mechanisms by demonstrating that they have low posterior sensitivity and applying our general transfer theorem.
We here show that differentially private mechanisms have low posterior-sensitivity for linear queries. In the Appendix we extend this argument to low-sensitivity and optimization
queries.
Lemma 6.3.4. If M is pϵ, δq-differentially private, then for any data distribution P, any
analyst A, and any constant c ą 0:
„
Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

ȷ
δ
max |qj pQΠ q ´ qj pPq| ą peϵ ´ 1q ` 2c ď
j
c

i.e. it is pϵ1 , δ 1 q-posterior sensitive for every data analyst A, where ϵ1 “ eϵ ´ 1 ` 2c and
δ 1 “ δc .
Proof. Given a transcript π P Π, let j ˚ pπq P argmaxj |qj pQπ q ´ qj pPq|. Define for an α ą 0:
␣
(
Πα “ π P Π|qj ˚ pπq pQπ q ´ qj ˚ pπq pPq ą α
"
X ` pπq “ x P X |

Pr

S„Qπ ,Si „S

Bα` “

ď `

*
rSi “ xs ą Pr rSi “ xs

X ` pπq ˆ tπu

Si „P

˘

πPΠα

␣
(
`
Π`
α pxq “ π P Π|px, πq P Bα
ˇ
“ˇ
‰
Fix any α. Suppose that Pr ˇqj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPqˇ ą α ą δc . We must have that either
“
‰
“
‰
δ
δ
Pr qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPq ą α ą 2c
or Pr qj ˚ pΠq pPq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ą α ą 2c
. Without
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loss of generality, assume
“
‰
δ
Pr qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPq ą α “ Pr rΠ P Πα s ą
2c

(6.1)

Let Si be the random variable obtained by first sampling S „ P n and then sampling
Si P S uniformly at random. We compare the probability measure of Bα` under the joint
distribution on Si and Π with its corresponding measure under the product distribution of
Si and Π:
“

Pr
pSi ,Πq

‰
“
‰
pSi , Πq P Bα` ´ Pr pSi , Πq P Bα`

ÿ
“

Si bΠ

PrrΠ “ πs

πPΠα

ÿ
ě
ÿ

PrrΠ “ πs

ÿ

ÿ

qj ˚ pπq pxq pPrrSi “ x|Π “ πs ´ PrrSi “ xsq

xPX ` pπq

PrrΠ “ πs

ÿ

qj ˚ pπq pxq pPrrSi “ x|Π “ πs ´ PrrSi “ xsq

xPX

πPΠα

“

pPrrSi “ x|Π “ πs ´ PrrSi “ xsq

xPX ` pπq

πPΠα

ě

ÿ

`
˘
PrrΠ “ πs qj ˚ pπq pQπ q ´ qj ˚ pπq pPq

πPΠα

ą α ¨ Pr rΠ P Πα s

On the other hand, using the definition of pϵ, δq-differential privacy (See Lemma 6.D.1 for
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the elementary derivation of the first inequality):

“

Pr
pSi ,Πq

‰
“
‰
pSi , Πq P Bα` ´ Pr pSi , Πq P Bα`

ÿ
“

Si bΠ

` “
‰
“
‰˘
`
PrrSi “ xs Pr Π P Π`
α pxq|Si “ x ´ Pr Π P Πα pxq

xPX

ÿ
ď

`
“
‰
˘
PrrSi “ xs peϵ ´ 1q Pr Π P Π`
α pxq ` δ

xPX

“ peϵ ´ 1q Pr

“

Si bΠ

‰
pSi , Πq P Bα` ` δ

ď peϵ ´ 1q Pr rΠ P Πα s ` δ
ă peϵ ´ 1q Pr rΠ P Πα s ` 2c Pr rΠ P Πα s

(by Equation (6.1))

“ ppeϵ ´ 1q ` 2cq ¨ Pr rΠ P Πα s
This is a contradiction for α ě peϵ ´ 1q ` 2c.

Remark 6.3.1. Note
1. Since differential privacy is closed under post processing, this claim can be generalized
beyond queries contained in the transcript to any query generated as function of the
transcript.
2. In the case of pϵ, 0q-differential privacy, choosing c “ 0, the claim holds for every
query with probability 1.
Combined with our general transfer theorem (Theorem 6.3.1), this directly yields a transfer
theorem for differential privacy:
Theorem 6.3.5 (Transfer Theorem for pϵ, δq-Differential Privacy). Suppose that M is pϵ, δqdifferentially private and pα, βq-sample accurate for linear queries. Then for every analyst
A and c, d ą 0 it also satisfies:

Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

rmax |aj ´ qj pPq| ą α ` peϵ ´ 1q ` c ` 2ds ď
j
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β
δ
`
c
d

i.e. it is pα1 , β 1 q-distributionally accurate for α1 “ α ` peϵ ´ 1q ` c ` 2d and β 1 “

β
c

` dδ .

Remark 6.3.2. As we will see in Section 6.4, the Gaussian mechanism (and many other
differentially private mechanisms) has a sample accuracy bound that depends only on the
square root of the log of both 1{β and 1{δ. Thus, despite the Markov-like term β 1 “

β
c

`

δ
d

in the above transfer theorem, together with the sample accuracy bounds of the Gaussian
mechanism, it yields Chernoff-like concentration.
Our technique extends easily to reason about arbitrary low sensitivity queries and minimization queries. See Appendix 6.A and 6.B for more details.

6.4. Applications: The Gaussian Mechanism
We now apply our new transfer theorem to derive the concrete bounds that we plotted in
Figure 5. The Gaussian mechanism is extremely simple and has only a single parameter σ:
for each query qi that arrives, the Gaussian mechanism returns the answer ai „ N pqi pSq, σ 2 q
where N pqi pSq, σ 2 q denotes the Gaussian distribution with mean qi pSq and standard deviation σ. First, we recall the differential privacy properties of the Gaussian mechanism.

Theorem 6.4.1 ([16]). When used to answer k linear queries, the Gaussian mechanism
with parameter σ satisfies ρ-zCDP for ρ “

k
.
2n2 σ 2

A consequence of this is that for every

0 ă δ ă 1, it satisfies pϵ, δq-differential privacy for:
g
˜c
¸
f
f k
k
k
ϵ “ 2 2 ` e2 2 2 log
π ¨ 2 2 {δ
2n σ
n σ
2n σ

It is also easy to see that the sample-accuracy of the Gaussian mechanism is characterized
by the CDF of the Gaussian distribution:
Lemma 6.4.2. For any 0 ă β ă 1, the Gaussian mechanism with parameter σ is pαG , βq-
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sample accurate for:

αG “

?

d ˆ? ˙
˙ ¸
ˆ
ˆ ˙
?
?
β 1{k
β
2k
ă 2σ ¨ erfc´1
ă 2σ log
.
2´2 1´
2
k
πβ

˜
2σ ¨ erfc´1

Above, erfcpxq “ 1 ´ erfpxq is the complementary error function.
Proof. For a query qj , write aj “ qj pSq ` Zj where Zj „ N p0, σ 2 q. The sample error
is maxj |aj ´ qj pSq| “ maxj |Zj |. We have that Prrmaxj |Zj | ě αs ď Prrmaxj Zj ě αs `
Prrminj Zj ď ´αs. αG is the value that solves the equation Prrmaxj Zj ě αs “ Prrminj Zj ď
´αs “ β{2

With these quantities in hand, we can now apply Theorem 6.3.5 to derive distributional
accuracy bounds for the Gaussian mechanism:
Theorem 6.4.3. Fix a desired confidence parameter 0 ă β ă 1. When σ is set optimally,
the Gaussian mechanism can be used to answer k linear queries while satisfying pα, βqdistributional accuracy, where α is the solution to the following unconstrained minimization
problem:
#
α “ min

σ,δą0

?
2σ ¨ erfc´1

c
´b
¯
ˆ ˙
ˆ ˙+
k
k
k
`
2
log
π¨
{δ
δ
δ
2 2
n2 σ 2
2n2 σ 2
´1`6
` e 2n σ
k
β

Proof. Using Theorem 6.3.5 and fixing β 1 “ δ and c “ d, we have that an pα1 , β 1 q-sample
accurate, pϵ, δq-differentially private mechanism is pα, βq-distributionally accurate for α “
α1 ` peϵ ´ 1q ` 3c and β “
of β, we can take c “

2δ
β,

2δ
c

where c can be an arbitrary parameter. For any fixed value

and see that we obtain pα, βq-distributional accuracy where

α “ α1 ` peϵ ´ 1q ` 6 pδ{βq. The theorem then follows from plugging in the privacy bound
from Theorem 6.4.1, the sample accuracy bound from Theorem 6.4.2, and optimizing over
the free variables σ and δ.

121

6.5. Discussion
We have given a new proof of the transfer theorem for differential privacy that has several
appealing properties. Besides being simpler than previous arguments, it achieves substantially better concrete bounds than previous transfer theorems, and uncovers new structural
insights about the role of differential privacy and sample accuracy. In particular, sample accuracy serves to guarantee that the reported answers are close to their conditional means,
and differential privacy serves to guarantee that the conditional means are close to their
true answers. This focuses attention on the conditional data distribution as a key quantity of interest, which we expect will be fruitful in future work. In particular, it may shed
light on what makes certain data analysts overfit less than worst-case bounds would suggest: because they choose queries whose conditional means are closer to the prior than the
worst-case query.
There seems to be one remaining place to look for improvement in our transfer theorem:
Lemmas 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 both exhibit a Markov-like tradeoff between a parameter c and β
and δ respectively. Although the dependence on β and δ in our ultimate bounds is only
root-logarithmic, it would still yield an improvement if this Markov-like dependence could
be replaced with a Chernoff-like dependence. It is possible to do this for the β parameter:
we give an alternative (and even simpler) proof of the transfer theorem for pϵ, 0q-differential
privacy which shows that conditional distributions induced by private mechanisms exhibit
Chernoff-like concentration, in Appendix 6.E. But the only way we know to extend this
argument to pϵ, δq-differential privacy requires dividing δ by a factor of n, which yields a
final theorem that is inferior to Theorem 6.3.5.
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Appendix
6.A. Low Sensitivity Queries
Our technique extends easily to reason about arbitrary low sensitivity queries. We only need
to generalize our lemma about posterior sensitivity.
Definition 6.A.1. A query q : X n Ñ R is called ∆-sensitive if for all pairs of neighbouring
datasets S, S 1 P X n : |qpSq ´ qpS 1 q| ď ∆. Note that linear queries are p1{nq-sensitive.
Lemma 6.A.1. If M is an pϵ, δq-differentially private mechanism for answering ∆-sensitive
queries, then for any data distribution P, analyst A, and any constant c ą 0:
„

ȷ
n

Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sqq

ϵ

max |qj pQΠ q ´ qj pP q| ą pe ´ 1 ` 4cqn∆ ď
j

δ
c

i.e. it is pϵ1 , δc q-posterior sensitive for every A, where ϵ1 “ peϵ ´ 1 ` 4cqn∆.
Proof. We introduce a useful bit of notation: q̄ pxďi q “

E

S 1 „P n´i

rq ppxďi , S 1 qqs. Notice that

q̄ pxď0 q “ q pP n q and q̄ pxďn q “ q pxq. Given a transcript π P Π, let
j ˚ pπq P argmax |qj pQπ q ´ qj pP n q|
j

Denote for any α ě 0
(
␣
Πα “ π P Π|qj ˚ pπq pQπ q ´ qj ˚ pπq pP n q ą α

and for any z P r0, 2∆s denote
␣
(
Πα,z pxďi q “ π P Πα |q̄j ˚ pπq pxďi q ´ q̄j ˚ pπq pxďi´1 q ą z ´ ∆
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From the definition of differential privacy:
«

ff
ÿ

`

˘
Pr rΠ “ πs q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi q ´ q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi´1 q ` ∆

ES„P n
πPΠα

Π„IpSq

„ż 2∆

ȷ
Pr rΠ P Πα,z pSďi qs dz

“ ES„P n

Π„IpSq

0

„ż 2∆ ˆ
˙ ȷ
ϵ
rΠ P Πα,z pSďi qs ` δ dz
ď ES„P n ,Y „P
e
Pr
Π„IpS iÐY q
0
«
ff
ÿ
`
˘
rΠ “ πs q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi q ´ q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi´1 q ` ∆ ` 2∆δ
“ ES„P n ,Y „P eϵ
Pr
πPΠα

Π„IpS iÐY q

«
“ ES„P n ,Y „P e

ff
ϵ

ÿ

`
` iÐY ˘
˘
Pr rΠ “ πs q̄j ˚ pπq Sďi
´ q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi´1 q ` ∆ ` 2∆δ

πPΠα

Π„IpSq

where S iÐY “ pS1 , . . . , Si´1 , Y, Si`1 , . . . , Sn q, and the last equality follows from the observation that pS, Y q and pS iÐY , Siq are identically distributed. Since Y „ P, independently
“
` iÐY ˘‰
from Π, we get that EY „P q̄j ˚ pπq Sďi
“ q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi´1 q, so
ff

«
ÿ

˘
Pr rΠ “ πs q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi q ´ q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi´1 q ` ∆
`

ES„P n
πPΠα

Π„IpSq

„ˆ
ď ES„P n

eϵ

˙ ȷ
Pr rΠ P Πα s ` 2δ ∆

Π„IpSq

“ peϵ Pr rΠ P Πα s ` 2δq ∆

Subtracting ∆ Pr rΠ P Πα s from both sides we get
«
ÿ
E

S„P n

πPΠα

ff
`
˘
Pr rΠ “ πs q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi q ´ q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi´1 q ď ppeϵ ´ 1q Pr rΠ P Πα s ` 2δq ∆

Π„IpSq

(6.2)
ˇ
“ˇ
‰
We now choose α “ peϵ ´ 1 ` 4cq n∆. Suppose that Pr ˇqj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pP n qˇ ą α ą δc .
We must have that either
“
‰
δ
Pr qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pP n q ą α ą
2c
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or
“
‰
δ
Pr qj ˚ pΠq pP n q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ą α ą
2c
Without loss of generality, assume
“
‰
δ
Pr qj ˚ pΠq pQΠ q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pP n q ą α “ Pr rΠ P Πα s ą
2c

(6.3)

But this leads to a contradiction, since
ÿ

Pr rΠ P Πα s peϵ ´ 1 ` 4cq n∆ ă

`
˘
Pr rΠ “ πs qj ˚ pπq pQπ q ´ qj ˚ pπq pP n q

πPΠα

«

ff
ÿ

˘
Pr rΠ “ πs qj ˚ pπq pSq ´ qj ˚ pπq pP n q
`

“ En
S„P

πPΠα

n
ÿ

“

Π„IpSq

«

ff
ÿ

E

i“1

S„P n

πPΠα

`
˘
Pr rΠ “ πs q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi q ´ q̄j ˚ pπq pSďi´1 q

Π„IpSq

ď ppeϵ ´ 1q Pr rΠ P Πα s ` 2δq n∆
ă Pr rΠ P Πα s peϵ ´ 1 ` 4cq n∆

(by Equation (6.2))
(by Equation (6.3))

We can combine this Lemma with Lemma 6.3.3 (which holds for any query type) to get our
transfer theorem:
Theorem 6.A.2 (Transfer Theorem for Low Sensitivity Queries). Suppose that M is pϵ, δqdifferentially private and pα, βq-sample accurate for ∆-sensitive queries. Then for every
analyst A, c, d ą 0 it also satisfies:
„
Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

ȷ
n

ϵ

max |aj ´ qj pP q| ą α ` c ` pe ´ 1 ` 4dqn∆ ď
j

δ
β
`
c
d

i.e. it is pα1 , β 1 q-distributionally accurate for α1 “ α ` c ` peϵ ´ 1 ` 4dqn∆ and β 1 “
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β
c

` dδ .

6.B. Minimization Queries
Definition 6.B.1. Minimization queries are specified by a loss function L : X n ˆΘ Ñ r0, 1s
where Θ is generally known as the “parameter space”. An answer to a minimization query
L is a parameter θ P Θ. We work with ∆-sensitive minimization queries: for all pairs of
neighbouring datasets S, S 1 P X n and all θ P Θ, |LpS, θq ´ LpS 1 , θq| ď ∆.
A mechanism M is pα, βq-sample accurate for minimization queries if for every data analyst
A and every dataset S P X n :
„
Pr

ˇ
ˇ
ȷ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
ˇ
max ˇLj pS, θj q ´ min Lj pS, θqˇ ě α ď β
j

Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

θPΘ

We say that M satisfies pα, βq-distributional accuracy for minimization queries if for every
data analyst A and every data distribution P:

Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

ˇ
„
„
ȷˇ
ȷ
ˇ
ˇ
1
1
max ˇˇES 1 „P n Lj pS , θj q ´ min Lj pS , θq ˇˇ ě α ď β
j

θPΘ

Remark 6.B.1. Note that

“
ES 1 „P n

„
ȷ
‰
“
‰
1
1
1
Lj pS , θj q ´ min ES 1 „P n Lj pS , θq ď ES 1 „P n Lj pS , θj q ´ min Lj pS , θq
1

θPΘ

θPΘ

So as long as the RHS is bounded, the LHS is bounded too.
Remark 6.B.2. For a given ∆-sensitive minimization query Lj and an answer θj , define:

qj pSq :“ Lj pS, θj q ´ min Lj pS, θq
θPΘ

and

aj :“ 0

Note several things:
1. If Lj is ∆-sensitive, then qj is 2∆-sensitive.
2. The mapping from a minimization query transcript π “ ppL1 , θ1 q, . . . , pLk , θk qq to the
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2∆-sensitive query transcript π 1 “ ppq1 , a1 q, . . . , pqk , ak qq as defined above is a datasetindependent post-processing π 1 “ f pπq.
3. π satisfies an pα, βq-accuracy guarantee if and only if π 1 does.
With the above observation, the transfer theorem for minimization queries immediately
follows by Lemma 6.A.1 and Lemma 6.3.3.
Theorem 6.B.1 (Transfer Theorem for Minimization Queries). Suppose that M is pϵ, δqdifferentially private and pα, βq-sample accurate for ∆-sensitive minimization queries. Then
for every analyst A and c, d ą 0 it also satisfies:
„
Pr

S„P n ,Π„InteractpM,A;Sq

ď

ˇ
„
ȷˇ
ȷ
ˇ
ˇ
1
1
ϵ
ˇ
ˇ
max ˇES 1 „P n Lj pS , θj q ´ min Lj pS , θq ˇ ą α ` c ` 2pe ´ 1 ` 4dqn∆
j
θPΘ

β
δ
`
c
d

i.e. it is pα1 , β 1 q-distributionally accurate for α1 “ α ` c ` 2peϵ ´ 1 ` 4dqn∆ and β 1 “

β
c

` dδ .

6.C. Details from Section 6.3.1
Proof of Lemma 6.3.2. This follows from the expansion of the definition, and an application
of Bayes Rule.

Pr
rpS 1 , Πq P Es
ÿÿÿ
“
PrrS “ xs PrrΠ “ π|S “ xs 1Pr rS 1 “ x1 s1rpx1 , πq P Es
S„P n ,Π„IpSq,S 1 „QΠ

x

S „Qπ

π x1

ÿÿ
“
π x1

ÿÿ
“

PrrΠ “ πs 1Pr rS 1 “ x1 s1rpx1 , πq P Es
S „Qπ

PrrΠ “ πs PrrS “ x1 |Π “ πs1rpx1 , πq P Es

π x1

ÿÿ
“

PrrΠ “ πs

π x1

“

Pr

S„P n ,Π„IpSq

PrrΠ “ π|S “ x1 s ¨ PrrS “ x1 s
1rpx1 , πq P Es
PrrΠ “ πs

rpS, Πq P Es
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6.D. Details from Section 6.3.2
Lemma 6.D.1. If M is pϵ, δq-differentially private, then for any event E and datapoint x:
rΠ P E|Si “ xs ď eϵ

Pr

S„P n ,Si „S,Π„IpSq

Pr

S„P n ,Π„IpSq

rΠ P Es ` δ

Proof. This follows from expanding the definitions.

Pr

rΠ P E|Si “ xs “

S„P n ,Si „S,Π„IpSq

n
1ÿ
Pr
rΠ P E|Si “ xs
n i“1 S„P n ,Π„IpSq

“

n
1ÿ ÿ
Pr rS “ xs ¨ PrrΠ P E|S “ px´i , xqs
n i“1 xPX n S„P n

ď

n
1ÿ ÿ
Pr rS “ xs ¨ peϵ PrrΠ P E|S “ xs ` δq
n i“1 xPX n S„P n

“ eϵ

Pr

S„P n ,Π„IpSq

rΠ P Es ` δ

where the inequality follows from the definition of differential privacy.

6.E. An (even) Simpler and Better Proof for Pure Differential Privacy
In this section we give an even simpler proof of an even better transfer theorem for pϵ, 0)differential privacy. Rather than using Markov’s inequality as we did in the proof of Lemma
6.3.3, we can directly show that conditional distributions induced by differentially private
mechanisms exhibit Chernoff-like concentration.
Lemma 6.E.1. If M is pϵ, 0q-differentially private, then for any data distribution P, any
transcript π P Π, any linear query q, and any η ą 0:
«
Pr

S„Qπ

c
ϵ

|qpSq ´ qpPq| ě pe ´ 1q `

ff
2 lnp2{ηq
ďη
n

Proof. Define the random variables Vi “ qpSi q´ErqpSi q|Săi s, and let Xi “

1
n

ři

j“1 Vj .

Then

the sequence 0 “ X0 , X1 , . . . , Xn forms a martingale and |Xi ´ Xi´1 | “ n1 |Vi | ď n1 . We can
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therefore apply Azuma’s inequality to conclude that:
ˇ
ff
«ˇ
ˆ 2 ˙
n
n
ˇ
ˇ1 ÿ
ÿ
1
´t n
ˇ
ˇ
qpSi q ´
ErqpSi q|Săi sˇ ě t ď 2 exp
Pr ˇ
ˇ
ˇ n i“1
n i“1
2

(6.4)

Now fix any realization x, and consider each term: ErqpSi q|Săi “ xăi s. We have:

ES„Qπ rqpSi q|Săi “ xăi s “

ÿ

qpxq ¨ Pr n rSi “ x|Π “ π, Săi “ xăi s
S„P

x

ÿ
“
x
ϵ

qpxq ¨

ď e ¨

ÿ

PrS„P n rΠ “ π|Si “ x, Săi “ xăi s ¨ PrS„P n rSi “ xs
PrrΠ “ π|Săi “ xăi s

qpxq ¨ Pr n rSi “ xs

x

S„P

ϵ

“ e qpPq

where the inequality follows from the definition of pϵ, 0q-differential privacy. Symmetrically,
we can show that ES„Qπ rqpSi q|Săi “ xăi s ě e´ϵ qpPq. Therefore we have that:
n
1ÿ
e qpPq ď
ErqpSi q|Săi s ď eϵ qpPq.
n i“1
´ϵ

Combining this with Equation 6.4 gives us that for any η ą 0, with probability 1 ´ η when
S „ Qπ :

c
ϵ

qpSq ď e qpPq `

2 lnp2{ηq
and qpSq ě e´ϵ qpPq ´
n

c

2 lnp2{ηq
n

A transfer theorem follows immediately from lemma 6.E.1.
Theorem 6.E.2. Suppose that M is pϵ, 0q-differentially private and pα, βq-sample accurate.
b
Then for any η ą 0 it is pα1 , β 1 q-distributionally accurate for α1 “ α ` peϵ ´ 1q ` 2 lnp2{ηq
n
and β 1 “ β ` η.
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Proof. For a given π, let j ˚ pπq “ argmaxj |aj ´ qj pPq|. By the triangle inequality we have:

|aj ˚ pΠq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPq| ď |aj ˚ pΠq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pSq| ` |qj ˚ pΠq pSq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPq|
ď max |aj ´ qj pSq| ` |qj ˚ pΠq pSq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPq|
j

By the definition of pα, βq-sample accuracy, we have that with probability 1 ´ β, maxj |aj ´
qj pSq| ď α. The Resampling Lemma (Lemma 6.3.2) gives us that:
«

ff
2
lnp2{ηq
Pr
|qj ˚ pΠq pSq ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPq| ě peϵ ´ 1q `
n
S„P n ,Π„IpSq
ff
«
c
2 lnp2{ηq
1
ϵ
|qj ˚ pΠq pS q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPq| ě pe ´ 1q `
“
Pr
n
S„P n ,Π„IpSq,S 1 „QΠ
«
«
ffff
c
2 lnp2{ηq
1
ϵ
“ ES„P n ,Π„IpSq 1Pr
|qj ˚ pΠq pS q ´ qj ˚ pΠq pPq| ě pe ´ 1q `
S „QΠ
n
c

ďη

Because Lemma 6.E.1 guarantees us that for every π,
«
Pr

S 1 „Qπ

c
ϵ

1

|qj ˚ pπq pS q ´ qj ˚ pπq pPq| ě pe ´ 1q `

The theorem then follows from a union bound.
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ff
2 lnp2{ηq
ď η.
n

III

The Right to Be Forgotten

Chapter 7
Descent to Delete for Machine Unlearning
We study the data deletion problem for convex models. By leveraging techniques from
convex optimization and reservoir sampling, we give the first data deletion algorithms that
are able to handle an arbitrarily long sequence of adversarial updates while promising
both per-deletion run-time and steady-state error that do not grow with the length of
the update sequence. We also introduce several new conceptual distinctions: for example,
we can ask that after a deletion, the entire state maintained by the optimization algorithm
is statistically indistinguishable from the state that would have resulted had we retrained,
or we can ask for the weaker condition that only the observable output is statistically
indistinguishable from the observable output that would have resulted from retraining. We
are able to give more efficient deletion algorithms under this weaker deletion criterion.

7.1. Introduction
Users voluntarily provide huge amounts of personal data to online services, such as Facebook, Google, and Amazon, in exchange for useful services. But a basic principle of data
autonomy asserts that users should be able to revoke access to their data if they no longer
find the exchange of data for services worthwhile. Indeed, each of these organizations provides a way for users to request that their data be deleted. This is related to, although
distinct from the “Right to be Forgotten” from the European Union’s General Data Protection Act (GPDR). The Right to be Forgotten entails the right for users, in certain
circumstances, to request that negative information concerning them to be removed. Like
basic data autonomy, it sometimes obligates companies to delete data.
But what does it mean to delete data? Typically, user data does not sit siloed in a database,
but rather is used to produce derivatives such as predictive models. Deleting a user’s data
from a database may prevent it from influencing the training of future models10 , but does
10

Or perhaps not, if previously trained models (trained before a user’s data deletion) are used as inputs

132

not remove the influence of a user’s data on existing models — and that influence may be
significant. For example, it is possible to extract information about specific data points used
for training from models that have been trained in standard ways [130]. So deleting a user’s
data naively, by simply removing it from a database, may not accomplish much: what we
really want is to remove (or at least rigorously limit) the influence that an individual’s data
has on the behavior of any part of the system.
How should we accomplish this? We could retrain all predictive models from scratch every time a user requests that their data be removed, but this would entail an enormous
computational cost. Ginart et al. [60] propose a compelling alternative: full retraining is
unnecessary if we can design a deletion operation that produces a (distribution of) model
output(s) that is statistically indistinguishable from the (distribution of) model output(s)
that would have arisen from full retraining. Ginart et al. [60] also propose an approximate
notion of deletion that uses a differential-privacy like measure of “approximate” statistical
indistinguishability that we adopt in this work.
7.1.1. Our Results and Techniques
In this paper, we consider convex models that are trained to some specified accuracy, and
then are deployed while a sequence of requests arrive to delete (or add) additional data
points. The deletion or addition must happen immediately, before the next point comes in,
using only a fixed running time (which we measure in terms of gradient computations) per
update. We require that the distribution on output models be pϵ, δq-indistinguishable from
the distribution on output models that would result from full retraining (see Section 7.2 for
the precise definition: this is a notion of approximate statistical indistinguishability from
the differential privacy literature). In a departure from prior work, we make the distinction
between whether the entire internal state of the algorithm must be indistinguishable from
full re-training, or whether we only require statistical indistinguishability with respect to
the observable outputs of the algorithms. If we require indistinguishability with respect to
the full internal state, we call these update or unlearning algorithms perfect. This is similar
to the subsequent models.
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to the distinction made in the differential privacy literature, which typically only requires
indistinguishability for the outputs of private algorithms, but which has a strengthening
(called pan privacy [7, 37]) which also requires that the internal state satisfy statistical
indistinguishability. We remark that while unlearning algorithms that are allowed to maintain a “secret state” that need not satisfy the data deletion notion require additional trust
in the security of the training system, this is orthogonal to privacy. Indeed, [19] show that
even without secret state, algorithms satisfying standard deletion guarantees can exacerbate
membership inference attacks if the attacker can observe the model both before and after a
deletion (because standard deletion guarantees promise nothing about what can be learned
about an individual from two model outputs). In contrast, although some of our unlearning
algorithms maintain a secret state that does not satisfy the statistical indistinguishability
property, our model outputs themselves satisfy pϵ, δq-differential privacy. This in particular
prevents membership inference attacks from observers who can observe a small number of
output models, so long as they cannot observe the secret state. All prior work has focused
on perfect unlearning.
We introduce another novel distinction between strong unlearning algorithms and weak
unlearning algorithms. For an unlearning algorithm to be strong, we require that for a fixed
accuracy target, the run-time of the update operation be constant (or at most logarithmic)
in the length of the update sequence. A weak unlearning algorithm may have run-time
per update (or equivalently, error) that grows polynomially with the length of the update
sequence. All prior work has given weak unlearning algorithms.
We give two sets of results. The first, which operates under the most permissive set of assumptions, is a simple family of gradient descent algorithms. After each addition or deletion
request, the update algorithm starts from the previous model, and performs a small number
of gradient descent updates — sufficient to guarantee that the model parameter is boundedly
close to the optimal model parameter in Euclidean distance. It then perturbs the model parameter with Gaussian noise of sufficient magnitude to guarantee pϵ, δq-indistinguishability
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with respect to anything within a small neighborhood of the optimal model. We prove that
this simple approach yields a strong, perfect unlearning algorithm for loss functions that
are strongly convex and smooth. Without the strong convexity assumption, we can still
derive strong unlearning algorithms, but ones which must maintain secret state. We can
further improve our accuracy guarantees if we are willing to settle for weak unlearning algorithms. The per-round computation budget and the achievable steady state accuracy can
be smoothly traded off against one another.
Our second algorithm improves over the straightforward approach above (under slightly
stronger regularity assumptions) when the data dimension is sufficiently large. It first takes a
bootstrap sample from the underlying dataset, and then randomly partitions it into K parts.
The initial training algorithm separately and independently optimizes the loss function on
each part, and then averages the parameter vector from each part, before finally releasing the
perturbed average. Zhang et al [147] analyzed this algorithm (absent the final perturbation)
and proved accuracy bounds with respect to the underlying distribution (which for us is
the dataset from which we draw the bootstrap sample). Our update operation involves first
using a variant of reservoir-sampling that maintains the property that the union of the
partitions continue to be distributed as independent samples drawn with replacement from
our current dataset. We then use the simple gradient based update algorithms from our first
set of results to update the parameters only from the partitions that have been modified by the
addition or deletion. Because each of these partitions contains only a fraction of the dataset,
we can use our fixed gradient computation budget to perform more updates. Because we
have maintained the marginal distributions on partition elements via our reservoir sampling
step, the overall accuracy analysis of [147] carries over even after an arbitrary sequence of
updates. This is also crucial for our statistical indistinguishability guarantee. The result is
a strong unlearning algorithm that yields an improved tradeoff between per-round run-time
and steady state accuracy for sufficiently high dimensional data.
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7.1.2. Related Work
At a high level, our work differs from prior work in several ways. We call deletion algorithms
that do not maintain secret state perfect. All prior work focuses on perfect deletion algorithms, but we give improved bounds for several problems by allowing our algorithms to
maintain secret state. Second, we allow arbitrary sequences of updates, which can include
additions and deletions (rather than just deletions). Finally, we distinguish between weak
and strong unlearning algorithms, and give the first strong unlearning algorithms.
Cao and Yang [17] first considered the problem of efficiently deleting data from a trained
model under a deterministic notion of deletion, and coined the term “machine unlearning”.
They gave efficient deletion methods for certain statistical query algorithms — but in general, their methods (or indeed, any deterministic notion of deletion) can apply to only very
structured problems. Ginart et al. [60] gave the first definition of data deletion that can
apply to randomized algorithms, in terms of statistical indistinguishability. We adopt the
approximate deletion notion they introduced, which is itself based on differential privacy
[31, 35]. Ginart et al. gave a deletion algorithm for the k-means problem. Their algorithm
is a weak deletion algorithm, because their (amortized) running time per update scales
linearly with the number of updates.
Guo et al. [63] give deletion algorithms for linear and logistic regression, using the same
notion of approximate statistical indistinguishability that we use. Their algorithm is similar
to our first algorithm: it performs a convex optimization step, followed by a Gaussian
perturbation. They use a second order update (a Newton step) rather than first order
updates as we do, and their algorithm yields error that grows linearly with the number of
updates, and so is a weak deletion algorithm. Izzo et al [75] focus on linear regression and
show how to improve the run-time per deletion of the algorithm given in [63] from quadratic
to linear in the dimension.
Our main result leverages a distributed optimization algorithm that partitions the data,
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separately optimizes on each partition, and then averages the parameters, analyzed by
Zhang et al [147]. Optimizing separately on different partitions of the data, and then aggregating the results is also a well known general technique in differential privacy known
as “Subsample and Aggregate” [117] which has found applications in private learning [120].
Bourtoule et al. [14] use a similar technique in the context of machine unlearning that
they call “SISA” (Sharded, Isolated, Sliced, Aggregated). Their goal is more ambitious (to
perform deletion for non-convex models), but they have a weaker deletion criterion (that
it simply be possible that the model arrived at after deletion could have arisen from the
retraining process), and they give no error guarantees. Their algorithm involves full retraining on the affected partitions, a different aggregation function, no randomization, and does
not include the reservoir sampling step that is crucial to our stronger indistinguishability
guarantees. This distributed optimization algorithm also bears similarity to the well-known
FederatedAveraging algorithm of [107] used for deep learning in the federated setting.
Chen et al. [19] observe that deterministic deletion procedures such as SISA [14] can exacerbate privacy problems when an attacker can observe both the model before and after
the deletion of a particular user’s data point, and show how to perform membership inference attacks against SISA in this setting. Our method leverages techniques from differential
privacy, and so in addition to being an pϵ, δq-deletion algorithm, a view of the two outputs of our algorithm before and after a deletion is p2ϵ, 2δq-differentially private, which
precludes non-trivial membership inference for reasonable values of ϵ and δ. This follows
because our deletion algorithm is randomized: procedures such as the one from [63] which
have randomized training procedure but deterministic deletion procedure do not share this
property.

7.2. Model and Preliminaries
We write Z to denote the data domain. A dataset D is a multi-set of elements from Z.
Datasets can be modified by updates which are requests to either add or remove one element
from the dataset.
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Definition 7.2.1 (Update). An update u is a pair pz, ‚q where z P Z is a data point and
‚ P T “ t1 add1 , 1 delete1 u determines the type of the update. An update sequence U is a
sequence pu1 , u2 , . . .q where ui P Z ˆ T for all i. Given a dataset D and an update u “ pz, ‚q,
the update operation is defined as follows.

D ˝ u fi

$
’
’
&D Y tzu

if ‚ “ 1 add1

’
’
%Dztzu

if ‚ “ 1 delete1

We use Θ to denote the space of models. In our setting, a learning or training algorithm is
a mapping A : Z˚ Ñ Θ that maps datasets to models. An unlearning or update algorithm
for A is a mapping RA : Z˚ ˆ pZ ˆ T q ˆ Θ Ñ Θ that takes as input a dataset accompanied
by a single update, and a model, and outputs an updated model. Some of our update
algorithms will also take as input auxiliary information, that we elide here but will be
clear from context. The output of the unlearning algorithm itself will not be made public:
before any model is made public, it must pass through a publishing function. A publishing
function is a mapping fpublish : Θ Ñ Θ that maps a (secret) model to the model that will
be made publicly available. Our unlearning guarantee will informally require that there
should be no way to distinguish whether the published model resulted from full retraining,
or an arbitrary sequence of updates via the unlearning algorithm. Depending on whether we
demand perfect unlearning or not (to be defined shortly), we may save either the (secret)
output of the unlearning algorithm as persistent state, or save only the (public) output of
the publishing function.
Definition 7.2.2 (Di , θi , θ̂i , θri ). Fix any pair pA, RA q of learning and unlearning algorithms, any publishing function fpublish , any dataset D, and any update sequence U “
pu1 , u2 , . . .q. We write D0 “ D and for any i ě 1, Di “ Di´1 ˝ ui . For any i ě 1, we write
θi for the model input to the unlearning algorithm RA on round i. We write θ̂0 “ A pD0 q,
and for any i ě 1, θ̂i “ RA pDi´1 , ui , θi q. For any i ě 0, we define θri “ fpublish pθ̂i q. In
other words, whenever A, RA , fpublish , D, and U are clear from context, we write tDi uiě0
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to represent the sequence of updated datasets, tθi uiě1 for the sequence of input models to
RA , tθ̂i uiě0 to denote the (secret) output models of A and RA , and tθri uiě0 to denote their
corresponding sequence of published models.
Our pϵ, δq-unlearning notion is similar to the deletion notion proposed in [60] but generalizes
it to an update sequence consisting of both additions and deletions.
Definition 7.2.3 (pϵ, δq-indistinguishability). Let X and Y be random variables over some
ϵ,δ

domain Ω. We say X and Y are pϵ, δq-indistinguishable and write X « Y , if for all S Ď Ω,
Pr rX P Ss ď eϵ Pr rY P Ss ` δ,

Pr rY P Ss ď eϵ Pr rX P Ss ` δ

Definition 7.2.4 (pϵ, δq-unlearning). We say that RA is an pϵ, δq-unlearning algorithm for
A with respect to a publishing function fpublish , if for all data sets D and all update sequences
U “ pui qi , the following condition holds. For every update step i ě 1, for θi “ θ̂i´1
ϵ,δ

fpublish pRA pDi´1 , ui , θi qq « fpublish pA pDi qq

If the above condition holds for θi “ θri´1 , RA is an pϵ, δq-perfect unlearning algorithm for
A.
Remark 7.2.1. Observe that an unlearning algorithm takes as input the model output by
the previous round’s unlearning algorithm, whereas a perfect unlearning algorithm takes as
input the model output by the previous round’s publishing algorithm. Since we require that the
published outputs satisfy pϵ, δq-indistinguishability, this means that unlearning algorithms
may need to maintain secret state that does not satisfy the indistinguishability guarantee,
but that perfect unlearning algorithms do not need to.
Assumption 7.2.1. For notational simplicity (so that we can state asymptotic bounds in
terms of n) We assume throughout that over the course of an update sequence, the size of the
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updated datasets never drops below n{2 where n is the size of the original training dataset:
@i, ni ě n{2 where ni is the size of Di . Note that this is consistent with update sequences
being of arbitrary length, since we allow additions as well as deletions. This assumption is
not necessary, but otherwise bounds would have to be stated in terms of ni .
7.2.1. Learning Framework: ERM
We consider an Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) setting in this paper where models
are (parameter) vectors in d-dimensional space Rd equipped with the (Euclidean) ℓ2 -norm
which will be denoted by }¨}2 . Let Θ Ď Rd be a convex and closed subset of Rd , and let
D “ supθ,θ1 PΘ }θ ´ θ1 }2 be the diameter of Θ. We denote a loss function by a mapping
f : Θ ˆ Z Ñ R that takes as input a parameter θ P Θ and a data point z P Z, and
outputs the loss of θ on z, f pθ, zq — which we may also denote by fz pθq. Given a dataset
D “ tzi uni“1 P Zn , with slight abuse of notation, let fD pθq denote the empirical loss of θ on
the dataset D. In other words,
fD pθq fi

n
1ÿ
fz pθq
n i“1 i

(7.1)

Definition 7.2.5 (pα, βq-accuracy). We say a pair pA, RA q of learning and unlearning
algorithms is pα, βq-accurate with respect to a publishing function fpublish , if for every dataset
D and every update sequence U, the following condition holds. For every i ě 0,
„

ȷ
r
Pr fDi pθi q ´ min fDi pθq ą α ă β
θPΘ

Definition 7.2.6 (strong vs. weak unlearning). Fix any pair pA, RA q of learning and unlearning algorithms that satisfy pα, βq-accuracy with respect to some publishing function
fpublish . Let Ci represent the overall computational cost of the unlearning algorithm at step
i of the update. We say RA is a “strong” unlearning algorithm for A if
1. α and β are independent of the length of the update sequence, and
2. For every i ě 1, Ci {C1 “ O plogpiqq, i.e., the computation cost of the unlearning
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algorithm must grow at most logarithmically with i.
If (1) holds and @i ě 1, Ci {C1 “ Ω ppolypiqq, we say RA is a “weak” unlearning algorithm
for A.
We remark that we have defined update sequences as if they are non-adaptively chosen, but
that our basic algorithms in Section 7.3 have guarantees also for adaptively chosen update
sequences.
7.2.2. Loss Function Properties
Definition 7.2.7 (Strong Convexity). A function h : Θ Ñ R is said to be m-strongly convex
for some m ě 0, if for any θ1 , θ2 P Θ, and any t P p0, 1q,

h ptθ1 ` p1 ´ tqθ2 q ď thpθ1 q ` p1 ´ tqhpθ2 q ´

m
tp1 ´ tq ∥θ1 ´ θ2 ∥22
2

if the above condition holds for m “ 0, we say h is convex.
Definition 7.2.8 (Lipschitzness). A function h : Θ Ñ R is said to be L-Lipschitz if for all
θ1 , θ2 P Θ,
|hpθ1 q ´ hpθ2 q| ď L }θ1 ´ θ2 }2

Definition 7.2.9 (Smoothness). A function h : Θ Ñ R is said to be M -smooth, if it is
differentiable and for all θ1 , θ2 P Θ,

}∇hpθ1 q ´ ∇hpθ2 q}2 ď M }θ1 ´ θ2 }2

7.2.3. Strong Convexity and Sensitivity
Throughout the paper we will leverage the fact that the optimizers of strongly convex
functions have low sensitivity to individual data points. We will formally state this fact in
Lemma 7.2.1.
Lemma 7.2.1 (Sensitivity). Suppose for any z P Z, fz is L-Lipschitz and m-strongly
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˚ fi argmin
convex. For any dataset D, let θD
θPΘ fD pθq. We have that for any integer n, any
˚ ´ θ˚ ∥ ď
data set D of size n, and any update u, ∥θD
D˝u 2

2L
mn .

7.2.4. Convergence Results for Gradient Descent
We make use of projected gradient descent extensively throughout this paper. Here, we
state two convergence results for gradient descent that we will use. A crucial feature of
these bounds (and one not shared by all bounds for gradient descent and its variants)
is that they improve as a function of how close our initial parameter is to the optimal
parameter.
Let h : Θ Ñ R where Θ Ď Rd is convex, closed, and bounded. Our goal is to approximate
minθPΘ hpθq. The Gradient Descent (GD) algorithm starts with an initial point θ0 P Θ and
proceeds as follows:
@t ě 1 :

θt “ ProjΘ pθt´1 ´ ηt ∇hpθt´1 qq

ProjΘ pθq “ argminθ1 PΘ }θ ´ θ1 }2 is a projection onto Θ, and ηt is the step size used in round
t.
Theorem 7.2.2 (Strongly Convex and Smooth [21]). Let h be m-strongly convex and M smooth, and let θ˚ “ argminθPΘ hpθq. We have that after T steps of GD with step size
ηt “

2
m`M ,

ˆ
˚

∥θT ´ θ ∥2 ď

M ´m
M `m

˙T
∥θ0 ´ θ˚ ∥2

Theorem 7.2.3 (Convex and Smooth [8]). Let h be convex and M -smooth, and let θ˚ P
argminθPΘ hpθq. We have that after T steps of GD with step size ηt “

hpθT q ´ min hpθq ď
θPΘ

1
M,

M ∥θ0 ´ θ˚ ∥22
2T

7.3. Basic Perturbed Gradient Descent
A key building block for our main result (and a simple and effective deletion scheme in
its own right, that requires fewer assumptions than our main result) is perturbed gradient
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descent. The basic idea is as follows, for both the training algorithm and the deletion algorithm: we will perform gradient descent updates until we are guaranteed that we have
found a θ̂t which is within Euclidean distance α of the optimizer, for some small α. Our
publishing algorithm fpublish adds Gaussian noise scaled as a function of α to every coordinate. This guarantees pϵ, δq-indistinguishability with respect to any other parameter that is
within distance α of the optimizer — and hence between the outcomes of full retraining and
updating. Depending on whether we want a perfect deletion algorithm or not, we save either
the perturbed or unperturbed parameter as our initialization point for the next update.
Our update algorithm will be the same as our training algorithm — except that it will be
initialized at the learned parameter from the previous round, which will guarantee faster
convergence. This is because — if we allow secret state — the initialization parameter will be
1
q
within α of the optimizer before the update, and if f is strongly convex, within Opα ` mn

of the optimal parameter after the update by the sensitivity Lemma 7.2.1. If we require
a perfect deletion algorithm, we will necessarily need to start further from the optimizer,
because our saved state will have been additionally perturbed with Gaussian noise. Here
we leverage the fact that gradient descent converges quickly when its initialization point is
near the optimal solution.
This algorithm relies crucially on leveraging strong convexity, which guarantees us that
updates only change the empirical risk minimizer by a small amounts in parameter space. In
Section 7.3.2 we solve the non-strongly-convex case by adding a strongly convex regularizer.
Algorithm 14 A: Learning for Perturbed Gradient Descent
Input: dataset D
Initialize θ01 P Θ
for t “ 1, 2, . . .`T do
˘
1
1 q
θt1 “ ProjΘ θt´1
´ ηt ∇fD pθt´1
end
Output: θ̂0 “ θT1

Ź Secret output

We parameterize our results by the computational cost of the update operations, and we can
trade off run-time for accuracy. We measure computational cost by gradient computations.
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In this section, we parameterize our strong unlearning algorithms by the number of iterations
I that they run for, which corresponds to a budget of « nI gradient computations per
update. For weak unlearning algorithms, this is the number of iterations they run for at
their first update.
Algorithm 15 RA : ith Unlearning for Perturbed Gradient Descent
Input: dataset Di´1 , update ui , model θi
Update dataset Di “ Di´1 ˝ ui
Initialize θ01 “ θi
for t “ 1, 2, . . .`Ti do
˘
1
1 q
θt1 “ ProjΘ θt´1
´ ηt ∇fDi pθt´1
end
Output θ̂i “ θT1 i

Ź Secret output

Algorithm 16 fpublish : Publishing function
Input: θ̂ P Rd `
˘
Draw Z „ N 0, σ 2 Id
Output: θr “ θ̂ ` Z

Ź Public output

7.3.1. Perturbed GD Analysis: Strongly Convex Loss
In this section we analyze Algorithms 14 and 15 in the case when f is m-strongly convex.
Theorem 7.3.1 (Accuracy, Unlearning, and Computation Tradeoffs). Suppose for all z P Z,
the loss function fz is m-strongly convex, L-Lipschitz, and M -smooth. Define γ fi pM ´
mq{pM ` mq and η fi 2{pM ` mq. Let the learning algorithm A (Algorithm 14) run with
ηt “ η and T ě I ` logp Dmn
2L q{ log p1{γq where n is the size of the input dataset, and let
the unlearning algorithm RA (Algorithm 15) run with input models θi ” θ̂i´1 and ηt “ η
and Ti “ I iterations, for all i ě 1. Let the unlearning parameters ϵ and δ be such that
ϵ “ O plog p1{δqq, and let

σ“

?
4 2Lγ I
mn p1 ´ γ I q

´a
¯
a
log p1{δq ` ϵ ´ log p1{δq

in fpublish (Algorithm 16). We have that
1. Unlearning: RA is a strong pϵ, δq-unlearning algorithm for A with respect to fpublish .
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2. Accuracy: for any β, pA, RA q is pα, βq-accurate with respect to fpublish where
˜
α“O

M L2 γ 2I d log p1{δq log2 pd{βq

¸

p1 ´ γ I q2 m2 ϵ2 n2

Proof of Theorem 7.3.1. We first prove the unlearning guarantee. Fix a training dataset D
of size n and an update sequence U “ pui qi . Recall from Definition 7.2.2 the notation we use:
tDi uiě0 for the sequence of updated datasets according to the update sequence U, tθ̂i uiě0
for the sequence of secret non-noisy parameters, and tθri uiě0 for the sequence of published
noisy parameters. We also use ni to denote the size of Di . Note that n0 “ n and that by
Assumption 7.2.1, ni ě n{2 for all i. Let θi˚ fi argminθ fDi pθq denote the optimizer of fDi ,
for any i ě 0.
`
˘
We have that for any i ě 0, fpublish pA pDi qq „ N µi , σ 2 Id , where it follows by the convergence guarantee of Theorem 7.2.2 that
›
›
2Lγ I }θ01 ´ θi˚ }2
4L
}µi ´ θi˚ }2 ď γ T ›θ01 ´ θi˚ ›2 “
¨ γI
ď
Dmni
mn

(7.2)

`
˘
We also have that for any i ě 1, fpublish pRA pDi´1 , ui , θi qq „ N µ1i , σ 2 Id where
I
› 1
›
›µi ´ θi˚ › ď 4L ¨ γ
2
mn 1 ´ γ I

(7.3)

We use induction on i to prove this claim. Let’s focus on the base case i “ 1. We have that
›
›
› 1
›
›µ1 ´ θ1˚ › ď γ I ››θ̂0 ´ θ1˚ ››
2
2
›
¯
´›
›
›
ď γ I ›θ̂0 ´ θ0˚ › ` }θ0˚ ´ θ1˚ }2
2
ˆ
˙
I
4L
γ
4L
I
ďγ
¨
`
mn 1 ´ γ I
mn
I
4L
γ
“
¨
mn 1 ´ γ I
The first inequality follows from Theorem 7.2.2 and the fact that when running Algorithm 15
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for the first update i “ 1, the initial point θ01 “ θ1 ” θ̂0 saved by the training algorithm. The
second inequality is a simple triangle inequality, and the third follows from Equation (7.2)
(noting that θ̂0 ” µ0 ) and the sensitivity Lemma 7.2.1. Let’s move on to the induction step
of the argument. Suppose Equation (7.3) holds for some i ě 1. We will show that it holds
for pi ` 1q as well. We have that
›
›
› 1
›
˚ ›
I›
˚ ›
›µi`1 ´ θi`1
ď
γ
θ̂
´
θ
›
i
i`1 ›
2
2
›
´›
›
› ¯
›
›
˚ ›
ď γ I ›θ̂i ´ θi˚ › ` ›θi˚ ´ θi`1
2
2
˙
ˆ
I
γ
4L
4L
¨
`
ď γI
I
mn 1 ´ γ
mn
I
4L
γ
“
¨
mn 1 ´ γ I
The first inequality follows from Theorem 7.2.2 and the fact that when running Algorithm 15
for the pi ` 1qth update, the initial point θ01 “ θi`1 “ θ̂i saved by the previous run of
the unlearning algorithm. The second inequality is a simple triangle inequality, and the
third follows from the induction assumption for i (noting that θ̂i ” µ1i ), the sensitivity
Lemma 7.2.1, and the assumption that ni ě n{2.
We therefore have shown that for any i ě 1, for θi ” θ̂i´1
`
˘
fpublish pA pDi qq „ N µi , σ 2 Id ,

`
˘
fpublish pRA pDi´1 , ui , θi qq „ N µ1i , σ 2 Id

where Equations (7.2) and (7.3) imply
I
›
›
›µi ´ µ1i › ď ∆ fi 8L ¨ γ
2
mn 1 ´ γ I
2

∆
It then follows that RA is a p 2σ
2 `

∆
σ

a
2 log p1{δq, δq-unlearning algorithm for A, where,

with σ specified in the theorem statement, we get pϵ, δq-unlearning guarantee.
Now let’s prove the accuracy statement of the theorem. We will make use of Equations
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(7.2) and (7.3) and a Gaussian tail bound. Recall that for any i ě 0, the published output
θri “ θ̂i ` Z, and that θ̂0 ” µ0 and θ̂i ” µ1i for i ě 1. We therefore have that, for any β, and
for any update step i ě 0,
„›
ȷ
›
?
γI
4L
›r
˚›
Pr ›θi ´ θi › ě
¨
` σ 2d log p2d{βq ď β
mn 1 ´ γ I
2
a
The choice of σ in the theorem and the fact that for ϵ “ O plog p1{δqq, we have log p1{δq ` ϵ´
a
a
log p1{δq “ Ωpϵ{ log p1{δqq, imply that for any i ě 0, with probability at least 1 ´ β,
˜
›
›
›r
›
›θi ´ θi˚ › “ O
2

Lγ I

a

d log p1{δq log pd{βq
p1 ´ γ I q ϵmn

¸
(7.4)

Finally, since fz is M -smooth for all z, we get that for any update step i ě 0, with probability
at least 1 ´ β,
›2
M ›› r
›
fDi pθri q ´ fDi pθi˚ q ď
›θi ´ θi˚ › “ O
2
2

˜

M L2 γ 2I d log p1{δq log2 pd{βq

¸

p1 ´ γ I q2 m2 ϵ2 n2

The same algorithm can be analyzed as a perfect unlearning algorithm (i.e. without maintaining secret state). It obtains the same asymptotic tradeoff between running time and
accuracy, under the condition that the per-update run-time is at least logarithmic in the
relevant parameters. Intuitively, this run-time lower bound is required so that the update
algorithm can “recover” from the effect of the added noise.
Theorem 7.3.2 (Perfect Unlearning). Suppose for all z P Z, the loss function fz is mstrongly convex, L-Lipschitz, and M -smooth. Define γ fi pM ´ mq{pM ` mq and η fi
2{pM ` mq. Let the unlearning parameters ϵ and δ be such that ϵ “ O plog p1{δqq. Let the
learning algorithm A (Algorithm 14) run with ηt “ η and T ě I `logp Dmn
2L q{ log p1{γq where
n is the size of the input dataset, and let the unlearning algorithm RA (Algorithm 15) run
with input models θi ” θri´1 and ηt “ η and Ti “ I ` log plog p4di{δqq { log p1{γq iterations
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for all i ě 1 where
ˆ
log
Iě

˙
?
´1
2dp1´γq
?
2 logp2{δq`ϵ´ 2 logp2{δq

?

log p1{γq

, and

`
˘´1
8Lγ I 1 ´ γ I
´a
¯
σ“
a
mn
2 log p2{δq ` 3ϵ ´ 2 log p2{δq ` 2ϵ

in fpublish (Algorithm 16). We have that
1. Unlearning: RA is a strong pϵ, δq-perfect unlearning for A with respect to fpublish .
2. Accuracy: for any β, pA, RA q is pα, β ` δq-accurate with respect to fpublish where
˜
α“O

M L2 γ 2I d log p1{δq log2 pd{βq

¸

p1 ´ γ I q2 m2 ϵ2 n2

7.3.2. Convex Loss: Regularized Perturbed GD
If our loss function is not strongly convex, we can regularize it to enforce strong convexity,
and apply our algorithms to the regularized loss function. When we do this, we must manage
a basic tradeoff: the more aggressively we regularize the loss function, the less sensitive it
will be, and so the less noise we will need to add in our fpublish routine. This reduced noise
will increase accuracy. On the other hand, the more aggressively we regularize, the less
well the optimizer of the regularized loss function will optimize the original loss function
of interest, which will decrease accuracy. More aggressive regularization will also degrade
the Lipschitz and smoothness guarantees of the loss function. We choose our regularization
parameter carefully to trade off these various sources of error.
Suppose in this section, without loss of generality, that Θ contains the origin: 0 P Θ. This
will imply that supθPΘ }θ}2 ď D where D is the diameter of Θ, as before. Our strategy
is to regularize f so as to make it strongly convex, and have our learning and unlearning
algorithms run on the regularized version of f . Let, for any z P Z and any θ P Θ, for some
m ą 0,
gz pθq fi fz pθq `
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m
}θ}22
2

(7.5)

Claim 7.3.3. If fz is convex, L-Lipschitz, and M -smooth, then gz is m-strongly convex,
pL ` mDq-Lipschitz, and pM ` mq-smooth.
Theorem 7.3.4 (Accuracy, Unlearning, and Computation Tradeoffs). Suppose for all z P Z,
the loss function fz is convex, L-Lipschitz, and M -smooth, and let gz be defined as in
Equation (7.5) for some m specified later. Define γ fi M {pM ` 2mq and η fi 2{pM ` 2mq.
Let the learning algorithm A (Algorithm 14) run on the regularized g with ηt “ η and
T ě I ` logp Dmn
2L q{ log p1{γq where n is the size of the input dataset, and let the unlearning
algorithm RA (Algorithm 15) run on the regularized g with input models θi ” θ̂i´1 and
ηt “ η and Ti “ I iterations for all i ě 1. Let the unlearning parameters ϵ and δ be such
that ϵ “ O plog p1{δqq, and let
˜
¸2
?
3a
LM 2 d log p1{δq 5
4 2 pL ` mDq γ I
´a
¯, m “
σ“
a
DϵnI
mn p1 ´ γ I q
log p1{δq ` ϵ ´ log p1{δq
where σ is the noise level in fpublish . We have that
1. Unlearning: RA is a strong pϵ, δq-unlearning algorithm for A with respect to fpublish .
2. Accuracy: for any β, pA, RA q is pα, βq-accurate with respect to fpublish where
¨˜

M
α “ O˝

3
2

LD4

a

d log p1{δq
ϵnI

¸2
5

˛
´ 4¯
´ 6¯
´5
‚
` O n´ 5
log pd{βq ` O n
2

Proof of Theorem 7.3.4. The unlearning guarantee of the theorem holds for any m ą 0,
and follows from Theorem 7.3.1 by the choice of σ in the theorem statement. Let’s prove
the accuracy statement. Let θi˚r “ argminθPΘ gDi pθq denote the optimizer of the regularized
gDi , for all i ě 0. It follows from the proof of Theorem 7.3.1 (see Equation (7.4)) that for
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any update step i ě 0, with probability 1 ´ β,
˜
›
›
›r
›
›θi ´ θi˚r › “ O
2

¸
a
pL ` mDq γ I d log p1{δq log pd{βq
p1 ´ γ I q ϵmn

(7.6)

Also note that
M
γI
1
ď
“
I
1 ´ γI
mI
p1 ` 2 pm{M qq ´ 1

(7.7)

Now let θi˚ P argminθPΘ fDi pθq denote an optimizer of the original loss function fDi , for any
i ě 0. We have that, for any i ě 0,
fDi pθri q ´ fDi pθi˚ q “ fDi pθri q ´ fDi pθi˚r q ` fDi pθi˚r q ´ fDi pθi˚ q
›2
´
¯ M›
p1q
›r
›
ď ∇fDi pθi˚r qJ θri ´ θi˚r `
›θi ´ θi˚r › ` fDi pθi˚r q ´ fDi pθi˚ q
2
2
›
›2
´
¯
p2q M ›
›
“
›θri ´ θi˚r › ` mθi˚rJ θi˚r ´ θri ` fDi pθi˚r q ´ fDi pθi˚ q
2
2
›2
p3q M ›
›r
›
ď
›θi ´ θi˚r › ` mD2 ` fDi pθi˚r q ´ fDi pθi˚ q
2
2
›2
m
M ›› r
2
˚r ›
“
›θi ´ θi › ` mD2 ` gDi pθi˚r q ´ }θi˚r }2 ´ fDi pθi˚ q
2
2
2
›2
p4q M ›
m
›r
2
˚r ›
ď
›θi ´ θi › ` mD2 ` gDi pθi˚ q ´ }θi˚r }2 ´ fDi pθi˚ q
2
2
2
›2
¯
M ›› r
m´ ˚ 2
›
}θi }2 ´ }θi˚r }22
“
›θi ´ θi˚r › ` mD2 `
2˜
2
2
¸
2
3
M pL ` mDq d log p1{δq log2 pd{βq
p5q
` mD2
“O
m4 ϵ2 n2 I 2

(7.8)

where inequality (1) follows from fDi being M -smooth. (2) follows from the fact that for
all θ, ∇fDi pθq “ ∇gDi pθq ´ mθ and that by optimality of θi˚r for gDi , we have ∇gDi pθi˚r q “
0. (3) follows from a simple application of Cauchy-Schwarz: for all θ1 , θ2 P Θ, we have
θ1J θ2 ď }θ1 }2 }θ2 }2 ď D2 . (4) follows from the optimality of θi˚r for gDi , and (5) is implied
by Equations (7.6) and (7.7), and it holds with probability 1 ´ β. Now for the choice of m
in the theorem, we conclude that for any i ě 0, with probability 1 ´ β,
¨˜
fDi pθri q ´ fDi pθi˚ q “ O ˝

M

3
2

LD4

a

d log p1{δq
ϵnI
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¸2
5

˛
´ 6¯
´ 4¯
log2 pd{βq‚` O n´ 5 ` O n´ 5

If our goal is to satisfy only weak unlearning (i.e. to allow our run-time to grow with the
length of the update sequence), we can obtain error bounds that have a better dependence
on n.
Theorem 7.3.5 (Accuracy, Unlearning, and Computation Tradeoffs). Suppose for all z P Z,
the loss function fz is convex, L-Lipschitz, and M -smooth, and let gz be defined as in
Equation (7.5) for some m specified later. Define γ fi M {pM ` 2mq and η fi 2{pM ` 2mq.
Let the learning algorithm A (Algorithm 14) run on the regularized g with ηt “ η and
T ě I ` logp Dmn
2L q{ log p1{γq where n is the size of the input dataset, and let the unlearning
algorithm RA (Algorithm 15) run on the regularized g with input model θi ” θ̂i´1 and ηt “ η
and Ti “ i2 ¨ I iterations, for the ith update. Let the unlearning parameters ϵ and δ be such
that ϵ “ O plog p1{δqq, and let
d
a
?
LM d log p1{δq
2 2M pL ` mDq
´a
¯, m “
?
σ“ ?
a
Dϵn I
m mIn
log p1{δq ` ϵ ´ log p1{δq
where σ is the noise level in fpublish . We have that
1. Unlearning: RA is a weak pϵ, δq-unlearning algorithm for A with respect to fpublish .
2. Accuracy: for any β, pA, RA q is pα, βq-accurate with respect to fpublish where
¨d
α “ O˝

˛
M LD3

a

´ 3¯
`
˘
d log p1{δq
?
log2 pd{βq‚` O n´1 ` O n´ 2
ϵn I

Remark 7.3.1. We remark that we can further explore the tradeoff between each update’s
runtime Ti and dependence on sample size n. Let ξ ě 1 be any constant (Theorem 7.3.5
corresponds to ξ “ 1). We have that under the setting of Theorem 7.3.5, with Ti “ i2ξ ¨ I

151

iterations, and
ξ
¸ 3ξ`1
˜
1`ξ
?
1
2
2ξ
ξ
d log p1{δq
2 2M pL ` mDq
L M
´a
¯, m “
σ“
a
1
1
mpmIq 2ξ n
log p1{δq ` ϵ ´ log p1{δq
D2 ϵ2 n2 I ξ

1. Unlearning: RA is a weak pϵ, δq-unlearning algorithm for A with respect to fpublish .
2. Accuracy: for any β, pA, RA q is pα, βq-accurate with respect to fpublish where
˛
¨
ξ
˜ 1`ξ
¸ 3ξ`1
2`4ξ
´
¯
´
¯
2
4ξ
6ξ
‹
˚ M ξ L D ξ d log p1{δq
´ 3ξ`1
´ 3ξ`1
2
pd{βq
`
O
n
α “ O˝
log
`
O
n
‚
1
ϵ2 n2 I ξ

7.4. Perturbed Distributed Descent
Our next algorithm obtains additional running time improvements for sufficiently high dimensional data. The basic idea is as follows: we randomly partition the dataset into K parts,
separately optimize to find a model that approximates the empirical risk minimizer on each
part, and then take the average of each of the K models. Zhang et al [147] analyze this
algorithm and show that its out of sample guarantees match the out of sample guarantees
?
of non-distributed gradient descent, whenever K ď n. For us, this algorithm has a key
advantage: the element involved in an update will only appear in a small number of the
partitions, and we only need to update the parameters corresponding to those partitions.
Our algorithm will improve over basic gradient descent because those partitions are smaller
in size than the entire dataset by a factor of K, and hence our run-time budget of nI
gradient computations will allow us to perform more than I gradient descent operations
per modified partition. We provide deletion guarantees by using a publishing function that
adds noise to the average of the K parameters.
There are several difficulties that we must overcome. Primary among these is that the analysis of [147] provides out of sample guarantees for a dataset that is drawn i.i.d. from some
fixed distribution. In our case (because our dataset results from an arbitrary and possi-
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bly adversarial sequence of additions and deletions), there is no distribution from which the
dataset is drawn. To deal with this, our initial training algorithm does not directly partition
the dataset, but instead draws a bootstrap sample (i.e. a sample with replacement) from the
empirical distribution defined by the dataset, so that the “out of sample” guarantees of [147]
correspond to empirical risk bounds in our case. Because the accuracy analysis depends on
this distributional property, as updates come in, before we use gradient descent to update
the models corresponding to the appropriate partitions, we must apply a form of reservoir
sampling to guarantee that each partition continues to be distributed as a set of samples
drawn i.i.d. from the empirical distribution defined by the current dataset (i.e. after the
update). This is also crucial to our unlearning guarantee. Finally, the basic instantiation of
this algorithm only gives guarantees on the expected error of the learned model [147], and
we want high probability guarantees. To achieve these, we run C “ Oplogp1{βqq copies of
the algorithm in parallel, and at every round, only publish a noisy version of the parameter
achieving the lowest loss among all C candidates. We now go into more detail.
To facilitate the technical development in this section, we introduce some notation:
Definition 7.4.1. Fix any update round i ě 0. In this section we use S i “ pSij qK
j“1 for
the partitioned dataset at round i. We use Si (unbold) to denote the union of partitions
in S i and Di for the unique data points in Si (i..e Di removes the duplicates in Si which
results from our sampling scheme). We use θ̂i “ pθ̂ij qK
j“1 for the learned parameters in each
partition. θri “ fpublish pθ̂i q represents the published model of round i. In this section, the
unlearning algorithm for update i takes as input the partitioned dataset of previous round
S i´1 , an update ui , and the learned models of previous round θ̂i´1 , and outputs the updated
models θ̂i and the updated datasets S i for use in the next update.
Throughout we denote the distribution on datasets of size B sampled with replacement
from D by P B pDq. We need to maintain the condition that the marginal distribution of the
sampled dataset Si at round i is P B pDi q. To do this, at each update, we iteratively update
each partition using a technique called reservoir sampling with replacement (that we need
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Algorithm 17 A: Learning for Perturbed Distributed Gradient Descent
Input: dataset D
for l “ 1, 2, . . . , C do
Draw S „ P B pDq.
Ź Bootstrap B data points.
Partition S randomly into K equally-sized datasets: S 0,l “ pSj qK
j“1 .
for j “ 1, 2, . . . , K do
Initialize θ01 P Θ.
for t “ 1, 2, . . .`T do
˘
1
1 q
θt1 “ ProjΘ θt´1
´ ηt ∇fSj pθt´1
end
θ̂j “ θT1
end
θ̂0,l “ pθ̂j qK
Ź l’th set of models.
j“1
end
Ź Publish the best model.
Call fpublish pθ̂0,l˚ q where l˚ “ argminl fD pavgpθ̂0,l qq.
C
Ź For use in first update.
,
S
“
pS
q
Output: θ̂0 “ pθ̂0,l qC
0
0,l l“1
l“1
B is detailed below.
to extend to handle both additions and deletions). The algorithm Srep
B : Reservoir Sampling with Replacement for ith update
Algorithm 18 Srep

Input: Subsample Si´1 , update ui “ pzi , ‚i q.
Si “ Si´1 .
if ‚i “ 1 add1 then
Draw N „ BinomialpB, n´1
Ź ni : size of Di .
i q.
Pick distinct indices i1 , . . . , iN at random from rBs.
for k “ 1, 2, . . . , N do
Replace zik with zi in Si .
end
else
for zk P Si : zk “ zi do
Replace zk with z „ PpDi q in Si
Ź PpDi q: empirical distribution of Di .
end
end
Output: Si .
Lemma 7.4.1. Fix any training dataset D and any non-adaptively chosen update sequence
B pS
U. Let S0 „ P B pDq (as in the learning algorithm) and for every i ě 1, Si „ Srep
i´1 , ui q

(as in the unlearning algorithm). We have that for all i ě 0:
d

Si “ P B pDi q.
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Lemma 7.4.2 shows that the reservoir sampling operation (Algorithm 18) modifies at most
si “ ÕpB{nq data points, and hence, at most si partitions containing a modified data point.
Thus we can divide our budget of nTi gradient computations at round i, into pKnTi q{pBsi q
gradient computations per modified partition.
Lemma 7.4.2. Fix any training dataset D and any update sequence U, and suppose B ě n.
Let si denote the number of data points modified by the update of round i, namely, ui . In
other words, si “ |tzl : zl P Si , zl R Si´1 u|. We have that for any update step i and any
δ 1 ď e´1 , with probability at least 1 ´ δ 1 ,

si ď

`
˘
10B
log 1{δ 1
n
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Algorithm 19 RA : ith Unlearning for Perturbed Distributed Gradient Descent
C
Input: datasets S i´1 “ pS i´1,l qC
l“1 , update ui , models θ̂i´1 “ pθ̂i´1,l ql“1 .

Update Di “ Di´1 ˝ ui .
for l “ 1, 2, . . . , C do
B pS
Draw S i,l „ Srep
i´1,l , ui q

Ź Reservoir update + similar partition.

K
K
Let pSi,j qK
j“1 ” S i,l , pSi´1,j qj“1 ” S i´1,l , pθ̂i´1,j qj“1 ” θ̂i´1,l .

Let ind “ tj : Si´1,j ‰ Si,j u

Ź Modified partitions.

for j “ 1, 2, . . . , K do
if j P ind then
Initialize θ01 “ θ̂i´1,j
KnTi
for t “ 1, 2, . . . , T “ B|ind|
do
˘
`
1
1 q
1
θt “ ProjΘ θt´1 ´ ηt ∇fSi,j pθt´1

end
θ̂i,j “ θT1
else
θ̂i,j “ θ̂i´1,j
end
end
θ̂i,l “ pθ̂i,j qK
j“1

Ź l’th set of models.

end
Call fpublish pθ̂i,l˚ q where l˚ “ argminl fDi pavgpθ̂i,l qq

Ź Publish the best model.

C
Output: θ̂i “ pθ̂i,l qC
l“1 , S i “ pS i,l ql“1 .

Ź For use in next update.

Algorithm 20 fpublish : publishing function
Input: θ̂ “ pθ̂j qK
j“1
`
˘
Draw Z „ N 0, σ 2 Id
Output: θr “ avgpθ̂q ` Z

Ź avgp¨q averages input models.

We now state the accuracy and strong unlearning bounds for perturbed distributed gradient
descent. The convergence analysis on each partition is similar to the analysis in the proof
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of Theorem 7.3.1, with the added complexity of handling the number of partitions updated
at each round, and the number of duplicated points (that could possibly be removed) in
each partition. In order to obtain accuracy bounds we need to leverage an accuracy bound
for the averaged parameter in a distributed setting, which we quote below from [147]. They
remark that the required assumptions hold in most common settings, including in linear and
logistic regression as long as the data distribution satisfies standard regularity conditions.
˚ “ K ´1
Theorem 7.4.3 (Corollary 2 of [147]). Let θavg

řK

˚
j“1 θj ,

where θj˚ are the empirical

risk minimizers on partition j of a dataset of size B sampled i.i.d. from some distribution P.
Let θ˚ “ argminθPΘ Ez„P rfz pθqs. Then under the assumption that fz is m-strongly convex
for all z, and satisfies the following smoothness conditions for all θ P Θ:
ı
”
”ˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ8 ı
Ez„P }∇fz pθq}82 ď L8 , Ez„P ˇˇˇ∇2 fz pθq ´ ∇2 Ez„P rfz pθqsˇˇˇ2 ď H 8 ,
and the Hessian matrix ∇2 fz p¨q is G-Lipschitz continuous for all z, then, for some constant
c:
ˆ
˙
ˆ ˙
ˆ 3˙
”›
› ı
cK 2 L2
L2 G2
2L2
K
K
2
˚
˚ ›2
›
`O
`O
E θavg ´ θ 2 ď 2 ` 4 2 H log d `
m B
m B
m2
B2
B3

Theorem 7.4.4 (Accuracy, Unlearning, and Computation Tradeoffs). Suppose for all z P Z,
the loss function fz is m-strongly convex, L-Lipschitz, M -smooth, and that its Hessian
is G-Lipschitz and bounded by H (with respect to ℓ2 -operator norm of matrices). Define
γ fi pM ´ mq{pM ` mq and η fi 2{pM ` mq. Fix any 1 ď ξ ď 4{3, and let B “ nξ and
?
K “ B. Let the learning algorithm A (Algorithm 17) run with ηt “ η and T iterations on
every partition, and for any update i ě 1, let the unlearning algorithm RA (Algorithm 19)
run with ηt “ η and total Ti iterations per copy (i.e. total nTi gradient computations per
copy), where for any I,

T ě In

4´3ξ
2

`
˘
log DmL´1 nξ p1 ` 10 log p2{δqq
`
log p1{γq
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ˆ
Ti “ 10 log p2i{δq I `

1
n

4´3ξ
2

¨

log p1 ` 10i log p2i{δqq
log p1{γq

˙

Let the unlearning parameters ϵ and δ be such that ϵ “ O plog p1{δqq and δ “ OpB ´1 q, and
let

4´3ξ
?
4 2Lγ In 2
ˆ
˙´
σ“
¯
4´3ξ
a
a
mn 1 ´ γ In 2
log p2{δq ` ϵ ´ log p2{δq

in fpublish (Algorithm 20). We have that
1. Unlearning: RA is a strong pϵ, δq-unlearning algorithm for A with respect to fpublish .
2. Accuracy: for any β, letting C “ log p2{βq { log 2, we get that pA, RA q is pα, βq-accurate
with respect to fpublish where
˛
4´3ξ
˙
ˆ
˙
ˆ
2 γ 2In 2 d log p1{δq log2 pd{βq
1
log d
M
L
‚
˝
`O
`O
α“O
3ξ
m2 p1 ´ γq2 ϵ2 n2
nξ
n2
¨

Remark 7.4.1. For any 1 ď ξ ď 4{3:
¨
α “ Õ ˝

γ In

4´3ξ
2

˛
d

ϵ2 n2

`

1‚
nξ

This improves over the bound of Theorem 7.3.1 (Basic Perturbed GD), whenever
˜
d “ Ω̃

ϵ2 n2´ξ
γ I ´ γ In
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4´3ξ
2

¸

Chapter 8
Adaptive Machine Unlearning
Data deletion algorithms aim to remove the influence of deleted data points from trained
models at a cheaper computational cost than fully retraining those models. However, for
sequences of deletions, most prior work in the non-convex setting gives valid guarantees
only for sequences that are chosen independently of the models that are published. If people
choose to delete their data as a function of the published models (because they don’t like
what the models reveal about them, for example), then the update sequence is adaptive. In
this paper, we give a general reduction from deletion guarantees against adaptive sequences
to deletion guarantees against non-adaptive sequences, using differential privacy and its
connection to max information. Combined with ideas from prior work which give guarantees
for non-adaptive deletion sequences, this leads to extremely flexible algorithms able to
handle arbitrary model classes and training methodologies, giving strong provable deletion
guarantees for adaptive deletion sequences. We show in theory how prior work for nonconvex models fails against adaptive deletion sequences, and use this intuition to design a
practical attack against the SISA algorithm of [14] on CIFAR-10, MNIST, Fashion-MNIST.

8.1. Introduction
Businesses like Facebook and Google depend on training sophisticated models on user data.
Increasingly—in part because of regulations like the European Union’s General Data Protection Act and the California Consumer Privacy Act—these organizations are receiving
requests to delete the data of particular users. But what should that mean? It is straightforward to delete a customer’s data from a database and stop using it to train future models.
But what about models that have already been trained using an individual’s data? These
are not necessarily safe; it is known that individual training data can be exfiltrated from
models trained in standard ways via model inversion attacks [55, 130, 139]. Regulators are
still grappling with when a trained model should be considered to contain personal data of
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individuals in the training set and the potential legal implications. In 2020 draft guidance,
the U.K.’s Information Commissioner’s Office addressed how to comply with data deletion
requests as they pertain to ML models:
If the request is for rectification or erasure of the data, this may not be possible
without re-training the model...or deleting the model altogether [74].
Fully retraining the model every time a deletion request is received can be prohibitive in
terms of both time and money—especially for large models and frequent deletion requests.
The problem of data deletion (also known as machine unlearning) is to find an algorithmic middle ground between the compliant but impractical baseline of retraining, and the
potentially illegal standard of doing nothing. We iteratively update models as deletion requests come in, with the twin goals of having computational cost that is substantially less
than the cost of full retraining, and the guarantee that the models we produce are (almost)
indistinguishable from the models that would have resulted from full retraining.
After an initial model is deployed deletion requests arrive over time as users make decisions
about whether to delete their data. It is easy to see how these decisions may be adaptive
with respect to the models. For example, security researchers may publish a new model
inversion attack that identifies a specific subset of people in the training data, thus leading
to increased deletion requests for people in that subset. In this paper we give the first
machine unlearning algorithms that both have rigorous deletion guarantees against these
kind of adaptive deletion sequence, and can accommodate arbitrary non-convex models like
deep neural networks without requiring pretraining on non-user data.
8.1.1. Main Results
The deletion guarantees proven for several prior methods crucially rely on the implicit
assumption that the points that are deleted are independent of the randomness used to
train the models. However this assumption fails unless the sequence of deletion requests is
chosen independently of the information that the model provider has made public. This is
a very strong assumption, because users may wish to delete their data exactly because of
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what deployed models reveal about them.
We give a generic reduction. We show that if:
1. A data deletion algorithm RA for a learning algorithm A has deletion guarantees for
oblivious sequences of deletion requests (as those from past work do), and
2. Information about the internal randomness of RA is revealed only in a manner that
satisfies differential privacy, then
(A, RA q also satisfies data deletion guarantees against an adaptive sequence of deletion
requests, that can depend in arbitrary ways on the information that the model provider has
made public.
In Section 8.3, we motivate our main result with a theoretical example which illustrates that
past method’s lack of guarantees for adaptive sequences is not simply a failure of analysis,
but an actual failure of these methods to satisfy deletion guarantees for adaptive deletion
sequences. As an exemplar, we use a variant of SISA from [14] that satisfies perfect deletion
guarantees for non-adaptive deletion sequences and exhibit adaptive deletion sequences that
strongly separate the resulting distribution on models compared to the retraining baseline.
The generic reduction found in Section 8.4 can be used to give adaptive data deletion
mechanisms for a wide variety of problems by leveraging past work on deletion algorithms
for non-adaptive sequences, and a line of work on differentially private aggregation [30, 121].
Since prior deletion algorithms themselves tend to use existing learning algorithms in a
black-box way, the entire pipeline is modular and easy to bolt-on to existing methods. In
Section 8.5, we show how this can be accomplished by using a variant of the SISA framework
of [14] together with a differentially private aggregation method.
In Section 8.6, we complement our main result with a set of experimental results on CIFAR10, MNIST, and Fashion-MNIST that demonstrate differential privacy may be useful in
giving adaptive guarantees beyond the statement of our theorems. Specifically we show that
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small amounts of noise addition (insufficient for our theorems to apply) already serve to
break the adaptive deletion strategies that we use to falsify the adaptive deletion guarantees
in our experiments described in Section 8.3 and do so at minimal expense in model accuracy.
8.1.2. Related Work
Data deletion was introduced by [17]; we adopt the randomized formulation of [60]. [60]
anticipate the problem of deletion requests that might be correlated with internal state of
the algorithm, and define (and propose as a study for future work) robust data deletion
which is a data deletion guarantee that holds for adversaries with knowledge of the internal
state. Our insight is that we can provide deletion guarantees against adaptive sequences
by instead obscuring the internal state of the algorithm using techniques from differential
privacy.
We are the first to explicitly consider the problem of adaptive sequences of deletion requests,
but some techniques from past work do have deletion guarantees that extend to adaptive
sequences. Deterministic methods and methods that depend only on randomness that is
sampled after the deletion request are already robust to adaptive deletion. This includes
techniques that find an approximately optimal solution to a strongly convex problem and
then perturb the solution to obscure the optimizer within a small radius e.g. [63, 114, 128]. It
also includes the approach of [61, 62] which pre-trains a nonconvex model on data that will
never be deleted and then does convex fine-tuning on user data on top of that. Techniques
whose deletion guarantees depend on randomness sampled at training in general do not
have guarantees against adaptive deletions. This includes algorithms given in [14, 60, 114]
— the SISA framework of [14] being of particular interest as it is agnostic to the class of
models and training methodology, and so is extremely flexible.
Differential privacy has been used as a mitigation for adaptivity since the work of [42, 45]. In
machine learning, it has been used to mitigate the bias of adaptive data gathering strategies
as used in bandit learning algorithms [113]. The application that is most similar to our work
is [69], which uses differential privacy of the internal randomness of an algorithm (as we
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do) to reduce streaming algorithms with guarantees against adaptive adversarial streams to
streaming algorithms with guarantees against oblivious adversaries. Our techniques differ;
while [69] reduce to the so-called “transfer theorem for linear and low sensitivity queries”
developed over a series of works [12, 45, 81], we use a more general connection between
differential privacy and “max-information” established in [43, 124].

8.2. Preliminaries
Let Z be the data domain. A dataset D is a multi-set of elements from Z. We consider
update requests of two types: deletion and addition. These update requests are formally
defined below, similar to how they are defined in [114].
Definition 8.2.1 (Update Operations and Sequences). An update u is a pair pz, ‚q where
z P Z is a datapoint and ‚ P T “ t1 add1 , 1 delete1 u determines the type of the update. An
update sequence U is a sequence pu1 , u2 , . . .q where ut P Z ˆ T for all t. Given a dataset D
and an update u “ pz, ‚q, the update operation is defined as:
$
’
’
&D Y tzu

if ‚ “ 1 add1

’
’
%Dztzu

if ‚ “ 1 delete1

D ˝ u fi

Given an update sequence U “ pu1 , u2 , . . .q, we have D ˝ U fi pppD ˝ u1 q ˝ u2 q ˝ . . .q.
We use Θ to denote the space of models. A learning or training algorithm is a mapping
A : Z ˚ Ñ Θ˚ that maps a dataset D P Z ˚ to a collection of models θ P Θ˚ . An unlearning
or update algorithm for A is a mapping RA : Z ˚ ˆ pZ ˆ T q ˆ S Ñ Θ˚ which takes in a data
set D P Z ˚ , an update request u P Z ˆ T , and some current state for the algorithms s P S
(the domain S can be arbitrary), and outputs an updated collection of models θ1 P Θ˚ . In
this paper we consider a setting in which a stream of update requests arrive in sequence.
We note that in this sequential framework, the update algorithm RA also updates the state
of the algorithm after each update request is processed; however, for notational economy,
we do not explicitly write the updated state as an output of the algorithm.
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t
At each round, we provide access to the models through a mapping fpublish
: Θ˚ Ñ Ψ that

takes in the collection of models and outputs some object ψ P Ψ. A published object ψ P Ψ
can, for instance, be the aggregate predictions of the learned models on a data set, or,
some aggregation of the models. To model adaptively chosen update sequences, we define
an arbitrary “update requester” who interacts with the learning and unlearning algorithms
pA, RA q through the publishing function fpublish in rounds to generate a sequence of updates. The update requester is denoted by UpdReq and defined in Definition 8.2.2, and the
interaction between the algorithms and the update requester is described in Algorithm 21.
Throughout we will use ut to denote the update request at round t. We will use Dt to denote
the data set at round t: D0 is the initial training data set and for all t ě 1, Dt “ Dt´1 ˝ ut .
We will use θt to denote the learned models at round t: θ0 is generated by the initial
training algorithm A, and θt for t ě 1 denotes the updated models at round t generated by
t
pθt q.
the update algorithm RA . ψ t denotes the published object at round t: ψ t “ fpublish

Definition 8.2.2 (Update Requester (UpdReq)). The update sequence is generated by an
update requester which is modeled by a (possibly randomized) mapping UpdReq : Ψ˚ ˆ pZ ˆ
T q˚ Ñ pZ ˆ T q that takes as input the history of interaction between herself and the
algorithms, and outputs a new update for the current round. Given an update requester
t
ut , the update sequence U “
UpdReq, algorithms pA, RA q and publishing functions tfpublish

tut ut can be written as
`
˘
`
˘
` ˘
u1 “ UpdReq ψ 0 , u2 “ UpdReq ψ 0 , u1 , ψ 1 , . . . , ut “ UpdReq ψ 0 , u1 , ψ 1 , . . . , ut´1 , ψ t´1

We say an update requester UpdReq is nonadaptive if it is independent of the published
objects, i.e., if there exists a mapping UpdReq1 : pZ ˆ T q˚ Ñ pZ ˆ T q such that for all t ě 1,
`
˘
`
˘
ut “ UpdReq ψ 0 , u1 , ψ 1 , u2 , . . . , ut´1 , ψ t´1 “ UpdReq1 u1 , u2 , . . . , ut´1

This is equivalent to saying that the update sequence is fixed before the interaction occurs.
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Algorithm 21 Interaction between pA, RA q and UpdReq
Input: Data set D
Let D0 Ð D.
Train θ0 Ð ApDq.
0
Publish ψ 0 Ð fpublish
pθ0 q.
Save the initial state s0 .
for t “ 1, 2, . . . do
The update requester
` requests a new update, given
˘ the history of interaction:
ut Ð UpdReq ψ 0 , u1 , ψ 1 , u2 , . . . , ut´1 , ψ t´1 .
The algorithms update, given ut : `
˘
Update the models θt`Ð˘RA Dt´1 , ut , st´1 .
t
Publish ψ t Ð fpublish
θt .
Save the updated state st .
Update the data set Dt Ð Dt´1 ˝ ut .
end

Following [60], we propose the following definition for an unlearning algorithm in the sequential update setting ([60] gives a definition for a single deletion request, whereas here we
define a natural extension for an arbitrarily long sequence of deletions, as well as additions,
that can be chosen adaptively.). Informally, we require that at every round, and for all
possible update requesters, with high probability over the draw of the update sequence, no
subset of models resulting from deletion occurs with substantially higher probability than
it would have under full retraining.
Definition 8.2.3 (pα, β, γq-unlearning). We say that RA is an pα, β, γq-unlearning algorithm for A, if for all datasets D “ D0 and all update requesters UpdReq, the following
condition holds: For every update step t ě 1, with probability at least 1 ´ γ over the draw of
the update sequence uďt “ pu1 , . . . , ut q from UpdReq,

@E Ď Θ˚ :

ˇ
“
`
˘
‰
“ ` ˘
‰
Pr RA Dt´1 , ut , st´1 P E ˇuďt ď eα ¨ Pr A Dt P E ` β

We say RA is a nonadaptive pα, β, γq-unlearning algorithm for A if the above condition
holds for any nonadaptive UpdReq.
Remark 8.2.1. Our definition of unlearning is reminiscent of differential privacy, but

165

following [60], we ask only for a one-sided guarantee: that the probability of any event
under the unlearning scheme is not too much larger than the probability of the same event
under full retraining, but not vice versa. The reason is that we do not want there to be
events that can substantially increase an observer’s confidence that we did not engage in
full retraining, but we do not object to observers who strongly update their beliefs that we
did engage in full retraining. Our events E are defined directly over the sets of models in
Θ˚ output by A and RA — note that because of information processing inequalities, this is
only stronger than defining events E over the observable outcome space Ψ.
8.2.1. Differential Privacy and Max-Information
Differential privacy will be a key tool in our results. Let X denote an arbitrary data domain.
We use x P X to denote an individual element of X , and X P X ˚ to denote a collection
of elements from X — which we call a data set. We say two data sets X, X 1 P X ˚ are
neighboring if they differ in at most one element. We say an algorithm M : X n Ñ O is
differentially private if its output distributions on neighboring data sets are close, formalized
below.
Definition 8.2.4 (Differential Privacy (DP) [33, 35]). An algorithm M : X m Ñ O is pϵ, δqdifferentially private, if for every neighboring X and X 1 , and for every O Ď O, we have
Pr rM pXq P Os ď eϵ Pr rM pX 1 q P Os ` δ.
We remark at the outset that the “datasets” to which we will eventually ask for differential
privacy with respect to will not be the datasets on which our learning algorithms are trained,
but will instead be collections of random bits parameterizing our randomized algorithms.
Differentially private algorithms are robust to data-independent post-processing:
Lemma 8.2.1 (Post-processing preserves DP [35]). If M : X m Ñ O is pϵ, δq-differentially
private, then for all f : O Ñ R, we have f ˝ M : X m Ñ R defined by f ˝ M pXq “ f pM pXqq
is pϵ, δq-differentially private.
The max-information between two jointly distributed random variables measures how close
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their joint distribution is to the product of their corresponding marginal distributions.
Definition 8.2.5 (Max-Information [43]). Let X and Y be jointly distributed random variables over the domain pX , Yq. The β-approximate max-information between X and Y is:
β
I8
pX; Y q “ log

sup
EĎpX ,Yq,PrrpX,Y qPEsąβ

PrrpX, Y q P Es ´ β
PrrpX b Y q P Es

where pX b Y q represents the product distribution of X and Y .
The max-information of an algorithm M that takes a dataset X as input and outputs
M pXq, is defined as the max-information between X and M pXq for the worst case product
distribution over X:
Definition 8.2.6 (Max-Information of an Algorithm [43]). Let M : X m Ñ O be an Algoβ
pM, mq ď k, if for
rithm. We say M has β-approximate max-information of k, written I8
β
every distribution P over X , we have I8
pX; M pXqq ď k when X „ P m .

In this paper, we will use the fact that differentially private algorithms have bounded maxinformation:
Theorem 8.2.2 (DP implies bounded max-information [124]). Let M : X m Ñ O be an
β
pϵ, δq-differentially private algorithm for 0 ă ϵ ď 1{2 and 0 ă δ ă ϵ. Then, I8
pM, mq “
´
¯
´ a ¯
a
2
O ϵ2 m ` m δ{ϵ for β “ e´ϵ m ` O m δ{ϵ .

8.3. Falsifying Unlearning Guarantees with Adaptivity
In this section we demonstrate that the deletion guarantees of algorithms in the SISA
framework [14] fail for adaptive deletion sequences. We give a clean toy construction which
shows algorithms in the SISA framework fail to have nontrivial adaptive deletion guarantees
even in the black-box setting when the models within each shard are not made public, only
aggregations of their classification outputs. In the Appendix we experimentally evaluate a
more realistic instantiation of this construction.
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The setting we consider directly corresponds to the setting in which our final algorithms
operate: what is made public is the aggregate predictions of the ensemble of models, but
not the models themselves. For non-adaptive sequences of deletions, distributed algorithms
of the sort described in Section 8.5 have perfect deletion guarantees. We demonstrate via a
simple example that these guarantees dramatically fail for adaptive deletion sequences.
Suppose we have a dataset consisting of real-valued points with binary labels tpxi , yi qu2n
i“1 ,
xi P Rd , yi P t0, 1u in which there are exactly two copies of each distinct training example.
Consider a simplistic classification model, resembling a lookup table, which given a point
xi predicts the label yi if the model has been trained on (xi , yi ) and a dummy prediction
value ”K” otherwise:
fD pxi q “

$
’
’
&y

if pxi , yi q P D,

’
’
%K

otherwise

i

Consider what happens when the training algorithm randomly partitions this dataset into
three pieces and trains such a model on each partition. This constructs an ensemble which,
at query time, predicts the class with the majority vote. On this dataset, the ensemble
will predict the labels of roughly 2{3 of the training points correctly—that is, exactly those
points for which the duplicates have fallen into distinct partitions, so that the ensemble gets
the majority vote right.
We construct an adaptive adversary who chooses to delete exactly those training points that
the ensemble correctly classifies (which are those points for whom the duplicates have fallen
into distinct shards). The result is that the model resulting from this deletion sequence will
misclassify every remaining training point. Full retraining (because it would rerandomize the
partition) would again lead to training accuracy of approximately 2{3. Recalling that our
deletion notion requires that the probability of any event under the unlearning scheme is not
much larger than the probability of the same event under full retraining, this demonstrates
that there are algorithms in the SISA framework — even if the models are not directly
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exposed — that do not satisfy pα, β, γq-deletion guarantees for any nontrivial value of α.
We formalize this below:
Theorem 8.3.1. There are learning and unlearning algorithms in the SISA framework
pA, RA q such that for any α, and any β, γ ă 1{4, RA is not an pα, β, γq-unlearning algorithm
for A.
A proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix.

8.4. A Reduction from Adaptive to Nonadaptive Update Requesters
In our analysis we imagine without loss of generality that the learning algorithm A draws
an i.i.d. sequence of random variables r „ P m (that encodes all the randomness to be used
over the course of the updates) from some distribution P, and passes it to the unlearning
algorithm RA . Note r is drawn once in the initial training, and given r, A and RA become
deterministic mappings. We can also view the state st as a deterministic mapping of r,
the update requests so far uďt “ pu1 , . . . , ut q, and the original data set D0 . We write
st “ g t pD0 , uďt , rq for some deterministic mapping g t . We can therefore summarize the
trajectory of the algorithms pA, RA q as follows.
` 0˘
0
θ .
• t “ 0: draw r „ P m , let θ0 “ ApDq ” ApD; rq, and ψ 0 “ fpublish
` t˘
t
• t ě 1: θt “ RA pDt´1 , ut , st´1 q where st´1 “ g t´1 pD0 , uďt´1 , rq, and ψ t “ fpublish
θ .
In this view, the randomness r used by the learning algorithm A and the subsequent invocations of the unlearning algorithm RA is represented as part of the internal state. Past
analyses of unlearning algorithms have crucially assumed that r is statistically independent
of the updates pu1 , u2 , . . .q (which is the case for non-adaptive update requesters, but not
for adaptive update requesters). In the following general theorem, we show that if a learning/unlearning pair satisfies unlearning guarantees against non-adaptive update requesters,
and the publishing function is differentially private in the internal randomness r, then the
resulting algorithms also satisfy unlearning guarantees against adaptive update requesters.
Note that what is important is that the publishing algorithms are differentially private in
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the internal randomness r, not in the datapoints used for training.
Theorem 8.4.1 (A General Theorem). Fix a pair of learning and unlearning algorithms
t
pA, RA q and the publishing functions tfpublish
ut . Suppose for every round t, the sequence of
1

t
publishing functions tfpublish
ut1 ďt is pϵ, δq-differentially private in r „ P m , for 0 ă ϵ ď 1{2

and 0 ă δ ă ϵ. Suppose RA is a non-adaptive pα, β, γq-unlearning algorithm for A. Then
?
?
1
RA is an pα1 , β 1 , γ 1 q-unlearning algorithm for A for α1 “ α ` ϵ1 , β 1 “ βeϵ ` δ 1 , γ 1 “ γ ` δ 1
´
´ a ¯
a ¯
2
where ϵ1 “ O ϵ2 m ` m δ{ϵ and δ 1 “ e´ϵ m ` O m δ{ϵ .
The proof can be found in the Appendix, but at an intuitive level, it proceeds as follows. Because it does not change the joint distribution on update requests and internal
state, we can imagine in our analysis that r is redrawn after each update request from its
conditional distribution, conditioned on the observed update sequence so far. Because the
publishing function is differentially private in r, by the fact that post-processing preserves
differential privacy (Lemma 8.2.1), so is the update sequence. We may therefore apply the
max-information bound (Theorem 8.2.2), which allows us to relate the conditional distribution on r to its original (prior) distribution P m . But resampling r from P m removes
the dependence between r and the update sequence, which places us in the non-adaptive
case, and allows us to apply the hypothesized unlearning guarantees for nonadaptive update
requesters.

8.5. Distributed Algorithms
In this section, we describe a general family of distributed learning and unlearning algorithms that are in the spirit of the “SISA” framework of [14] (with one crucial modification).
At a high level, the SISA framework operates by first randomly dividing the data into k
“shards”, and separately training a model on each shard. When a new point is deleted, it
is removed from the shards that contained it, and only the models corresponding to those
shards are retrained. The flexibility of this methodology is that the models and training
procedures used in each shard can be arbitrary, as can the aggregation done at the end to
convert the resulting ensemble into predictions: however these choices are instantiated, this
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Algorithm 22 Adistr : Distributed Learning Algorithm
Input: dataset D ” D0 of size n
Draw the shards: Di0 “ SamplerpD0 , pq, for every i P rks.
Train the models: θi0 “ Asingle pDi0 q, for every i P rks.
Save the state: s0 “ ptDi0 uiPrks , tθi0 uiPrks q // to be used for the 1st update.
Output: tθi0 uiPrks
framework gives a p0, 0, 0q-unlearning algorithm against any non-adaptive update requester
(Lemma 8.5.1). Here we show that if the k shards are selected independently of one another, then we can apply our reduction given in the previous section with m “ k and obtain
algorithms that satisfy deletion guarantees against adaptive update requesters.
A distributed learning algorithm Adistr : Z ˚ Ñ Θ˚ is described by a single-shard learning
algorithm Asingle : Z ˚ Ñ Θ and a routine Sampler, used to select the points in a shard.
Sampler, given a dataset D and some probability p P r0, 1s, includes each element of D in
the shard with probability p.
Distributed learning algorithm Adistr creates k independent shards from the dataset D
of size n by running Sampler k times and training a model with Asingle on each shard
i P rks to form an ensemble of k models. To emphasize that the randomness across shards is
independent, we will instantiate k independent samplers Sampleri and training algorithms
Asingle
for each shard i P rks. We formally describe Adistr in Algorithm 22.
i
The state s of the unlearning algorithm RAdistr records the k shards tDi ui and the ensemble
of k models tθi ui . Thus S “ tZ ˚ uk ˆ Θk . As an update request u is received, the update
function removes the data point from every shard that contains it (for deletion) or adds the
new point to each shard with probability p (for addition). In either case, only the models
corresponding to shards that have been updated are retrained using Asingle . We formally
describe RAdistr in Algorithm 23.
First, we show that if the update requester is non-adaptive, RAdistr is a p0, 0, 0q-unlearning
algorithm:
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Algorithm 23 RAdistr : Distributed Unlearning Algorithm: t’th round of unlearning
Input: dataset Dt´1 , update ut “ pz t , ‚t q, state st´1 “ ptDit´1 uiPrks , tθit´1 uiPrks q
if ‚t “ 1 delete1 then
S “ ti P rks : z t P Dit´1 u // the shards z t belongs to.
else
S “ ti P rks : Sampleri ptz t u, pq ‰ tuu // the shards z t will be added to.
end
#
Dit´1 ˝ ut
Dit´1

Update the shards: Dit “

if i P S
, for every i P rks.
otherwise

#

Asingle pDit q if i P S
, for every i P rks.
θit´1
otherwise
Update the state: st “ ptDit uiPrks , tθit uiPrks q // to be used for the next update.
Output: tθit uiPrks
Update the models: θit “

Lemma 8.5.1. RAdistr is a non-adaptive p0, 0, 0q-unlearning algorithm for Adistr .
Now, by combining Lemma 8.5.1 and our general Theorem 8.4.1, we can show the following:

Theorem 8.5.2 (Unlearning Guarantees). If for every round t, the sequence of publishing
1

t
functions tfpublish
ut1 ďt is pϵ, δq-differentially private in the random seeds r „ P k of the

algorithms for 0 ă ϵ ď 1{2 and 0 ă δ ă ϵ, then RAdistr is an pα, β, γq-unlearning algorithm
for Adistr where
´
a ¯
α “ O ϵ2 k ` k δ{ϵ ,

ˆb
˙
a
2k
´ϵ
β“γ“O
e
` k δ{ϵ

Next, we bound the time complexity of our algorithms:
Theorem 8.5.3 (Run-time Guarantees). Let p “ 1{k. Suppose the publishing functions
satisfy the differential privacy requirement of Theorem 8.5.2. Let N t denote the number of
times Rdistr
calls Asingle at round t. We have that N 0 “ k, and for every round t ě 1: 1)
A
if the update requester is non-adaptive, for every ξ, with probability at least 1 ´ ξ, N t ď
a
1 ` 2 log p1{ξq. 2) if the update requester is adaptive, for every ξ, with probability at least
a
1 ´ ξ, N t ď 1 ` 2 log ppn ` tq{ξq. Furthermore, for ξ ą δ 1 , with probability at least 1 ´ ξ,
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we have

N t ď 1 ` min

!a
)
a
2 log p2pn ` tq{pξ ´ δ 1 qq, 2ϵ1 ` 2 log p2{pξ ´ δ 1 qq

´ a ¯
´
a ¯
2
where ϵ1 “ O ϵ2 k ` k δ{ϵ and δ 1 “ e´ϵ k ` O k δ{ϵ
The proof can be found in the appendix, but at a high level it proceeds as follows. For a
deletion request, we must retrain every shard that contains the point to be deleted. For
a non-adaptive deletion request, we retrain one shard in expectation and we can obtain a
high probability upper bound by using a Hoeffding bound. In the adaptive case, this may no
longer be true, but there are two ways to obtain upper bounds that correspond to the two
bounds in our Theorem. We can provide a worst-case upper bound on the number of shards
?
that any of the n data points belongs to, which incurs a cost of order log n. Alternately, we
can apply max-information bounds to reduce to the non-adaptive case, using an argument
that is similar to our reduction for deletion guarantees.
Remark 8.5.1. We note that there is an alternative algorithm that one might consider,
resulting from group differential privacy. If a learning algorithm satisfies kϵ ´differential privacy, a valid unlearning procedure is to do nothing for k updates and then fully retrain on
the pk ` 1qth update. This follows from the ϵ´differential privacy guarantee the algorithm
will have for groups of size k. Our algorithm substantially outperforms this alternative algorithm as well, namely because our privacy parameter degrades much slower than in this
group privacy baseline. Our analysis leverages adaptive composition of privacy across the
publishing functions which means that privacy degrades with the square root of the number
of updates, while it degrades linearly with group privacy. Consequently the group privacy
baseline would require a full retraining every k updates, but our algorithm requires a full
retraining only every k 2 updates.
8.5.1. Private Aggregation
We briefly describe how we serve prediction requests by privately aggregating the output
of the ensemble of models such that the published predictions are differentially private in
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the random seeds r. At each round t, while Rdistr
is waiting for the next update request
A
ut`1 , we receive prediction requests x and serve predictions ŷ. For each prediction request,
we privately aggregate the predictions made by the ensemble of models tθit ui ; [30] show
several ways to privately aggregate predictions (one simple technique is to use the exponential mechanism to approximate the majority vote). Suppose we aggregate the predictions
made by the ensemble of models using PrivatePredictkϵ1 : Θk ˆ X Ñ Y, which takes
in an ensemble of k models and a data point, aggregates predictions from the ensemble
models, and outputs a label that is ϵ1 -differentially private in the models. If we receive lt
many prediction requests pxt1 , . . . , xtlt q before our next update request ut`1 , we can write
t
pŷ1t , . . . , ŷltt q “ fpublish
ptθit ui q where ŷjt “ PrivatePredictkϵ1 ptθit ui , xtj q.

Theorem 8.5.2, tells us that desired unlearning parameters pα, β, γq can be obtained by guaranteeing that the sequence of predictions is pϵ, δq differentially private in the models (and
hence r), for target parameters ϵ, δ. As we serve prediction requests using PrivatePredictkϵ1
our privacy loss will accumulate and eventually exhaust our budget of pϵ, δq-differential privacy. Hence we must track our accumulated privacy loss in the state of our unlearning
algorithm, and when it is exhausted, fully retrain using Adistr . This resamples r and hence
resets our privacy budget. Standard composition theorems (see [31]) show that we exhaust
our privacy budget (and need to fully retrain) every time the number of prediction requests
]
Y
2
made since the last full retraining exceeds 8pϵ1 q2ϵ lnp 1 q . We call this
δ

PrivatePredictionInteractionpϵ1 , ϵ, δ, kq

and state its unlearning guarantee in Theorem 8.5.4.
Theorem 8.5.4. The models ttθit ui ut in PrivatePredictionInteractionpϵ1 , ϵ, δ, kq satisfy
pα, β, γq-unlearning guarantee for Adistr , if 0 ă ϵ ď 1{2 and 0 ă δ ă ϵ, where
´

a ¯
α “ O ϵ k ` k δ{ϵ
2

ˆb
˙
a
2k
´ϵ
β, γ “ O
e
` k δ{ϵ
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8.6. Evaluation of Unlearning Guarantees
In this section we consider the white-box setting in which the models in each shard are
made public. SISA continues to have perfect deletion guarantees against non-adaptive deletion sequences in this setting. Experimental results on CIFAR-10 [100], MNIST [103], and
Fashion-MNIST [143] show both the failure of SISA to satisfy adaptive deletion guarantees,
and give evidence that differential privacy can mitigate this problem well beyond the setting
of our theorems while achieving accuracy only modestly worse than SISA. The code for our
experiments can be found at https://github.com/ChrisWaites/adaptive-machine-un
learning.
We train SISA with an ensemble of convolutional neural networks on several datasets of
points with categorical labels. Given a new point at query time, each model in the ensemble
votes on the most likely label and aggregates their votes. The models are exposed publicly.
This scheme has perfect non-adaptive deletion guarantees.
To construct an adaptive deletion sequence to falsify the hypothesis that the scheme has
adaptive deletion guarantees, we exploit the observation that neural networks are often
overconfident in the correct label for points on which they have been trained. For each
training point, we guess that it falls into the shard corresponding to the model that has the
highest confidence for the correct label. We then delete points for which we guess that they
fall into the first k{2 of the shards, and do not delete any others. After deleting the targeted
points, we compute a test statistic: the indicator of whether the average accuracy of the
models from the targeted shards is lower than the average accuracy of the models from the
non-targeted shards. Under full retraining, by the symmetry of the random partition, the
expectation of this test statistic is 0.5. Thus under the null hypothesis that the deletion
algorithm satisfies perfect deletion guarantees, the test statistic also has expectation 0.5.
Therefore, to the extent that the expectation of the indicator differs from 0.5, we falsify
the null hypothesis that SISA has adaptive data deletion guarantees, and larger deviations
from 0.5 falsify weaker deletion guarantees.
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We run this experiment on three datasets (CIFAR-10, MNIST, and Fashion-MNIST). We
then repeat the experiment by adding various amounts of noise to the gradients in the model
training process to guarantee finite levels of differential privacy (though much weaker privacy
guarantees than would be needed to invoke our theorems). We observe that on each dataset,
modest amounts of noise are sufficient to break our attack (i.e. 95% confidence intervals for
the expectation of our indicator include 0.5, and hence fail to falsify the null hypothesis)
while still approaching the accuracy of our models trained without differential privacy. This
gives evidence that differential privacy can improve deletion guarantees in the presence of
adaptivity even in regimes beyond which our theory gives nontrivial guarantees.

8.7. Conclusion and Discussion
We identify an important blindspot in the data deletion literature (the tenuous implicit
assumption that deletion requests are independent of previously released models), and provide a very general methodology to reduce adaptive deletion guarantees to oblivious deletion
guarantees. Through this reduction we get the first model and training algorithm agnostic
methodology that allows for deletion of arbitrary sequences of adaptively chosen points
while giving rigorous guarantees. The constants that our theorems inherit from the max
information bounds of [124] are such that in most realistic settings they will not give useful
parameters. But we hope that these constants will be improved in future work, and we give
empirical evidence that differential privacy mitigates adaptive deletion “attacks” at very
practical levels, beyond the promises of our theoretical results. We note that like for differential privacy, the pα, β, γq-deletion guarantees we give in this paper are parameterized,
and are not meaningful absent a specification of those parameters. There is a risk with such
technologies that they will be used with large values of the parameters that give only very
weak guarantees, but will be described publicly in a way that glosses over this issue. We
therefore recommend that if adopted in deployed products, deletion guarantees always be
discussed in public in a way that is precise about what they promise, including the relevant
parameter settings.
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[1] Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag A Pathak, and Alvin E Roth. The new york city high
school match. American Economic Review, 95(2):364–367, 2005. 9
[2] ACM. ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. 2019. URL
https://fatconference.org/index.html. 62
[3] Alekh Agarwal, Alina Beygelzimer, Miroslav Dudik, John Langford, and Hanna Wallach. A reductions approach to fair classification. In Jennifer Dy and Andreas Krause,
editors, Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Machine Learning, volume 80 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, pages 60–69, Stockholmsmässan,
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